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In the last few decades, worsening environmental problems have attracted attention
to sustainable development practices. In this respect, product recovery, which aims to
regain the value in end-of-life products and, thus can be regarded as an implementation
towards sustainable development at the firm level, has gained importance. This disser-
tation addresses two interrelated decisions in the context of product recovery systems:
at the strategic level, we analyze the impact of environmental policy as a coercive force
on product recovery undertakings of firms; and at the tactical level, we explore the
disposition decisions of a firm who is already engaged in product recovery. First, we
focus on one of the main motivators of recovery practices; environmental legislation,
and investigate its effectiveness in encouraging manufacturers for product recovery and
redesign. We find that initial investment requirements may have a serious impact on the
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legislation’s effectiveness. We, then, focus on two common forms of take-back legislation
(tax and rate models) and compare them from the perspective of different stakehold-
ers. We observe that in terms of the profitability of the two forms, there are some
misalignments between the incentives of different stakeholders (the social planner, the
manufacturers and the environment). Furthermore, we consider the decisions of a firm
engaged in recovery operations and investigate the associated disposition decisions. We
address this problem employing a common revenue management technique of bid price
controls. As a result of our numerical experiments, we find that a dynamic approach
based on bid price controls significantly outperforms a static one.
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U¨RU¨N GERI˙ KAZANIM SI˙STEMLERI˙:
YASAL DU¨ZENLEMELER VE GERI˙ KAZANIM ALTERNATI˙FLERI˙NI˙N SEC¸I˙MI˙
O¨znur O¨zdemir
Doktora Tezi, 2009
Tez Danıs¸manı: Prof. Dr. Meltem Denizel
Anahtar Kelimeler: u¨ru¨n geri kazanımı, c¸evre ile ilgili yasal du¨zenlemeler, genis¸letilmis¸
u¨retici sorumlulug˘u ilkesi, geri kazanım alternatiflerinin sec¸imi, teklif fiyatı kontrolleri
Son yıllarda, giderek artan c¸evre sorunları su¨rdu¨ru¨lebilir kalkınma uygulamalarına olan
ilginin artmasına neden oldu. Bu bag˘lamda, o¨mru¨ tu¨kenmis¸ u¨ru¨nlerdeki deg˘eri geri
kazanmayı amac¸layan ve su¨rdu¨ru¨lebilir kalkınmaya yo¨nelik firma du¨zeyinde bir uygu-
lama olarak go¨ru¨lebilecek u¨ru¨n geri kazanımı o¨nem kazandı. Bu tez c¸alıs¸ması, u¨ru¨n
geri kazanım sistemleri c¸erc¸evesinde birbiriyle ilis¸kili iki kararı ele almaktadır: stratejik
du¨zeyde firmaların u¨ru¨n geri kazanım u¨stlenimleri ic¸in zorlayıcı bir gu¨c¸ olan c¸evre poli-
tikalarının etkisi, taktik du¨zeyde ise halihazırda u¨ru¨n geri kazanımı yapan bir firmanın,
geri alınan kullanılmıs¸ u¨ru¨nleri (o¨zleri) geri kazanım sec¸enekleri arasında dag˘ıtım karar-
ları incelenmis¸tir. I˙lk olarak, geri kazanım uygulamalarının temel gu¨du¨leyicilerinden
biri olan c¸evre ile ilgili yasal du¨zenlemelere odaklanılarak, bunların u¨reticileri u¨ru¨n geri
kazanım ve yeniden tasarımına yo¨nlendirmek konusundaki etkinlikleri aras¸tırılmıs¸tır.
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Ardından u¨ru¨nlerin tu¨keticilerden toplanması ic¸in yaygın olarak kullanılan iki yasal
du¨zenleme modeli ele alınmıs¸ ve bu iki model, sistemdeki farklı taraflar ac¸ısından
kars¸ılas¸tırılmıs¸tır. Analizimiz sonucunda, modellerin kaˆrlılıg˘ı bakımından farklı taraflar
(sosyal du¨zenleyici, u¨reticiler ve c¸evre) arasında bazı uyus¸mazlıklar oldug˘u go¨zlemlenmis¸-
tir. Ayrıca, halihazırda u¨ru¨nlerini geri kazanan bir firmada, toplanan o¨zler ic¸in en uygun
geri kazanım sec¸eneklerinin belirlenmesi problemi ele alınmıs¸, bu problem gelir yo¨netimi
alanındaki teklif fiyatı kontrolleri yo¨ntemiyle irdelenmis¸tir. Sayısal deneylerimiz, teklif
fiyatı kontrolleri yo¨ntemine dayanan dinamik bir yaklas¸ımın, statik bir yaklas¸ımdan
anlamlı seviyede u¨stu¨n oldug˘unu go¨stermis¸tir.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, ever worsening environmental problems (e.g., rapid depletion
of scarce natural resources and shortage of areas suitable for landfills, alarmingly in-
creasing waste material accumulation and consequential environmental pollution) and
their serious consequences for the future of humankind have increased the environmen-
tal consciousness of all social segments and attracted considerable attention to sustain-
able development initiatives. Government enforcements for proper waste management
and recovery of the utmost value from end-of-life products have toughened and non-
governmental organizations’ (NGOs) emphasis on environmental friendly technologies
and practices have accelerated. In the industry, this growing concern on environment
materialized in the increasing emphasis put on sustainable manufacturing practices. In
this sense, regaining and re-integrating end-of-life products to the industry into the
different stages of the production process have become more important in the recent
years. As De Brito and Dekker (2004) indicate while only the flow of products from
raw material to end consumer was important twenty years ago, today firms, especially
the manufacturing industry, are also really concerned with the flow of products from
end customer back to producers or recovery centers. As a consequence of all these
developments, product recovery systems emerged as a new field of research in addition
to the traditional manufacturing systems.
1.1 What is a Product Recovery System?
In the last few years, manufacturing firms, especially the Original Equipment Manufac-
turers (OEMs), have begun to pay close attention to the production and distribution
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systems that will enable them to collect and recover used products besides manufactur-
ing new ones. The primary drivers of this increasing emphasis on recovery systems can
be sought both in the recent regulations of governments about the disposal of waste
materials/used products and the increasing importance of establishing a green image in
the eyes of customers as well as the possible economic gains that can be obtained from
such systems. In fact, recovery systems can be considered in relation to the broad area
of sustainable development. Brundland (1998) defined the sustainable development in
an EU report as ‘...to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs’.
Hence, De Brito and Dekker (2004) argue that recovery systems can be regarded as
the implementation of sustainable development at the firm level since product recovery
prescribes retaining the utmost value embedded in products and, hence, avoiding any
sort of waste of scarce resources.
Gu¨ngo¨r and Gupta (1999) define product recovery as the act of minimizing the
waste sent to landfills by recovering materials and parts from old or outdated products
by recycling, remanufacturing and reuse.
Jayaraman et al. (1999) consider a product recovery system as a recoverable
product environment, including strategies to increase product life through repair, re-
manufacturing, and recycling of products.
In fact, product recovery systems can be considered as part of a broader system,
closed-loop supply chain, which combines the traditional and the reverse supply chains
and, thus encompasses both manufacturing and recovery processes. Guide and Van
Wassenhove (2009), in a very recent study where they provide an overview of the evolu-
tion closed-loop supply chains (integration of product recovery systems with traditional
supply chain activities) research, define closed-loop supply chain management as ‘the
design, control, and operation of a system to maximize value creation over the entire
life cycle of a product’. Although the authors adopt a strong business perspective, they
still recognize the role of product recovery in the development of industrial systems
that are both economically and environmentally sustainable.
In the broadest sense, a product recovery system is composed of collection of used
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products from the end-consumers, inspection/sorting/selection of them, implementa-
tion of the most appropriate recovery strategy (e.g., repair, refurbish, remanufacturing,
and recycling), and disposal of non-recoverable waste materials/parts. After the inspec-
tion/sorting/selection stage in which the collected used products (cores) are checked
for their conditions and classified according to their quality levels, they are allocated
among the various recovery options.
1.2 Factors Motivating Firms for Product Recovery
There exist several factors leading OEMs or independent recovery firms to collect and
recover end-of-life products, which was once considered costly and economically in-
feasible. We can list the primary reasons for the increasing interest towards product
recovery systems in the last few decades as follows;
(i) Rapidly depleting scarce resources and landfills and the consequent problem of
environmental pollution: One of the most important goals of product recovery
systems is minimizing the amount of waste sent to landfills or disposal. Pollution
arising from land filling is so serious that EU has enacted a separate directive
(Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste) including
strict requirements on the characteristics of waste that can be land filled and how
the procedure should be managed to reduce environmental impact. In this respect,
Ferguson and Toktay (2006) report that in the US, the amount of Municipal Solid
Waste raised to three folds of the 1960 value by 2001 and 56% of this amount is
land filled. They also indicate that according to Environmental Protection Agency
records, in 1999, fourteen states had no landfill capacity left and eight states had
less than ten years of landfill capacity left. Similarly, according to European
Environment Agency statistics, each year 1.3 billion tonnes of waste (3.5 tonnes
per capita) is generated only in the European Union. Moreover, OECD estimates
that the waste amount generated in Europe by 2020 will increase to 45% of the
amount in 1995. For Turkey, although we do not have such exact figures, it is an
undeniable fact that industrial waste accumulation and consequent environmental
3
pollution are our ever-worsening problems mostly due to unregulated and not
sufficiently controlled industrial practices. Hence, adoption and dissemination
of proper waste management and product recovery activities carry even more
importance for our country.
These worrying facts have led to an increase in legislative enforcement and social
consciousness on environmental problems, which have ultimately motivated firms
for more product recovery as discussed below.
• Increasing environmental consciousness of society in general and consumers
in particular: Today, partly because of the worsening environmental prob-
lems like pollution, rapid depletion of natural resources, consumers begin to
pay more attention to firms’ concern for environmental protection. Behav-
ing in an environmentally responsible manner improves the green image of
firms and even increases the demand for firms’ products. For instance, Toffel
(2004:122), in reporting King and Mackkinnon’s survey, states that increasing
the amount of recyclable contents in products and adopting environmentally
sustainable business practices were perceived to have the greatest positive
impact on consumer’s willingness to use a firm’s products and services. The
author further indicates that OEMs like Kodak, FujiFilm, HP, IBM Europe
and Xerox have quickly become aware of the considerable effect of develop-
ing green brand image on firm performance and invested in product recovery
activities accordingly. Similarly, Gu¨ngo¨r and Gupta (1999) point out that
in the last decades, consumers have become more sensitive to their environ-
ment and its crucial problems, which may lead to irreversible consequences
if neglected. Hence, they have begun to show more interest towards environ-
mentally friendly products that will be taken back by their manufacturers at
the end of their useful lives for recovery. The authors state that this market
trend is an important stimulus for the OEMs to design and market envi-
ronmentally friendly products (or so called ‘green products’) so as to gain
competitive advantage against their competitors.
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• Increasing number of environmental regulations and legislation: In the last
few decades, especially with the worsening land filling and waste disposal
problems, governments’ concern for proper management of end-of-life prod-
ucts has increased. Especially in the European countries, ‘extended pro-
ducer responsibility (EPR)’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles have been widely
acknowledged. As a result, a number of laws and regulations enforcing firms
to undertake the responsibility of the whole life-cycle of their products have
been enacted in several countries. This entire legislation bases on the princi-
ple that the responsibility of manufacturers for their products does not end
with sale but extends beyond the consumer use after which products should
be either recovered or properly disposed under the OEMs’ control. One
of the widely known legislation about extended OEM responsibility is the
Waste Electronic and Electrical Equipment (WEEE) Directive of European
Commission (The European Parliament and the Council of the European
Union, 2003) that holds producers responsible for taking back and properly
recovering their electrical and electronic equipment.
Directive on End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) is another common example, which
aims to “make vehicle dismantling and recycling more environmental friendly,
set clear and quantified targets for reuse, recycling and recovery of vehicles
and their components and push producers to manufacture new vehicles also
with a view to their recyclability.” (European Commission, 2007).
If we consider the specific case of our country, although all the legislation
adopted from EU has not become fully active yet, for some prominent di-
rectives such as Regulation for Control of the Tyres Which have Completed
Their Life-Cycles (O¨mru¨nu¨ Tamamlamıs Lastiklerin Kontrolu¨ Yo¨netmeligi)
and Recovery and Disposal of Spent Accumulators and Batteries (Atık Pil
Ve Aku¨mu¨lato¨rlerin Kontrolu¨ Yo¨netmeligi) binding timetables which impose
specific recovery targets are already set. Hence, in a near future, establish-
ing and conducting efficient recovery systems will become as important for
Turkish manufacturers as their European counterparts. Furthermore, Turk-
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ish manufacturers, who are already selling their products in EU markets,
have to abide by the current regulations that are in force in the EU member
states.
(ii) Possible economic gains in collecting, reusing or recovering used products and
materials: Expected economic gains and other benefits are the main factors that
lead to voluntary and proactive involvement of manufacturers in product recovery.
In contrast to what was believed in the past, today it is widely accepted that
product recovery systems can contribute to firm performance a lot in economic
terms (Mabee et al., 1999, Ayres et al., 1997, S¸erifog˘lu et al., 2006). Some of these
contributions can be listed as follows;
• Raw materials, components or parts retained from returned products can
be used as inputs in new production and as spare parts in after sales and
repair services. These can also provide a valuable base for the parts and
components supply of no longer produced models.
• Energy consumption, waste disposal costs and landfill needs can be consid-
erably reduced.
• Capabilities gained through product recovery can be utilized in new product
development/design.
To quantify these effects; S¸erifog˘lu et al. (2006) note that worldwide energy
savings obtained by remanufacturing activities is about 120 trillion Btu/year
which is equivalent to the total amount that can be produced by 8 nuclear power
plants. Similarly, worldwide components/parts savings are designated as 14 mil-
lion tones/year. Mabee et al. (1999), on the other hand, express that cost reduc-
tions by remanufacturing have been estimated as 30-60% of new production.
Ayres et al. (1997) coin the word ‘double dividends’ in order to attract attention
to both increased profits and cost reductions for the firm, and the environmental
improvement for the society. The authors argue that the purchased parts and
materials and the waste disposal constitute a large proportion of a manufacturer’s
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cost and these cost items can simultaneously be avoided through strategic recovery
and remanufacturing systems. Xerox Corporation, Kodak, FujiFilm, Electrolux,
HP, IBM, Ford Motor Company and Mercedes-Benz are just some of the examples
which successfully carry out recovery operations and obtain economic gains from
this business. Ferguson and Toktay (2006) and S¸erifog˘lu et al. (2006) report
that there exist 73,000 firms engaged in product recovery in US by 1997 and
an estimated $53 billion revenue has been obtained by sale of remanufactured
products.
Another significant contribution of recovery activities is the improved product
development and design capabilities that may be attained with the help of the
experience gained in recovery operations. Knowledge about and familiarity with
the most frequent part/product failures may provide manufacturers with insights
and new ideas about future product designs and product characteristics besides
decreasing the repair and after-sale service costs.
(iii) Corporations’ own social responsibility principles and targets: Today, manufac-
turing firms’ concerns are no longer limited with producing in the most efficient
way and selling their goods with the highest possible profit. Partly because of the
increasing consumer consciousness for the global environmental problems (e.g.,
pollution, depletion of natural resources, climatic changes) and partly because
of the crucial effect of brand image on market demand, firms have begun to set
social responsibility targets for themselves and prepare reports to present their
activities in these respects. Since product recovery is one of the most effective
ways of working for the social well-being and contributing to environmental pro-
tection, commitment to self set social responsibility principles is another driving
factor for the adoption of product recovery systems as is the case in IBM Eu-
rope, Xerox and HP (Toffel, 2004). In this sense, Dhanda and Hill (2005) cite
‘the sincere commitment to environmental issues, successfully developed and im-
plemented ethical standards, and the existence of managers who are responsible
for their operationalisation’ as the primary internal drivers of product recovery
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systems.
1.3 Research Scope
Under the field of product recovery, one can list several problems that should be in-
vestigated. In fact, all the relevant problems and issues that have been examined for
traditional manufacturing systems for years can be reconsidered for recovery systems.
In this respect, Fleischmann et al. (1997), Gu¨ngo¨r and Gupta (1999) and Thierry
et al. (1995) give the earliest review studies that summarize the main problems of the
field and show new research venues. More recently, Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009)
discuss the evolution of research in the broader field of closed-loop supply chains over
the last fifteen years. Adopting a business perspective, they consider only the stud-
ies on value-added recovery activities (those firms are engaged in for profit purposes)
and examine them under five phases. The authors argue that while the papers in the
first phases have a technical engineering perspective and focus more on the individ-
ual problems (such as reverse logistics networks, production planning and inventory
control systems, value of information and remanufacturing shop/line design), the stud-
ies in the later phases develop a holistic business model view. Similarly, Atasu et al.
(2008) provide a review of analytic research that focus on practical problems in product
recovery. They classify this research stream in four categories as: industrial engineer-
ing/operations (e.g., forecasting, inventory control and reverse logistics network design
problems), design (e.g., product acquisition management, time value of product returns
and product durability problems), strategy (e.g., which actor should be responsible for
used product take-back and remanufacturing as a competitive weapon) and behavioral
issues (e.g., customer perceptions of remanufactured goods). Finally, Sasikumar and
Kannan (2008a, 2008b and 2009) provide one of the most comprehensive and the recent
review of literature through a series of three papers. In the first paper, they focus on the
studies on environmental regulations and inventory management while in the second
one they consider the research on reverse logistics (distribution). Finally in the third
paper, they adopt a broader perspective and provide both content and methodology-
based classifications of all the studies in the field of reverse supply chains. Especially
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Sasikumar and Kannan (2008a) emphasize the importance of environmental legislation
in encouraging product recovery practices.
In this dissertation study, we focus on environmental legislation and the disposi-
tion decisions in product recovery systems. Environmental legislation is one of the most
crucial coercive force leading manufacturers for product recovery. Especially in Euro-
pean Union, the emergence and the fast spread of product recovery practices coincide
with the enactment of environmental directives such as WEEE and ELV. Hence, im-
plications of environmental policies on product recovery decisions is a significant topic
to be investigated in this context. Still there exist variations between the environmen-
tal regulations currently in force in different countries. The analysis of the possible
differences between the different legislative forms can provide valuable insights both
for those countries who are yet shape their own environmental policies and for future
amendments and improvements in current legislation. Based on these observations, in
chapters 2 and 3, we adopt a more strategic perspective and examine the implications of
environmental legislation as well as the differences between the current environmental
regulations originated from extended producer responsibility (EPR) principle. Once
the firms start product recovery, more tactical issues such as collection of the used
products, inspection of them and selection of the most appropriate or profitable recov-
ery option come into the picture. One of the most important decisions at this stage
is how to assign the available used products (or cores) between alternative recovery
options, namely disposition process. Especially in those settings where there is high
demand for the outputs of recovery activities (e.g., parts and refurbished products) and
the available cores are not sufficient to meet all demand, disposition decisions of a firm
play an important role to maximize her recovery earnings. In practice and in literature,
disposition decisions are generally based on the quality of the available cores or the
priorities of the firm (some firms a priori set the recovery alternative they will use) (see
Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2003). Nevertheless, there may be problems with both of
these two approaches. Hence, in chapter 4 we consider the disposition decisions of a
remanufacturer.
Particularly, in chapter 2, we investigate the impact of EPR based legislation and
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the initial investments required to start recovery operations on the optimal product
recovery decisions of manufacturers. Motivated by the fact that product redesign can
increase savings from product recovery and one of the main objectives of EPR legisla-
tion is to promote redesign for recovery, we seek to understand; (1) how the redesign
opportunities affect the willingness of manufacturers for product recovery and (2) under
what circumstances EPR legislation can encourage manufacturers towards a product
design that will facilitate recovery operations.
On the other hand, in chapter 3, we focus on the two common forms of EPR based
product take-back legislation and compare the structural efficiency of tax and rate mod-
els from the perspectives of different stakeholders (i.e. manufacturers, social planner
and environment). We consider both monopolistic and competitive environments and
try to identify the circumstances under which the environment, the manufacturers or
the consumers benefit more from one of the two models.
In chapter 4, we consider the disposition decisions (assigning an available core to
a specific product recovery option) of a remanufacturer. We consider a setting where a
remanufacturer has two options to recover value from an available core; refurbish and
sell at a discount of a new unit’s price or dismantle it and sell (or internally use) the
harvested parts and where there is demand uncertainty for both options. We handle
the problem from a revenue management perspective employing bid price controls.
Finally, in chapter 5 we provide the important conclusions arising from our anal-
ysis and discuss some further research venues.
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Chapter 2
RECOVERY DECISIONS OF A MANUFACTURER IN A
LEGISLATIVE DISPOSAL FEE ENVIRONMENT
As a result of the rapid depletion of scarce resources and landfills, and alarmingly in-
creasing waste material accumulation; some national governments (e.g., Japan, Canada,
Taiwan) and the European Union toughened their legislative enforcement and encour-
agement for product recovery practices in the last decades. Among the various kinds of
policy instruments employed, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) Principle based
policies like product take-back mandates, recycling rate targets and advance recycling
fees (Walls, 2006) are the most common ones. These policies mainly aim to increase
the amount and the degree of recovery and minimize the environmental impact of waste
materials. They are intended to motivate firms to take into account the environmen-
tal impact of their products while planning their forward production. Another main
objective of EPR legislation is to promote product design/redesign that will facilitate
disassembly and recovery operations. In the European Commission Directive on WEEE
and in the EPR Guidance Manual for Governments of the OECD (2001), it is clearly
stated that proper legislation should encourage design and production, which take into
account and facilitate dismantling and recovery, in particular the re-use and recycling
of used products, their components and materials. However, environmental regulations
are not always successful in attaining these objectives.
Most of the time the initial investments manufacturers should make to start recov-
ery operations are not taken into account in these regulations. Nevertheless, this is an
important concern for several manufacturers who will just start the recovery business,
and may even deter manufacturers to start recovery operations. Manufacturers, who
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are generally reluctant to initiate product recovery voluntarily, do not want to allocate
serious amount of funds for these initial costs as well.
Given all these observations, in this research we mainly seek to answer the follow-
ing research questions;
• What is the impact of EPR based legislation on the optimal product recovery
decisions of manufacturers?
• How do the redesign opportunities affect the willingness of manufacturers for
product recovery and under what circumstances can EPR based legislation serve
to encourage manufacturers towards a product design that will facilitate recovery?
• How do initial investments needed to start recovery operations affect the optimal
recovery decisions?
To answer these questions we consider a legislative form in which the government
imposes a disposal fee on each product sold. We assume that manufacturers are obliged
to pay this fee unless they properly treat a used product for each new product they
introduce to the market. This approach is inline with the EC directive on WEEE which
confers the financial responsibility of recovery or disposal to producers and requires
them to submit a guarantee for this purpose when placing a product on the market.
This legislative form is also in the same vein with the advance recycling/recovery fees
or the taxes suggested in the literature (Walls, 2006) and used by some governments
(e.g., U.S., Canada).
2.1 Literature Review
The problem investigated in this chapter is related to two streams of research. The
first one adopts an economic perspective and seeks to find the socially optimum amount
of disposal and recycling generally through general/partial equilibrium models in a game
theoretic setting. These studies compare the efficiency of various policy instruments
like Pigovian taxes, disposal fees, deposit/refund systems and recycling subsidies. Some
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of them which are more relevant to our study, focus on product recyclability and inves-
tigate whether existing policies are efficient to attain this objective (Fullerton and Wu,
1998, Walls and Palmer, 2000 and Walls, 2000 and 2002). In this stream of research,
disposal fee is considered as a downstream policy instrument in which consumers are
charged for disposal of used products. Fullerton and Wu (1998), and Walls and Palmer
(2000) examine the effectiveness of upstream and downstream policies1 (e.g., Pigovian
taxes, disposal fees, subsidies on recyclable design, deposit/refund systems) in achiev-
ing the socially optimum level of product recyclability. The objective is to maximize
the consumer utility in Fullerton and Wu (1998) and the net social surplus (sum of
the total consumer and the total producer surplus) in Walls and Palmer (2000). Simi-
larly, Calcott and Walls (2000) and (2002) investigate whether downstream policies like
deposit/refund system and Pigovian type disposal fees can encourage manufacturers
for Design for Environment (DfE). They conclude that downstream policies are not
successful in encouraging product recyclability. Palmer and Walls (1997) compare the
efficiency of recycled content standards and deposit refund systems by maximizing net
social surplus. Although the study includes the recycling decisions of the consumers
(whether to recycle the used product instead of disposing) and the input combination
decisions of the manufacturers (recycled materials vs. virgin materials), their model
does not take into account product recyclability and DfE applications. Palmer et al.
(1996) also do not include product recyclability decisions in their empirical compari-
son of deposit/refund systems, recycling subsidies and advance disposal fees. Through
case studies, Palmer and Walls (1999) and Walls (2006) discuss advantages and dis-
advantages of different EPR policies. Palmer and Walls (1999) examine three policies:
upstream combined product tax and recycling subsidy (UCTS), manufacturer take-back
requirements and unit-based pricing. They conclude that UCTS is more cost effective
especially in terms of transaction costs. Walls (2006) gives an extensive overview of
various policies based on EPR principle and note that only limited form of DfE has
been encouraged by EPR based policies.
1Upstream policy instruments such as taxes, subsidies or take-back rate targets, focus on produc-
ers while the downstream policy instruments such as disposal fee charged on households per unit
consumption, focus on consumers.
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The common features of all these studies are: (a) exogenous price and perfectly
competitive manufacturers, (b) general/partial equilibrium models which include mul-
tiple decision makers, (c) focus on net social surplus or net consumer utility, (d) con-
sumers take the responsibility for treatment of returned products.
The second stream investigates the effects and the efficiency of EPR policies from
operations management perspective.
In terms of the research questions, the closest study to our research is Subra-
manian et al. (2008a). This study proposes a multi-period and multi-product math-
ematical programming model which integrates the operational decisions with the en-
vironmental considerations of the manufacturers. By a comprehensive model which
takes into various operational and environmental compliance decisions like manufactur-
ing/remanufacturing amounts, inventory levels, abatement levels, design choices, they
examine the trade-offs between these decisions. In contrast to the micro level and
operational approach of this paper, we consider the design for recoverability decisions
from a more macro perspective to see the individual impact of such kind of decisions.
Subramanian et al. (2008b) approach the design issue from a supply chain perspective
and investigate the influence of both EPR legislation and supply-chain coordination
on product design decisions. They discuss various contracts which can help to achieve
coordination between the customer and the manufacturer and lead to more favorable
product design. In a slightly different setting, Plambeck and Wang (2008) examine
the impact of e-waste (electronic waste such as scrapped mobile phones, video-game
consoles, televisions and computers) regulations on new product introduction frequency
and the quality and durability of new products. Walther and Spengler (2005) investi-
gate the impact of new legal requirements on e-waste (WEEE) on material flows and
costs in a reverse logistics network. They suggest a linear, activity-based materials flow
model and solve the model under different scenarios based on possible WEEE require-
ments to assess the impact of future regulations on the treatment of e-waste and to
provide policy recommendations.
Atasu et al. (2009) focus on the efficiency of existing WEEE legislation. They
conclude that the social planner should take into account the recycling costs and the
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environmental impact of different product groups to design effective legislation. By
examining another policy instrument, we have similar conclusions about the importance
of information about recovery costs for effective policies.
Jacobs and Subramanian (2009) approach the issue from a supply-chain perspec-
tive and examine the implications of EPR legislations on economic and environmental
performance of supply chains.
In contrast to the quantitative models discussed above, Gottberg et al. (2006)
provide an exploratory study to investigate the effectiveness of EPR policies on promot-
ing eco-design (design which provides durability, energy efficiency, avoidance of toxic
materials and ease of disassembly). The authors conclude that current EPR policies
(i.e. charges for producer responsibility) cannot sufficiently stimulate eco-design.
Finally, in this stream, there is a group of studies which focus only on the opera-
tional issues in product design. They do not take into account legislative issues. In this
sense, Debo et al. (2005) investigate the most profitable product technology for a tire
manufacturing firm. Ferrer (2001) suggests the design measures of disassemablability,
recyclability and reusability and develops a heuristic to determine the recovery routine
of a generic widget. Mangun and Thurston (2002) provide a decision tool for manu-
facturers to assess whether a used product should be taken back and which parts of it
should be reused, recycled or disposed under the scenarios of no market segmentation
and market segmentation.
Our work differs from both of the two streams in the following respects: (a)
our main contribution is taking into account the initial investments needed to start
recovery and redesign operations and investigating their impact on the effectiveness
of legislation; (b) we take into account product recoverability opportunities and their
impact on the manufacturer’s recovery decisions; (c) in our models, manufacturer bears
the full responsibility for the proper treatment of their used products as required in
EPR based legislations and (d) we examine the implications of EPR policies from the
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perspective of a manufacturer.
2.2 Models
We consider a setting where manufacturers are held responsible for each product they
introduce to the market. They are required either to pay a disposal fee, df , or to recover
a core per their unit sales. By recovering a core, we imply disassembling a used product
and making use of its components/parts/materials as inputs in the production or as
spare parts in maintenance and repair. Our models include a single decision maker, a
manufacturer, who decides on the sales quantity and the recovery amount as a percent-
age of his total sales to maximize his profits. To avoid the fee, the manufacturer may
also properly dispose the cores. However, since direct disposal is practically equivalent
to incurring the legal fee, we assume that once the manufacturer decides to avoid the
disposal fee for a core, he will prefer to disassemble it and make use of some parts or
components to obtain some savings. For each core recovered, there is a unit disassembly
cost, cd, and a unit saving, s. We assume that the yield rate is hundred percent and
the manufacturer can gain s from each core he disassembles. We model unit saving as a
fixed proportion, χ, of the unit production cost, c. This approach is different from the
current literature where savings from remanufacturing is taken into consideration by
means of cost disparities between newly manufactured and remanufactured products
(Savas¸kan, et al., 2004; Savas¸kan and Van Wassenhove, 2006; Majumder and Groen-
evelt, 2001). Modeling the recovery saving as a separate parameter instead of taking it
into consideration via the reduced remanufacturing costs, makes our models applicable
to other recovery types as well as the remanufacturing.
We consider a monopoly and assume that consumer utility (υ) from purchasing
a product is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and the market size is normalized
to 1. Hence, a consumer with utility Ωj purchases the product if Ωj is greater than or
equal to the unit price of the product, p. Given this, we obtain a linear inverse demand
function, p = 1 − q where q stands for the total sales quantity of the manufacturer.
To ensure that the legislation does not drive the manufacturer out of the business, we
assume that the sum of the unit production cost and the unit disposal fee is smaller
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than 1 (c+ df < 1).
Given this general setting, we examine the optimal decisions of the manufacturer
under three models. In our first model (the base model), the manufacturer decides only
on the recovery rate (qr), we do not consider the design for recoverability opportunities
in this model. We assume a fixed disassembly cost and do not take into account the
possible cost reductions that can be obtained by improving the design of products. In
the literature, it is widely acknowledged that product design is an important determi-
nant of recovery costs and may provide substantial cost reductions in disassembly (see
for instance Gu¨ngo¨r and Gupta, 1999, Calcott and Walls, 2000, Subramanian et al.,
2008(b)). However, product design is not explicitly included in the current models in-
vestigating the economic implications of product recovery, except for some recent papers
(e.g., Subramanian et al., 2008 (b), Debo et al., 2005, Calcott and Walls, 2002). Also,
design for recovery is an important objective of the current EPR legislations. In view
of these, in our second model we assume that the manufacturer has the opportunity of
increasing the recoverability of his products by product design changes. We define the
appropriateness of product design for disassembly and recovery operations as product
recoverability level (a), and let the manufacturer to decide on a so as to maximize his
profits. Improving product recoverability provides a reduction in the unit disassembly
cost but also leads to an increase in the unit production cost. We define the marginal
cost increase as recoverability improvement cost (cr) and the marginal cost reduction
as recoverability improvement saving (σ).
The current quantitative models in the literature assume that the facilities or the
capacity needed to conduct recovery operations already exist. Hence, they do not in-
clude initial investments needed to start recovery applications in the analysis. However;
considering the novelty of product recovery for most of the manufacturers, we believe
that initial investments for system set-up is an important concern for manufacturers
and may have significant effects on their recovery decisions. To disassemble and re-
cover a product, a manufacturer has to make an investment either to set-up his own
systems or to purchase the necessary capacity from an external supplier. To improve
the recoverability of his products, he also needs to invest in his production technology.
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However; most of the time the manufacturers are reluctant to finance these initial in-
vestments which imply a substantial lump-sum spending for the company. They can
generally allocate only a limited amount of funds which does not cover all the necessary
investments. In our last model, we include these initial investments into the analysis
and consider a constraint on the total amount of funds that can be allocated for this
purpose. We investigate the impact of the initial investment costs on the recovery
decisions of the manufacturer and the effectiveness of the legislation.
We solve all the three models under two different cost structures. First, we con-
sider the case where both the unit disassembly cost, (cd) and the unit recoverability
improvement cost (cr) are fixed and total cost functions are linear in quantity. Then,
we consider the case where cd is increasing in the recovery amount (qqr) and cr is in-
creasing in the product recoverability (a). Table 2.1 gives notation for the parameters
and the decision variables used in models.
Parameters
df unit disposal fee
cd unit disassembly cost
c unit production cost
s unit recovery saving s = χc where χ is a fixed proportion
cr unit recoverability improvement cost
σ unit saving from recoverability improvement
F available funds for initial investments
γ cost per unit recovery capacity
δ cost per unit production technology improvement
Decision Variables
q sales quantity
qr recovery rate - percentage of total sales recovered qr ∈ [0, 1]
a product recoverability level
Table 2.1: Notation
2.2.1 Linear Cost Case
Base model
In the base model, given the unit disposal fee (df ) and a constant unit disassembly
cost (cd), the manufacturer decides only on the sales quantity and the recovery rate to
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maximize his profits. The objective of the manufacturer is written as;
max
qr,q
ΠM = q(p− c)− q(1− qr)df − qqrcd + qqrs (2.1)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ 1 (2.2)
s = χc and p = 1− q (2.3)
In the objective function, the first term (q(p − c)) denotes total profit from the
sales, the second one (q(1 − qr)df ) denotes total disposal fee paid and, finally the last
two terms express total cost of disassembly and total savings from recovered cores,
respectively.
Proposition 1 The optimal decisions of the manufacturer under the base model are
summarized as in Table 2.2. The manufacturer prefers to avoid the disposal fee and
recover as much as his sales if cd − cχ ≤ df . In contrast if cd − cχ > df , he prefers to
pay the disposal fee and recovers nothing. Optimal recovery rate increases as df , c or
χ increases but decreases as cd increases.
Proof. See Appendix-A.1 for all proofs.
cd − cχ ≤ df cd − cχ > df
qr 1 0
q 1
2
(1− cd − c(1− χ)) 12(1− c− df )
p 1
2
(1 + cd + c(1− χ)) 12(1 + c+ df )
ΠM
1
4
(−1− χc+ c+ cd)2 14(−1 + c+ df )2
Table 2.2: Optimal solutions for the base model with linear costs given the possible
parameter realizations
As Table 2.2 shows, as long as the disposal fee is equal to or just above the net cost
of recovery (cd − χc), legislation can guarantee full recovery (qr = 1). In this case, the
manufacturer prefers to recover as much as his sales. However, if the disposal fee is set
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to a lower value, the manufacturer recovers nothing and reflects the disposal fee to the
sales price. In this case, legislation cannot achieve its objective in encouraging product
recovery and only serves as an extra burden for both consumers and manufacturers.
This result implies that the level of the disposal fee is very important to encourage
product recovery via a disposal fee policy. To make the policy effective, relevant costs
and savings (i.e. disassembly and production costs) specific to target industries or
product groups should be carefully examined and the legal fees should be customized
according to the characteristics of each product group. In this way, both high product
recovery rates can be obtained and artificially high but ineffective fees can be avoided.
Model Incorporating Design for Recoverability (IDR)
In this case, we take into account the product design opportunities and allow the
manufacturer to determine the recoverability of his products (a) as well as the recovery
rate. When the manufacturer increases the recoverability level by a unit, the unit
production cost increases by cr but the unit disassembly cost decreases by σ. We
assume that cr < σ since otherwise improving product recoverability would never be
profitable for the manufacturer. In the linear cost setting, we assume that cr is fixed
and total recoverability improvement cost (aqcr) is linear in a.
Given these, the objective function of the manufacturer is written as;
max
qr,q,a
ΠM = q(p− c)− q(1− qr)df − qqrcd + sqrq − crqa+ σqrqa (2.4)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ 1 (2.5)
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (2.6)
s = χc and p = 1− q (2.7)
Except for the last two terms, the objective function is the same as in the base
model. The last two terms (crqa and σqrqa) denote the total cost and total contribution
of recoverability improvement respectively.
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Proposition 2 The optimal decisions of the manufacturer in IDR case are given as
in Table 2.3. Similar to the base model, optimal solution occurs at boundaries. Re-
covery rate and product recoverability are mutually reinforcing each other’s effect. The
manufacturer prefers perfect recoverability (a = 1) in full recovery case and prefers zero
recoverability (a = 0) in no recovery case. The threshold on the disposal fee for full
recovery is lower due to the contribution of recoverability improvement.
df < cd − cχ− σ + cr df ≥ cd − cχ− σ + cr
a 0 1
qr 0 1
q 1
2
(1− c− df ) 12(1− c(1− χ)− cd − cr + σ)
p 1
2
(1 + c+ df )
1
2
(1 + c(1− χ) + cd + cr − σ)
ΠM
1
4
(−1 + c+ df )2 14(−1 + c(1− χ) + cr + cd − σ)2
Table 2.3: Optimal solution sets for the model IDR with linear costs given the possible
parameter realizations
As Table 2.3 shows, depending on the relevant costs and savings (e.g., cd, cr, σ,
χ) and the disposal fee, the manufacturer prefers either perfect or zero recoverability.
Partial product recoverability (0 < a < 1) is never optimal for the manufacturer. As
long as the disposal fee is sufficiently high to guarantee full recovery, the manufacturer
always prefers perfect recoverability.
Comparison of the base and the IDR case solutions clearly shows the effect of
redesign opportunities on the recovery decisions of the manufacturer. Reflecting the
contribution of recoverability improvement, the threshold on the disposal fee which en-
sures full recovery is lower than the base case. Since, the manufacturer can increase
his recovery savings by investing in product recoverability, he prefers full recovery even
at lower levels of disposal fee. Redesign opportunities increase favorableness and prof-
itability of product recovery. This implies that to increase the effectiveness of legislation
for different product groups, besides the recovery costs and savings, information about
the redesign opportunities and the associated costs and savings is crucial. In this way,
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the policy maker can accurately estimate the disposal fee threshold that can encour-
age the manufacturers for full recovery and perfect recoverability and can also avoid
unnecessarily increasing the sales price and the cost burden of manufacturers.
Model with Limitations on the Allocated Fund for Initial Costs (LAFIC)
In this case, we take into account the reluctance of the manufacturer to finance the
initial investments. We assume that the manufacturer needs to invest γ to increase his
recovery capacity by one unit. Similarly, to increase product recoverability by one unit,
he needs to invest δ in his production technology. The total investment expenditure is
a linear function of the recovery rate (qr), and the recoverability level (a). However,
the manufacturer is willing to allocate only a limited amount of funds (F ) for these
initial investments instead of completely covering these costs. Throughout this chapter
for the sake of brevity, we call the amount of funds the manufacturer can allocate for
these initial investments as the allocated fund.
The aim of this model is to reveal the effects of these initial expenditures and the
insufficiency of the allocated funds on the recovery decisions of the manufacturer.
The objective function of the manufacturer is written as;
max
qr,q,a
ΠM = q(p− c)− qqrcd − q(1− qr)df + sqrq − crqa+ σqrqa (2.8)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ 1 (2.9)
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (2.10)
aδ + γqqr ≤ F (2.11)
s = χc and p = 1− q (2.12)
The objective function is the same as in the model IDR. However, with the in-
clusion of a nonlinear constraint, the model becomes very complex for the derivation of
an analytical solution. Hence, we use numerical analysis.
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Numerical Analysis: We conduct the numerical analysis over a large experimental
set designed by full factorial design. We have chosen our experimental set as follows;
• F values are selected such that F is always smaller than the amount required to
cover all the initial investments. For this purpose, we set F to 30% and 90% of
the required amount.
• Three value levels (i.e. high, medium and low) for df and two value levels (i.e.
high and low) for all the other parameters are used.
• Unit recoverability improvement cost (cr) is set to be always lower than unit
saving from recoverability improvement (σ) since, otherwise recoverability would
never be profitable for the manufacturer and we are not interested in this case.
• Both unit production cost is higher than unit disassembly cost (c > cd) and unit
disassembly cost is higher than unit production cost (c < cd) scenarios are covered
in the experimental set. In real applications both of these cases are observable.
Given these specifications, see Appendix A.2 for the experimental set we used.
To find the global optimal solutions for our experimental set, we used a commercial
global optimal solver, Premium Solver by Frontline Systems. We employed Global
Interval Search provided by this software.
Results and Discussion
Observation 1 Initial investment costs has a substantial influence on the recovery
decisions of the manufacturer. These costs and the insufficiency of the allocated fund
may completely deter the manufacturer from starting product recovery even if he would
prefer full recovery and perfect recoverability (qr = 1, a = 1) otherwise. This is mostly
observed when F is relatively lower.
This observation is not obvious at first glance. Intuitively one would expect
that if recovery is more preferable for the manufacturer, then even if the allocated
fund is not sufficient to cover all the initial costs, the manufacturer would still try
23
to obtain the highest attainable recovery rate (qr) and product recoverability (a) by
entirely using his allocated fund. However, our results show that this is not always the
case. Especially when the needed amount for the initial investments is substantially
higher than the amount of funds the manufacturer is willing to allocate, then the
manufacturer prefers not to start recovery operations. The underlying reason for this
result is the interdependence between the two decision variables (a and qr). To increase
the profitability of product recoverability and to justify a positive a in the optimal
solution, recovery rate should exceed a certain threshold (see the proof of Proposition 2
in Appendix A.1). On the other hand, high recovery (i.e. exceeding the necessary
threshold) is only possible if product recoverability is high and recovery costs are low.
However, since the manufacturer can allocate only a limited amount of funds for the
initial investments, he will not be able to invest in both high product recoverability
and high recovery rate. Hence, no recovery and zero recoverability solution becomes
optimal given a relatively low F .
To see the impact of the constraint on optimal qr, a, p and ΠM we compare the
solutions for models IDR and LAFIC in Table 2.4. As Table 2.4 indicates when
Model IDR Average Model LAFIC Average Percent Decrease
qr 0.563 0.438 22%
a 0.563 0.271 52%
p 0.761 0.786 −3%
ΠM 0.061 0.056 9%
Table 2.4: Comparison of the model IDR and the model LAFIC solutions under linear
cost structure
the amount of funds the manufacturer is willing to allocate does not cover all the
initial investment costs, he substantially reduces his product recoverability (by 52%)
and recovery rate (by 22%). This result also supports our finding in Observation 1.
On the other hand, ΠM and p are not affected much by this constraint. Price increases
slightly while the manufacturer profit decreases by only 9%. These conclusions are also
verified by the statistical analysis given below.
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To investigate the impact of the parameters on the optimal objective value (manu-
facturer profit), we use one-at-a-time version of the global sensitivity analysis suggested
by Wagner (1995). We prefer the least squares regression approach to implement the
method (see Wagner, 1995).
We regressed each parameter on the optimal manufacturer profit (ΠM) in simple
regressions and found the corresponding adjusted R2s. Adjusted R2 values provide a
measure of the impact of each parameter on ΠM (see Wagner, 1995). Table 2.5 shows
adjusted R2 values in order from the simple regressions with a significant relation.
Parameters Adjusted R2
c 0.554
df 0.200
cd 0.080
F 0.008
Table 2.5: Adjusted R2 values from simple regressions for the model LAFIC with linear
costs
From Table 2.5, note that c is the most influential parameter on the optimal
manufacturer profit with an adjusted R2 of 0.554 which is considerably higher than that
of the other parameters. The influence of df is also high while the other parameters do
not have an important impact. Compared to the IDR case2, the impact of df is higher
and the impact of cd is lower. This change in the relative impact of the disposal fee
and the disassembly cost on the manufacturer profit can be explained by the increased
preference of the manufacturer for paying the disposal fee rather than investing in
recovery when the allocated fund does not cover all the initial investments.
To investigate the impact of the parameters on the decision variables (a, qr and
p), we used chi-square analysis (see Wagner, 1995). We constructed a cross-tabulation
for each decision variable with respect to each parameter. In cross-tabulations, we
categorized the optimal values of the decision variables into 3-tiles and grouped the
parameters under the value levels used in the experimental set. Wagner (1995) suggests
2Although we have provided closed-form solutions for the model IDR under linear cost structure,
to make comparisons with other models we have also conducted regression and chi-square analysis for
this model. We run the analysis over the same experimental set used for the other models. Tables A.2
and A.3 in Appendix-A.3 summarize the results of this analysis.
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using the significance probabilities (p-values) for the chi-square statistic to assess the
relative influence of each parameter. However; the significance probabilities for the
significantly influential parameters are all very small (u 0.000) in our case and did
not help much in comparing the influence of the parameters on the decision variables.
Thus, we use Cramer’s V coefficients to assess the parameters’ relative influence.
Parameters/Decision Variables qr a p
F 0.583 0.519 0.200
df 0.461 0.301 0.350
c 0.158 Not Signf. 0.785
cd 0.470 0.232 0.190
δ Not Signf. 0.339 Not Signf.
Table 2.6: Cramer’s V coefficients from chi-square analysis for the model LAFIC with
linear costs
Table 2.6 summarizes the Cramer’s V coefficients of the most influential param-
eters. The significance probabilities for all the parameters in the table (except for the
Not Signf. cases) are 0.000, thus all the relations are highly significant.
From the table we can conclude that;
1. The three most influential parameters on the optimal recovery rate (qr) are the
allocated fund (F ), the unit disassembly cost (cd) and the unit disposal fee (df ).
Among these, F has the highest influence with a Cramer’s V coefficient of 0.583.
2. The three most influential parameters on the optimal product recoverability (a)
are the allocated fund, the unit production technology improvement cost (δ) and
the unit disposal fee. Similar to qr, again F has the highest influence on a.
3. The three most influential parameters on the optimal price (p) are the unit pro-
duction cost (c), the unit disposal fee and the allocated fund. In contrast to qr
and a, the most influential parameter on the optimal price is the unit production
cost not the allocated fund.
4. Compared to the IDR case, the influence of df on a and qr decreases (see Ta-
ble A.3).
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Results 1, 2 and 4 support our argument that insufficiency of the allocated fund
for the initial investments may have a substantial impact on the recovery decisions. F
turns out to be the most important determinant of both the optimal recovery rate and
the product recoverability. When the allocated fund is not sufficient to cover the initial
investments, the effect of the disposal fee on the recovery variables reduces. In other
words, disposal fee is less effective in boosting recovery and redesign applications when
the manufacturer is reluctant to undertake all the initial costs. In contrast, optimal
price is not affected by the allocated fund to the same extent. From Table 2.5, we also
know that the impact of the allocated fund on ΠM is very small relative to the other
parameters.
In the light of all these findings and Table 2.4, we can conclude that the reluctance
of the manufacturer to undertake the initial costs and, thus the insufficiency of the
allocated fund for the initial investments substantially changes the recovery choices of
the manufacturer. The impact of this constraint on the recovery-related outputs which
are primarily the social planner’s concerns (i.e. recovery rate and recoverability) is
much greater than its impact on price and total profit. In other words, insufficiency of
the allocated fund affects the social planner more than the manufacturer. To design
effective policies and ensure higher recovery rates, at the outset the social planner needs
to consider this problem and try to find some solutions such as start-up subsidies/credits
or tax cuts.
2.2.2 Nonlinear Total Cost Case
In the previous section, we solved our models given that unit disassembly and recov-
erability improvement costs are fixed. However, for some product groups, increasing
disassembly and recoverability improvement costs may be more realistic. For instance,
for some product groups unit disassembly cost depends on the condition of the core
and manufacturers prefer to disassemble the cores in better condition first. Thus, unit
disassembly cost increases as the manufacturer recovers more products. Similarly, in
some cases, improving the recoverability of the product further becomes costlier at
higher recoverability levels. Although substantial cost savings can be obtained with
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small modifications in the initial stages, as the recoverability level increases, getting a
marginal improvement requires costlier and more complex modifications. In the light
of these observations, in this section, we consider that the unit disassembly cost is
increasing in the recovery amount (qqr) and unit recoverability improvement cost is
increasing in the recoverability level (a). We model unit disassembly cost, c
′
d, and unit
recoverability improvement, c
′
r, as;
c
′
d = cd + βcdqqr (2.13)
c
′
r = cr + βcra (2.14)
βcd and βcr stands for the rate of increase in c
′
d and c
′
d, respectively.
Given these, we investigate whether the nonlinear total cost structure alters our
findings from linear cost case.
Base model
Given c
′
d as above, the objective of the manufacturer is written as,
max
qr,q
ΠM = q(p− c)− qqrc′d − q(1− qr)df + sqrq (2.15)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ 1 (2.16)
s = χc and p = 1− q (2.17)
The objective function is the same as in the linear cost case base model. The only
difference is the disassembly cost function (c
′
d) which is increasing in recovery amount
in this case.
Proposition 3 The optimal decisions of the manufacturer under the base model with
increasing unit disassembly cost are summarized as in Table 2.7. In contrast to the linear
cost case, a disposal fee higher than net minimum cost of disassembly (cd−cχ) is no more
sufficient to guarantee full recovery. Instead of full recovery, partial recovery is preferred
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especially at a relatively lower disposal fee. As the rate of increase in disassembly cost
(βcd) increases, optimal recovery rate decreases and full recovery becomes possible at a
much higher disposal fee.
df ≤ cd − cχ cd − cχ < df < cd−cχ+βcd(1−c)βcd+1
cd−cχ+βcd (1−c)
βcd+1
≤ df
qr 0
cχ+df−cd
βcd (1−c−df )
1
q
(1−c−df )
2
(1−c−df )
2
(1−c−cd+cχ)
2(1+βcd )
p
(1+c+df )
2
(1+c+df )
2
2βcd+c+cd−cχ+1
2(1+βcd )
ΠM
(−1+c+df )2
4
βcd (−1+c+df )2+(−cd+cχ+df )2
4βcd
(−1−χc+c+cd)2
4(βcd+1)
Table 2.7: Optimal solutions for the base model with nonlinear total costs
A unit disassembly cost increasing in recovery amount decreases the preferability
of product recovery for the manufacturer. Keeping everything else equal, the manufac-
turer prefers full recovery at a higher disposal fee compared to the linear case. When
the disposal fee exceeds net minimum cost of disassembly (cd − cχ) but is lower than
cd−cχ+βcd(1−c)
βcd+1
, the manufacturer prefers partial recovery. Interestingly, in this case, even
if the manufacturer recovers some cores and obtains some savings, he does not reflect
this to his sales price. Sales price and quantity remain the same and disposal fee is re-
flected on consumers as in the no recovery case. Hence, setting the disposal fee higher
than
cd−cχ+βcd (1−c)
βcd+1
is important both to ensure full recovery and to minimize the effect
of legislation on sales price. For this purpose, information about the cost structure of
the manufacturers is essential for the policy maker.
Model incorporating design for recoverability
Given the increasing unit disassembly (c
′
d) and the increasing unit recoverability im-
provement costs (c
′
r), the objective of the manufacturer is written as;
max
qr,q,a
ΠM = q(p− c)− qqrc′d − q(1− qr)df + sqrq − c
′
rqa+ σqrqa (2.18)
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s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ 1 (2.19)
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (2.20)
s = χc and p = 1− q (2.21)
The objective function is same as in the linear cost case design model. However;
with nonlinear total cost functions, analytical solution of the model becomes very com-
plex. Hence, as in the LAFIC case with linear costs, we use numerical analysis. We add
the rate of increase parameters (βcd and βcr) to our experimental set and conduct the
analysis over this extended set. For βcd and βcr we consider two values, 0.03 and 0.09.
We selected these values to ensure that even with the maximum increase in recovery
costs, the total unit cost of manufacturer does not exceed 1 so that he can continue
production.
Results and Discussion:
Observation 2 Unlike the linear cost case, optimal solution does not always occur at
boundaries (i.e. qr = 0, a = 0 or qr = 1, a = 1). Especially for high cr and βcr , full
recovery can be accompanied with partial recoverability (0 < a < 1) instead of perfect
product recoverability (a = 1). Similarly, partial recovery may be accompanied by zero
recoverability. Reduction in the optimal product recoverability due to the increasing unit
costs is always higher than the reduction in the recovery rate and qr ≥ a in the optimal
solution in contrast to the linear cost case where qr = a.
Keeping everything else equal, increasing unit disassembly and unit recoverability
improvement costs decrease both the optimal recovery rate and the optimal product
recoverability. To see the impact of nonlinear total cost structure on qr, a, p and ΠM
we compare solutions of the model IDR with the linear and the nonlinear total costs
in Table 2.8. Under nonlinear total cost structure, although the sales price and the
manufacturer profit do not change to a great extent, the recovery variables substantially
decrease. Supporting Observation 2, the reduction in average a is almost twice of the
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reduction in average qr. This implies that to compensate for the increasing costs the
manufacturer first relinquishes product recoverability improvement.
Linear Cost Case Average Nonlinear Total Cost Case Average Percent Decrease
qr 0.563 0.449 20%
a 0.563 0.271 52%
p 0.761 0.776 −2%
ΠM 0.061 0.055 10%
Table 2.8: Comparison of the model IDR solutions under linear and nonlinear total
cost structures
To investigate impact of parameters on the optimal manufacturer profit and the
decision variables, we use simple regressions and chi-square analysis respectively similar
to the linear case. Table 2.9 gives the adjusted R2s from the simple regressions while
Table 2.10 summarizes the Cramer’s V coefficients from the chi-square analysis.
Parameters Adjusted R2
c 0.584
df 0.200
cd 0.086
Table 2.9: Adjusted R2 values from simple regressions for the model IDR with nonlinear
total costs
Table 2.9 shows that unit production cost is the most influential parameter on
ΠM . Like the linear cost case, df and cd also have considerable impact on ΠM . On the
other hand, neither βcd nor βcr has a significant impact. Compared to the linear cost
case model (see Table A.2 in Appendix-A.3), the impact of c remains almost the same.
However, the impact of df substantially increases and the impact of cd decreases. This
can be explained by the decrease in the amount of recovery made by the manufacturer.
Due to the increased recovery costs, the manufacturer prefers to pay the disposal fee
rather than recovering his products. Hence, the influence of the disposal fee on his profit
increases under nonlinear total cost structure. Along with the findings from Table 2.8,
these results imply that the rate of increase in recovery costs does not significantly affect
the manufacturer profit. However, the cost structure changes the effect of disassembly
cost and disposal fee on the manufacturer profit.
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Parameters/Decision Variables qr a p
df 0.658 0.463 0.283
c Not Signf Not Signf. 0.836
cd 0.471 0.480 0.374
βcr Not Signf. 0.518 Not Signf.
Table 2.10: Cramer’s V coefficients from chi-square analysis for the model IDR with
nonlinear total costs
As we can see from Table 2.10, the rate of increase in the unit recoverability im-
provement cost (βcr) has a significant influence on the product recoverability level (a).
From Table 2.8 we have already stated that under nonlinear total cost structure the
highest reduction occurs in product recoverability by 52%. Supporting this finding, βcr
is the most influential parameter on the product recoverability in Table 2.10. Nonlinear
total cost structure also affects the influence of the other parameters on a. Compared to
the linear cost case, especially the influence of the disposal fee on a decreases. However;
the same outcome is not valid for price and recovery rate. The most influential param-
eters and their relative impact on p and qr do not change substantially with respect to
the linear case (see Table A.3).
Overall, it seems that increasing recovery costs reduce the manufacturer’s dispo-
sition to improve recoverability of his products and weaken the effectiveness of disposal
fee in encouraging recoverability improvement.
Model with limitations on the allocated fund for initial costs
Similar to the linear case, the objective of the manufacturer is written as;
max
qr,q,a
ΠM = q(p− c)− qqrc′d − q(1− qr)df + sqrq − c
′
rqa+ σqrqa (2.22)
s.t. 0 ≤ qr ≤ 1 (2.23)
0 ≤ a ≤ 1 (2.24)
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aδ + γqqr ≤ F (2.25)
s = χc and p = 1− q (2.26)
Similar to the linear case, we solve the model numerically over the same experimental
set. We add βcd and βcr to our experimental set and again consider two values for these
parameters, 0.03 and 0.09, respectively.
Results and Discussion Table 2.11 gives a comparison of the solutions of the models
IDR and LAFIC with nonlinear total costs. Similar to the linear cost case, insufficiency
of the allocated fund leads to a serious reduction in qr and a in nonlinear total costs
case. Considering Table 2.11 and Table 2.4 together, the reduction due to the constraint
is higher under increasing recovery costs than the reduction under fixed recovery costs.
In other words, increasing disassembly and recoverability costs intensifies the impact of
the constraint.
Model IDR Average Model LAFIC Average Percent Decrease
qr 0.449 0.342 24%
a 0.271 0.114 58%
p 0.776 0.790 −2%
ΠM 0.055 0.052 5%
Table 2.11: Comparison of the model IDR and the model LAFIC solutions under
nonlinear total cost structure
We investigate the impact of parameters on the manufacturer profit and the deci-
sion variables through simple regressions and chi-square analysis as before. Table 2.12
shows the adjusted R2 values from the simple regressions where ΠM is the dependent
variable and a parameter is the independent variable. The table only shows the pa-
rameters with a significant relation with ΠM . From this table we see that like all the
previous models, production cost is the most influential parameter and the allocated
fund does not have any significant effect on the manufacturer profit. Compared to the
linear cost case, the impact of c remains almost the same; however the impact of df
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increases while the impact of cd decreases (see Table 2.5). As we have also observed for
the model IDR, increasing recovery costs intensifies the impact of disposal fee on the
manufacturer profit.
Parameters Adjusted R2
c 0.555
df 0.289
cd 0.044
χ 0.001
Table 2.12: Adjusted R2 values from simple regressions for the model LAFIC with
nonlinear total costs
Table 2.13 shows Cramer’s V coefficients from chi-square analysis of each parame-
ter and decision variables. Allocated fund is the most important determinant of optimal
recovery rate and product recoverability. df and cd are also influential especially on qr.
Compared to the model IDR, the impact of df on both qr and a weakens. Similar to the
linear cost case, when the amount of funds the manufacturer allocates is not sufficient
to entirely cover the initial investments, disposal fee is less effective in encouraging
product recovery and recoverability.
On the other hand, compared to the model LAFIC with linear costs, the impacts
of F and δ on a are lower. Table 2.13 does not include the parameters with a Cramer’s
V coefficient lower than 0.2 for all decision variables. Hence, we cannot see the impact
of cost parameters like cr, βcr in the Table 2.13. However; though smaller than the
parameters given in the table, these parameters also have a significant impact on a
and the decrease in the Cramer’s coefficients of F and δ on a can be explained by the
increased impact of these parameters.
Parameters/Decision Variables qr a p
F 0.572 0.432 0.139
df 0.468 0.282 0.366
c 0.094 Not Signf. 0.765
cd 0.475 0.236 0.158
Table 2.13: Cramer’s V coefficients from chi-square analysis for the model LAFIC with
nonlinear total costs
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2.3 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigate product recovery and recoverability decisions of a man-
ufacturer under a legislative disposal fee. We include the impact of initial investments
on the manufacturer’s decisions. We examine how the recovery choices of the manu-
facturer change when he is reluctant to or cannot entirely cover the initial investment
costs. First, we consider the case where the unit recovery costs are fixed and then we
extend our models to the case where the unit disassembly and the unit recoverability
improvement costs are increasing in the recovery amount and the recoverability level,
respectively.
As a result of our analysis, we observe that the insufficiency of the allocated fund
for the initial investments may have a serious impact on the optimal recovery decisions.
If the amount of funds the manufacturer is willing to allocate is not enough for the
initial investments, disposal fee policy will not be sufficient to encourage the manufac-
turer for more product recovery and higher product recoverability. Initial investment
expenditures and the reluctance of the manufacturer to allocate sufficient funds may
even completely deter the manufacturer from starting product recovery applications.
Hence, in order to design effective environmental policies to encourage product recov-
ery, these initial investment needs should be carefully taken into account and perhaps
through proper subsidies their negative effects should be alleviated.
To design effective policies, information about the recovery costs and savings and
the redesign opportunities for relevant product groups is also essential. To accurately
estimate the disposal fee that will encourage full recovery and perfect recoverability but
will not redundantly increase the cost burden of the manufacturers, the policy maker
should take into account these costs/savings.
We have similar findings in both fixed and increasing recovery costs case. How-
ever; increasing recovery costs weaken the effectiveness of the disposal fee especially in
encouraging redesign applications. When the cost burden increases, the manufacturer
substantially reduces his investments in product recoverability irrespective of the dis-
posal fee. Increasing recovery costs also intensify the impact of insufficiency of the fund
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allocated for the initial investments.
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Chapter 3
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE STRUCTURAL EFFICIENCY OF EPR
LEGISLATION
EPR principle based legislation involves extension of a producer’s financial and/or phys-
ical responsibility to the post-consumer stage of a product’s life cycle. Under EPR based
legislation, manufacturers are held responsible for the collection and the proper treat-
ment of their used products. Although the EPR based legislation is originated from
Europe and The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) and End-of-Life
Vehicle (ELV) directives in Europe are considered as the first examples of EPR leg-
islation, twelve USA states (Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia)
have also passed e-waste laws and a number of others are currently considering EPR
legislation. However, there exist variations among the policy tools used to implement
the EPR legislation. For instance, WEEE Directive in Europe holds producers physi-
cally responsible for meeting certain recycling or recovery targets for their own waste
while advance recycling fees used by California charge producers on the basis of their
sales. Nevertheless, manufacturers do not seem to be happy with the current legis-
lation. They generally complain about inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the current
regulations. They argue that mandatory take-back rates actually serve as hidden taxes
imposed on producers and advocate that the governments or social regulators should
undertake the take-back and recovery tasks (Atasu et al., 2009).
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the impact of the structural variations
that exist in the current EPR legislation on the welfare of different stakeholders (e.g.,
consumers, producers, the environment and the social planner). For this purpose, we
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classify the current EPR models under two categories; tax model and rate model, and
compare their efficiency from the perspectives of social planner, manufacturers, envi-
ronment and consumers. In the tax model, the social planner undertakes the take-back
task but requires manufacturers to pay a unit tax for their sales. On the other hand, in
the rate model she determines a mandatory take-back rate and requires manufacturers
to satisfy it. In other words, in the tax model manufacturers are held only financially re-
sponsible for their end-of-life products while in the rate model they are both financially
and physically responsible. First, we conduct our analysis in a monopolistic environ-
ment and then extend it to a competitive market to examine the effects of competition
on the relative efficiency of the two legislative forms. The model under which each
stakeholder is better off changes with respect to the parameter settings. Hence, we
also examine under which parameter settings the incentives of the stakeholders will be
aligned in each environment.
3.1 Literature Review
The problem we focus on in this chapter is closely related to two research streams.
The first stream adopts a microeconomic perspective and focuses on how the socially
optimum amount of waste generation and disposal can be ensured (Palmer, Sigman
and Walls, 1996, Palmer and Walls, 1997, Fullerton and Wu, 1998, Palmer and Walls,
1999, Walls and Palmer, 2000, Calcott and Walls, 2000, Calcott and Walls, 2002, Walls,
2003, Walls et al., 2003, Walls, 2006). Palmer, Sigman and Walls (1997) compare the
costs of three different policies (deposit/refund system, recycling subsidies and advance
disposal fees) in reducing municipal solid waste in an empirical setting and conclude that
deposit/refund is the least costly policy. Similarly, Palmer and Walls (1997) compare
the efficiency of deposit/refund system and recycling content standards in generating
the socially optimum amount of disposal. Both of these use a partial equilibrium model
with competitive markets and do not take into account product recyclability in their
analysis. Fullerton and Wu (1998) and Walls and Palmer (2000) formulate models that
take into account all environmental externalities throughout the whole life-cycle of a
product. In this setting, they discuss the efficiency of various upstream and downstream
38
policies (e.g., Pigovian taxes, disposal fees, subsidies on recyclable design, command and
control regulatory standards and deposit and refund systems) in ensuring the socially
optimum level of product recyclability. They conclude that depending on the objectives,
the market failures, and the ease of implementation different policies can be useful in
obtaining the social optimum. Calcott and Walls (2000 and 2002) also investigate the
success of deposit/refund system and Pigovian disposal fee in encouraging DfE and
product recyclability. Similar to the previous studies, they conclude that downstream
policies (e.g., disposal fees and taxes imposed on products) are not useful or practical
in encouraging product recyclability especially considering the lack of fully functioning
recycling markets and deposit/refund type policies can be more effective at least to
obtain the constrained socially optimum recyclability. However unlike Fullerton and
Wu (1998), Calcott and Walls (2002) explicitly consider a recycling market and instead
of simply assuming that these markets either function or not, they argue that there
may be some transaction costs that may obstruct the functioning of the markets and
analyze the effects of transaction costs on the efficiency of the environmental policies.
In a related stream, Palmer and Walls (1999) and Walls (2006) use case studies to
discuss the pros and cons of different environmental policies. Palmer and Walls (1999)
examine three specific policies (upstream combined product tax and recycling subsidy
(UCTS), manufacturer take-back requirements and unit-based pricing) and conclude
that UCTS, which is a special type of deposit/refund systems, is more cost effective
especially in terms of transaction costs. Walls (2006) provides a more extensive overview
and comparison of various policies under the EPR umbrella and presents insights from
the real life applications of these policies.
The common features of all these studies, specifically the ones with mathematical
models, are (i) exogenous price (ii) focus on the social optimum and to what extent it
can be attained by different policies and (iii) consideration of product recyclability and
DfE decisions in most of them.
Our research differs from the studies in this stream in the following aspects:(i) we
assume an endogenous price; (ii) we discuss the impact of competition on the relative
efficiency of the policies; (iii) we identify the possible misalignments between manufac-
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turers and government and (iv) rather than focusing on the social optimum and the
alternative policies which will ensure it, we explicitly compare two different policies
used in real life to assess their relative profitability for the manufacturer(s) and the
social planner.
The second stream analyzes the efficiency and effects of environmental regula-
tions from an operations management perspective. In this respect, the most relevant
paper to our research is Atasu et al. (2009) where the authors investigate the effi-
ciency of existing WEEE legislation and conclude that to design effective legislation
the recycling costs and environmental impact of different product groups as well as the
competitive conditions of the market and the consumers’ environmental consciousness
should be carefully considered. We also focus on the efficiency of existing take-back
legislations in this chapter. However unlike Atasu et al. (2009), instead of focusing on
only one type of legislation we investigate the relative efficiency of different legislative
forms with respect to social welfare and manufacturer profit. Similarly, Toyasaki et al.
(2008) compare the favorableness of two prevalent take-back scheme for WEEE (com-
petitive versus monopolistic) from the perspective of the manufacturers, consumers,
and recyclers through two-stage sequential games between competing manufacturers
and recyclers. In contrast to our problem, besides the collection they also consider
the recycling stage and assume that the recycling firms undertake the collection and
recycling tasks in return for a fee. Plambeck and Wang (2008) investigate the effects
of e-waste regulation (specifically EPR and advance recycling fees) on new product
introduction under both monopoly and duopoly settings and conclude that environ-
mental regulation can reduce both the production and the waste amount by giving rise
to less frequent new product introduction. Focusing on compliance to the directive on
Restriction of Hazardous Substances (RoHS), Plambeck and Taylor (2008) investigate
the choice of the regulators to rely on competitive testing (i.e. manufacturers inspect
their competitors’ products) or to make the inspection themselves to check whether
the products comply with RoHS. They conclude that competitive testing is effective
in markets dominated with a few firms but not effective in highly competitive markets
with many small firms.
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Jacobs and Subramanian (2009), on the other hand, take a supply chain per-
spective and investigate the implications of EPR regulation (specifically the take-back
and recycling mandates) on both the economic and environmental performance of the
supply chain and the social welfare under integrated and decentralized supply chain
settings. Similar to our problem, they make use of a social welfare construct, which is
the sum of manufacturer profit, environmental impact and consumer surplus. However;
instead of comparing the efficiency of different legislative forms from the perspective of
the stakeholders, they investigate the impact of the environmental cost sharing on the
social welfare. Subramanian et al. (2008a) also adopt a supply chain perspective. They
assume that the consumers and the manufacturer share the environmental costs and
primarily focus on the impact of EPR on product design and the effects of supply chain
coordination and different contractual arrangements that can ensure coordination in a
EPR setting.
The last two studies in this stream adopt different methodological approaches from
the previous studies, which mostly make use of game theoretic models. In this respect,
Subramanian et al. (2008b) propose a multi-period and multi-product mathematical
programming model to simultaneously examine the environmental considerations and
the operational decisions of a manufacturer. By this nonlinear model they seek to
determine the optimal compliance levels, pricing of new and remanufactured products
and optimal design choices. Kroes and Subramanian (2006), on the other hand, present
an empirical analysis on existing market based programs (in which firms are allowed
to choose among different compliance strategies such as abatement, input switching,
use of permits, and retirement of older dirtier facilities). With two sets of multiple
regression models, they examine the relation between the compliance choices and the
environmental performance and the relation between the environmental performance
and the financial performance of the participant manufacturers.
3.2 Models
In this section, we propose our generic model to investigate the basic economic drivers
(e.g., manufacturing, collection, recycling and environmental costs) of take-back in
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alternative legislative settings. We consider a market with three sets of decision makers:
consumers, manufacturers and a social planner.
Our generic model considers manufacturing of a single product. The decision
making process occurs in a Stackelberg setting (see Varian, 1984); first the social planner
decides on the legislative structure. We assume that she makes a choice between 2
different models (see Figure 3.1):
• Tax Model (T): The social planner undertakes the take-back task (i.e. collection
and recycling), but requires manufacturers to pay a unit tax (τ) for each product.
In this case, the social planner decides both on the tax and the take-back rate
(c).
• Take-back Rate Model (R): The social planner determines a certain take-back rate
(c) and requires manufacturers to ensure this take-back rate.
Figure 3.1: Take-back legislation models
We assume n identical manufacturers competing in a Cournot setting (see Varian,
1984). Given the choice of the social planner, each manufacturer (say i) decides on his
own sales quantity (qi) to maximize his total profit.
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We assume that consumer utilities (υ) from purchasing a product are uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1 and the market size is normalized to 1. Hence, a consumer
with utility υj purchases the product if υj is greater than or equal to the unit product
price, p. Given this, we obtain a linear inverse demand function, p = 1 − q where q
stands for the total quantity sold by n manufacturers, i.e p = 1−∑ni=1 qi.
We assume a unit cost of µ to produce each unit, and a unit cost of χ to take back
each used product from the consumers. We assume that χ + µ < 1 so that take-back
legislation does not drive manufacturers out of the market.1 We also require that the
unit tax to be always nonnegative and lower than 1−µ so that there is always positive
production in the market. Table 3.1 shows the notation used throughout the chapter.
Indices
i Manufacturer index
Decision Variables
p Unit price
q Total sales quantity
qi Sales quantity of manufacturer i
Parameters
µ Unit production cost
c Take-back rate
χ Unit take-back cost
² Unit environmental cost for each uncollected product
τ Unit tax imposed on manufacturers for each product
they introduce to the market.
n Number of competitors in the market
ΠE Total environmental impact of uncollected products
ΠM Total manufacturer profit
ΠC Total consumer surplus
Table 3.1: Common notation
Given these costs and k ∈ (T,R) denoting the legislation structure choice of the
social planner, the manufacturer i will maximize his profit;
max
qi
ΠMi(k) = qi(p− µ)− qiρk(τ, c) (3.1)
1Note that the maximum price is 1 and if the sum of the unit production cost and the unit take-back
cost is higher than 1, then the manufacturers cannot survive in the market.
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where,
ρk(τ, c) =
 τ, if k = T ;cχ, if k = R. (3.2)
In the objective function given above, the first term denotes the total sales revenue
and the second one denotes the total take-back cost incurred by manufacturer i in the
rate model and the total tax paid by manufacturer i in the tax model. ρk(τ, c) stands
for the unit tax imposed by the social planner in the tax model and the take-back cost
per unit sales in the rate model. From the objective function of manufacturer i, one
can derive the optimal qi as;
q∗i =
1− µ− ρk(τ, c)
n+ 1
(3.3)
By anticipating the manufacturer’s choice, the social planner maximizes the total
social welfare which consists of four main terms:
• Total Manufacturer Profit:
ΠM(k) =
n∑
i=1
ΠMi(k) = n(q
∗
i p(q
∗
i )− µ− ρk(τ, c))
where p(q∗i ) denotes the price when the optimal quantity chosen by each manu-
facturer is q∗i .
• Total Consumer Surplus:
ΠC(k) = (1− p(q∗i ))q∗i n/2
• Environmental Impact: We assume that there exists a unit environmental cost
of each uncollected product denoted by ² (see Atasu et al., 2009 for a detailed
discussion). Given this, the total environmental impact of not taking back (1− c)
proportion of total sales is,
ΠE(k) = −²(1− c)nq∗i
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Note that we define ΠE, total environmental impact, as the negative of total
environmental cost, hence when we talk about high ΠE, this means low envi-
ronmental cost and the more ΠE increases, the better it is for the environment.
Throughout the chapter, when we actually want to imply cost, we use the term
total environmental cost rather than total environmental impact.
• Depending on the particular legislative structure chosen, the social planner will
either collect taxes per unit production from the manufacturers and take the
responsibility of core take-back herself or impose a take-back rate on the manu-
facturers. Hence, given the legislative structure chosen (k), the social planner’s
objective includes the following cost term;
φk(τ, c) =
 nq∗i (τ − cχ), if k = T ;0, if k = R. (3.4)
Given these, the total social welfare (SW (k)) is written as;
SW (k) = ΠM(k) + ΠC(k) + ΠE(k) + φk(τ, c)
The social planner maximizes SW (k) by deciding on:
• the tax (τ) and the take-back rate (c) in the tax model and
• the take-back rate (c) in the take-back rate model.
3.3 Analysis
In this section, we customize our generic model to find out the efficiency level differences
between the alternative forms of legislation we consider. We first start with our base
model which considers a monopoly and ignores the externality of take-back assurance
(i.e. education cost). Then, we consider a competitive market and examine the impact
of competition on the relative efficiency of the alternative legislation forms.
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3.3.1 Monopoly Case
In this section, we consider a monopoly (n = 1) and compare the optimal choices of
the decision makers and the resulting social welfare under the two possible legislative
structures described in the previous section.
Tax model
If the social planner chooses the tax model (k = T ), she takes the responsibility of core
take-back and imposes a unit tax on the manufacturer for each product sold.
In this case the objective function of the manufacturer simplifies to;2
max
q
ΠM = (p− µ− τ)q (3.5)
where q = 1− p (3.6)
It is easy to see that the above objective function is concave in q and by backward
induction the optimal quantity for the manufacturer, q∗, can be written as (1−µ−τ)
2
.
Given the optimal quantity, the objective of the social planner simplifies to;
max
c,τ
SW = ΠE +ΠM +ΠC + τ q − χ c q (3.7)
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 (3.8)
0 ≤ τ < 1− µ (3.9)
where
ΠE = −²(1− c)(1− µ− τ)/2
ΠM = (1− µ− τ)2/4
ΠC = (1− µ− τ)2/8
2In the rest of the chapter, when we provide the solution of each model, we skip the legislation
structure identifier (k ∈ T,R) used in front of SW , ΠM , ΠC and ΠE for the sake of simplicity.
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The optimal solution to the model is summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under the tax model, the optimal decisions of the social planner are as
given in Table 3.2. The optimal take-back rate is always chosen at its upper bound 1
when the take-back cost is lower than the environmental cost and at its lower bound 0
otherwise. In case of perfect take-back, optimal tax increases with unit take-back cost
(χ) while it increases with the unit environmental cost (²) in case of zero take-back.
Proof. All proofs are provided in the Appendix-B.1.
² ≤ χ ² > χ
0 < ² ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< ² < 1− µ 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< χ < 1− µ
c 0 0 1 1
τ 0 −1 + 2²+ µ 0 −1 + 2χ+ µ
q 1−µ
2
1− µ− ² 1−µ
2
1− µ− χ
ΠM
(1−µ)2
4
(1− ²− µ)2 (1−µ)2
4
(1− χ− µ)2
ΠE − ²(1−µ)2 −²(1− ²− µ) 0 0
ΠC
(1−µ)2
8
(1−²−µ)2
2
(1−µ)2
8
(1−χ−µ)2
2
SW 1
8
(µ− 1)(4²+ 3µ− 3) (1−²−µ)2
2
1
8
(µ− 1)(4χ+ 3µ− 3) (1−χ−µ)2
2
Table 3.2: Optimal solutions for the tax model under all possible parameter realizations
Optimal take-back rate always occurs at boundaries. Since the social planner aims
to maximize the total social welfare and our model assumes a linear cost structure, it is
intuitive to obtain a perfect take-back rate when environmental cost (²) is higher than
take-back cost (χ) and a zero take-back rate otherwise.
Optimal tax increases with either the environmental or the take-back cost. As
long as ² is lower than or equal to χ, the social planner prefers zero take-back rate and
optimal tax increases in ². In this case, if ² > 1−µ
2
(i.e the marginal profit at no take-
back), the social planner imposes positive tax to reduce the sales quantity and increase
ΠE. When ² is greater than χ, on the other hand, the optimal tax increases with χ
and is always smaller than the take-back cost. This implies that the take-back cost is
shared by the manufacturer and the social planner in this case. In both of the cases the
social planner selects the optimal tax such that she always protects the manufacturer.
The optimal tax is positive only if ² or χ is greater than (1−µ)
2
.
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Take-back rate model
In this model, which corresponds to the Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment
Directive (WEEE), the social planner leaves the take-back task to the manufacturer.
The social planner decides on a target take-back rate and imposes this rate on the
manufacturer. Given the target rate and the take-back cost, manufacturer only decides
on sales quantity to maximize his profits.
The objective of the manufacturer simplifies to;
max
q
ΠM = (p− µ) q − χ q c (3.10)
where q = 1− p (3.11)
It is easy to see that the manufacturer’s objective is concave in q and by backward
induction, optimal quantity (q∗) is 1
2
(1− c χ− µ).
Given the optimal quantity, the objective of the social planner is written similar to
Atasu et al. (2009) as;
max
c
SW = ΠE +ΠM +ΠC (3.12)
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 (3.13)
where
ΠE = −1
2
(1− c)²(1− cχ− µ)
ΠC =
1
8
(1− cχ− µ)2
ΠM =
1
4
(1− cχ− µ)2
Proposition 5 The optimal decision of the social planner under the take-back rate
model is as summarized in Table 3.3. The optimal take-back rate is increasing in unit
environmental cost, ².
Optimal take-back rate is always increasing in the environmental cost and when
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0 < ² ≤ 3χ(1−µ)
2(χ+1−µ)
3χ(1−µ)
2(χ+1−µ) < ² <
3χ
2
3χ
2
≤ ²
c 0 3χ(1−µ)−2²(1−µ+χ)
χ(3χ−4²) 1
q (1−µ)
2
²(1−µ−χ)
4²−3χ
(1−χ−µ)
2
ΠM
(1−µ)2
4
²2(1−µ−χ)2
(3χ−4²)2
(1−χ−µ)2
4
ΠE − ²(1−µ)2 ²
2(2²−3χ)(1−χ−µ)2
χ(3χ−4²)2 0
ΠC
(1−µ)2
8
²2(1−µ−χ)2
2(3χ−4²)2
(1−χ−µ)2
8
SW 3(1−µ)
2
8
− ²(1−µ)
2
²2(1−µ−χ)2
2χ(4²−3χ)
3(1−χ−µ)2
8
Table 3.3: Optimal solutions for the take-back rate model under all possible parameter
realizations
the environmental cost is sufficiently higher than the take-back cost, take-back rate
is set to a positive value in the optimal solution. Perfect take-back is required if ²
is greater than 3χ
2
. This implies that compared to the tax model, perfect take-back
(i.e. the best environmental outcome) is possible at a higher environmental cost in this
model.
Comparison of monopoly models
In this section, we compare the two legislative forms with respect to the social welfare,
the manufacturer profit and the environmental impact. We do not make a separate
comparison for the consumer surplus since in the monopoly case, consumer surplus is
always half of the manufacturer profit and comparison for the consumer surplus will
be no different from the comparison for the manufacturer profit. First, we specify the
optimal manufacturer profit, the environmental impact and the social welfare for all
possible value intervals of environmental cost (²) and take-back cost (χ). Then, for every
parameter realization we evaluate the models’ relative efficiency from the perspective of
the social planner, the manufacturer, and the environment to see when the incentives
of different market figures are aligned. To ease understanding we use the same table
format as in Table 3.2.
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Corollary 1 Table 3.4 shows the dominating model with respect to social welfare under
all possible realizations of unit take-back cost (χ) and unit environmental cost (²). The
social planner is always better-off in the tax model except for the interval where ² is
lower than or equal to both χ and 1−µ
2
. Only in this case, where the environmental
cost is low enough so that zero take-back is optimal in both legislative forms, the social
planner is indifferent between the tax and the take-back rate models.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < 3(1−µ)
2
3(1−µ)
2
≤ ²
0 < ² ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< ² < 1− µ 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< χ < 1− µ 0 < χ < 1− µ
SW (T ) = SW (R) SW (T ) > SW (R)
Table 3.4: The dominating models for the social planner under all possible realizations
of take-back cost (χ) and environmental cost (²)
When the environmental cost is lower than or equal to both the take-back cost and
1−µ
2
, zero take-back is optimal for both the tax and the take-back rate models. This
is the case where the environmental cost is sufficiently low that social planner takes
back nothing in the tax model and imposes a zero take-back rate on the manufacturer
in the rate model. In fact, this case is equivalent to the no legislation case under both
legislative forms and two models are equivalent with respect to the social welfare.
When ² exceeds 1−µ
2
or when it is higher than χ, tax model always outperforms the
rate model.3 These results imply that except for the cases when the unit environmental
cost is very low, the social planner is always better-off under the tax model. That
is she can increase the social welfare by undertaking the take-back responsibility and
imposing a certain tax on the manufacturer.
Corollary 2 Similar to the social welfare case, Table4 3.5 summarizes the comparison
of the models with respect to the manufacturer profit. Tax model is either the dominating
or the equally favorable legislative form for the manufacturer except for the region where
3Only if the unit environmental cost is equal to the unit take-back cost in the interval of 3χ(1−µ)2(χ−µ+1) ≤
² < 1− µ, two models are equivalent with respect to the social welfare.
4See Proofs of Corollary 1-4 in Appendix B.1.1 for ²∗ and χ∗
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χ ≥ ² and 1−µ
2
< ² < 3(1−µ)
4
. In this interval, the take-back rate model outperforms the
tax model with either zero or interior optimal take-back rate (i.e. 0 < c < 1).
² ≤ χ χ < ² < 3(1−µ)
2
3(1−µ)
2
≤ ²
² ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< ² ≤ ²∗ ²∗ < ² < 3(1−µ)
4
3(1−µ)
4
< ² < 1− µ χ < χ∗ χ∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< χ < 1− µ 0 < χ < 1− µ
ΠM(T ) = ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) < ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) = ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R)
Table 3.5: The dominating models for the manufacturer under all possible realizations
of take-back cost (χ) and environmental cost (²)
Rate model is more profitable than the tax model for the manufacturer only if
the unit take-back cost is higher than or equal to the unit environmental cost and the
unit environmental cost is between the best possible profit margin and 3(1−µ)
4
. In this
interval zero take-back with positive tax is optimal for the tax model while either zero
or partial take-back is optimal in the rate model. It is intuitive that rate model with
zero take-back is more profitable for the manufacturer because manufacturer is not
sharing the environmental cost with no take-back and can obtain the same profit as in
a no legislation environment. In the same interval, rate model with partial take-back
can still outperform the tax model as long as the environmental cost is small enough
(< 3(1−µ)
4
). In this case, take-back rate imposed by the social planner is sufficiently
small so that the total take-back cost is lower than the total tax the manufacturer has
to pay in the tax model.5
Equality between the two models is possible when zero take-back is optimal in the
rate model and zero tax is optimal in the tax model. This case is actually equivalent to
the no legislation case and observed in two intervals in Table 3.5; (1) in the region of
² ≤ χ when the environmental cost is low enough (i.e. ² ≤ 1−µ
2
) to ensure zero take-back
and zero tax; (2) in the region of ² > χ when take-back and environmental costs are
not high enough (i.e. χ∗ ≤ χ < ² ≤ 1−µ
2
) to necessitate positive tax in the tax model
and positive take-back rate in the rate model. Overall, the dominance of the tax model
with respect to the manufacturer profit is obvious from the comparison in Table 3.5.
5If the unit environmental cost is equal to the unit take-back cost or 3(1−µ)4 in the interval of
²∗ < ² < (1−µ), two models are equivalent with respect to manufacturer profit since the total tax the
manufacturer has to pay and the take-back cost he incurs are equal in this case.
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Corollary 3 Table 3.6 summarizes the comparison of the models with respect to the
environmental impact. When either perfect take-back or zero take-back (with zero tax) is
optimal under both models, two models are equivalent in terms of the total environmental
impact. Only in a relatively restricted interval (i.e. ²† < ² < χ < 1 − µ),6 the rate
model outperforms the tax model. In all other cases, the tax model is always better than
the rate model.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < 3(1−µ)
2
3(1−µ)
2
≤ ²
² ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< ² < ²† ²† < ² < 1− µ χ ≤ 2²
3
2²
3
< χ ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< χ ≤ 2²
3
2²
3
< χ < 1− µ
ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) < ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R)
Table 3.6: The dominating models for the environment under all possible realizations
of take-back cost (χ) and environmental cost (²).
The dominance of the tax model with respect to the environmental impact is ob-
vious from Table 3.6. Except for the intervals where two models are equivalent and a
relatively small interval ²† < ² < 1 − µ where the rate model is better, the tax model
always outperforms the rate model. In the region where the rate model dominates,
partial take-back is optimal for the rate model while zero take-back with a positive tax
is optimal for the tax model. In other words, in the tax model the social planner tries
to reduce the total environmental cost by reducing the production with a positive tax
while in the rate model she tries to do so by imposing partial take-back on the manufac-
turer. In this region, requiring the manufacturer to take back at least some portion of
his used products is more effective than the taxing policy since the unit environmental
cost is relatively higher and taxing policy cannot be effective enough in reducing the
environmental cost. In contrast, in the region of (i.e. 1−µ
2
< ² < ²†), with the same
optimal solutions, tax model dominates the rate model because the unit environmental
cost is relatively lower and taxing policy can be more effective.
Two models are equivalent when either perfect or zero take-back is optimal in
both models. In the first case, there is no environmental cost while in the second one
6See Proofs of Corollary 1-4 in Appendix-B.1.1 for ²†.
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total environmental cost is maximum for both of the models and they are equivalent
with respect to the environmental impact. We observe the equivalence when unit en-
vironmental cost (²) is either sufficiently smaller or higher than unit take-back cost
(χ).
Corollary 4 Table 3.7 shows the intervals where the manufacturer and/or the envi-
ronment are better off under rate model in contrast to the social planner who is always
better off under tax model. As the table indicates when χ ≥ ² and (1−µ)
2
< ² < (1− µ),
at least for one of the stakeholders the rate model outperforms the tax model in contrast
to the social planner.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < 3(1−µ)
2
3(1−µ)
2
≤ ²
² ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< ² < ²† ²† < ² < 3(1−µ)
4
3(1−µ)
4
< ² < 1− µ χ ≤ 1−µ
2
1−µ
2
< χ < 1− µ 0 < χ < 1− µ
NONE MANUFACTURER
MANUFACTURER
ENVIRONMENT
NONE
ENVIRONMENT
Table 3.7: Stakeholders who are better off under the rate model under all possible
realizations of take-back cost (χ) and environmental cost (²)
Tax model optimizes the incentives of both the manufacturer (the consumers) and
the environment if ² > χ. This is the interval where perfect collection is always optimal
in the tax model. On the other hand, if ² ≤ χ, all stakeholders are better off under
the tax model only when environmental cost is sufficiently low (i.e. ² ≤ (1−µ)
2
). As ²
increases, first the manufacturer and, then the environment switch to the rate model.
For relatively low ² the manufacturer is worse off with the tax model while for higher
² environment suffers under the tax model.
3.3.2 Competition Case
In this case, we consider a competitive environment to investigate the effects of com-
petition on the relative efficiency of the three legislative models. We assume that there
are n identical manufacturers in the market and they play a Cournot game to obtain
their market shares.
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Tax model under competition
If the social planner chooses the tax model, she takes the responsibility of the core
take-back as in the base model and imposes a unit tax on manufacturers for each unit
they introduce to the market.
In this case, the objective function of each manufacturer is written as;
max
qi
ΠMi = (p− µ− τ)qi (3.14)
where p = 1−
n∑
i=1
qi (3.15)
It is easy to see that this objective function is concave in qi and by the first order
conditions, the optimal sales quantity for manufacturer i (q∗i ) and the optimal price
(p∗) are written as;
q∗i =
1− µ− τ
n+ 1
and p∗ = 1− n(1− µ− τ)
n+ 1
Given this optimal quantity, the social planner’s objective is;
max
c,τ
SW = ΠM +ΠC +ΠE + n qi τ − n qi c χ (3.16)
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 (3.17)
0 ≤ τ < 1− µ (3.18)
where
ΠM =
n∑
i=1
ΠMi =
n(µ+ τ − 1)2
(n+ 1)2
ΠC =
n2(µ+ τ − 1)2
2(n+ 1)2
ΠE = −²n(1− c)(−µ− τ + 1)
n+ 1
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The social planner’s objective is concave in the unit tax (τ) and linear in the take-
back rate (c) (see the proof of proposition 6 in Appendix-B.1.2). Hence, the optimal
take-back rate always occurs at the boundary values (either 0 or 1) while the optimal
unit tax may take interior values. The optimal solution of the model is summarized in
Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 The optimal decisions of the social planner are given in Table 3.8. As
in the monopoly case, take-back rate is always chosen at its upper bound 1 when the
unit take-back cost is lower than the unit environmental cost and at its lower bound 0
otherwise. Optimal tax, on the other hand, depends on the degree of competition (n).
It is increasing in n, ² and χ.
² ≤ χ ² > χ
0 < ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< ² < 1− µ 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ
c 0 0 1 1
τ 0 −1+(n+1)²+µ
n
0 −1+(n+1)χ+µ
n
q n(1−µ)
n+1
1− µ− ² n(1−µ)
n+1
1− µ− χ
nΠMi
n(1−µ)2
(n+1)2
(1−²−µ)2
n
n(1−µ)2
(n+1)2
(1−χ−µ)2
n
ΠE −n²(1−µ)n+1 −²(1− ²− µ) 0 0
ΠC
n2(1−µ)2
2(n+1)2
(1−²−µ)2
2
n2(1−µ)2
2(n+1)2
(1−χ−µ)2
2
SW (µ−1)n(2²(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
2(n+1)2
(1−²−µ)2
2
(µ−1)n(2χ(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
2(n+1)2
(1−χ−µ)2
2
Table 3.8: Optimal solutions for the tax model under competition given the possible
parameter realizations
As in the monopoly case, optimal take-back rate (c∗) always occurs at the bound-
aries. It is not affected by the degree of competition (n). However, competition affects
the optimal unit tax selected by the social planner. Quantity competition leads to a
price decline in the market which increases the number of consumers willing to pur-
chase the product and the total sales quantity. An increase in sales also increases the
total environmental impact and reduces the total social welfare. To compensate for this
adverse effect, the social planner increases the unit tax and brings down the total sales
to its monopoly level when environmental cost or take-back cost is sufficiently high. On
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the other hand, when these costs are not sufficiently high to necessitate a positive unit
tax (which is equivalent to no legislation case), total sales quantity increases and price
declines with competition.
As the degree of competition (n) increases, the social planner begins to impose
positive tax at even lower ² and χ. As a result, as Table 3.8 shows, optimal tax increases
under competition.
Corollary 5 Both the profit of each manufacturer (ΠMi) and the total manufacturer
profit (ΠM) decreases with the degree of competition (n) while the social welfare is not
affected when tax is positive and increases with n when tax is zero.
When the unit environmental or take-back cost is higher than the best profit
margin (1−µ
n+1
), the social planner increases the unit tax to keep the sales quantity at the
monopoly level, and this leads to a decline in the sales quantity of each manufacturer.
Hence, sales revenue of each manufacturer decreases with the degree of competition
(n). Due to higher tax, the total manufacturer profit (ΠM) also decreases with n. In
contrast, social welfare remains the same because the reduction in the manufacturer
profit is compensated by the increase in the tax revenue and the environmental impact
remain unchanged at the monopoly level.
On the other hand, when the unit environmental or take-back cost is lower than
the best profit margin (i.e. ²(χ) < 1−µ
n+1
), the social planner sets the unit tax to zero
and Cournot competition leads to an increase in total sales quantity and a decrease
in price. Nevertheless, the sales quantity of each manufacturer still decreases with n
and, the profit of each manufacturer and the total manufacturer profit reduce with
competition. On contrary, the social welfare increases with n because the reduction in
the manufacturer profit and the increase in the environmental cost is compensated by
the increase in the consumer surplus.
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Take-back rate model under competition
In this case, the objective function of manufacturer i is given as;
max
qi
ΠMi = (p− µ)qi − cχqi (3.19)
where p = 1−
n∑
i=1
qi (3.20)
It is easy to see that ΠMi is concave in qi and q
∗
i =
1−cχ−µ
n+1
by the first order conditions.
Given this, the social planner’s problem is written as,
max
c
SW = nΠMi +ΠC +ΠE (3.21)
s.t 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 (3.22)
where
nΠMi =
n(cχ+ µ− 1)2
(n+ 1)2
ΠC =
(cχ+ µ− 1)2n2
2(n+ 1)2
ΠE = −²(c− 1)(cχ+ µ− 1)n
n+ 1
Depending on the relation between the unit environmental cost (²) and the unit
take-back cost (χ), the objective function of the social planner can be linear, concave
or convex in the take-back rate c (see the proof of Proposition 7 in Appendix B.1.1).
Thus, optimal take-back rate (c∗) can take both boundary (0 or 1) and interior values
in this case. Proposition 7 summarizes the optimal solution set for the take-back rate
model under competition.
Proposition 7 Table 3.9 summarizes the optimal decision of the social planner for the
take-back rate model under competition. The optimal take-back rate increases with the
degree of the competition (n) and the unit environmental cost (²).
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Table 3.9: Optimal solutions for the take-back rate model under competition
Quantity competition leads to a price decline which increases the number of con-
sumers willing to purchase the product and, thus the total sales quantity increases.
However, an increase in sales also increases the total environmental cost and reduces
the total social welfare. To compensate for this effect, the social planner imposes a
positive take-back rate at lower levels of the unit environmental cost (²) in a Cournot
setting. The thresholds on the unit environmental cost for partial or perfect take-back
decrease as the degree of competition (n) increases. Similarly, as n increases the social
planner increases the optimal take-back rate in the partial take-back case; hence total
environmental cost decreases (ΠE increases) with n in this case. Overall intense com-
petition is beneficial for the environment. However, the same effect is not valid for the
manufacturers. Increase in the degree of competition reduces the total manufacturer
profit.
Comparison of models under competition
In this section, we compare the two legislative forms with respect to social welfare, total
manufacturer profit, and environmental impact under competition. As in the monopoly
case we do not make a separate comparison for consumer surplus since consumer surplus
is always equal to a constant (n
2
) times the total manufacturer profit and the comparison
with respect to the consumer surplus will be the same as the comparison for total
manufacturer profit. We investigate how competition affects the relative efficiency of
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the models for each stakeholder.
Corollary 6 Table 3.10 shows the dominating model with respect to the social welfare
under competition. Competition reinforces the dominance of the tax model. As the
degree of competition (n) increases, the region where tax model dominates gets larger
while the region where the two models are equivalent gets smaller.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
(n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²
0 < ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< ² < 1− µ 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ 0 < χ < 1− µ
SW (T ) = SW (R) SW (T ) > SW (R)
Table 3.10: The dominating models for the social planner under competition
Corollary 7 Table7 3.11 shows the dominating model with respect to the total manufac-
turer profit under competition. Similar to the social welfare case, competition reinforces
the dominance of the tax model with respect to the manufacturer profit. As the degree
of competition (n) increases, the regions where tax model dominates get larger while the
regions where two models are equivalent get smaller.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
(n+1)
(n+2)(1−µ)
(n+1)
≤ ²
² ≤ 1−µ
(n+1)
1−µ
(n+1)
< ² ≤ ²∗∗ ²∗∗ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
2(n+1)
(n+2)(1−µ)
2(n+1)
< ² < 1− µ χ < χ∗∗ χ∗∗ ≤ χ ≤ 1−µ
(n+1)
1−µ
(n+1)
< χ < 1− µ 0 < χ < 1− µ
ΠM(T ) = ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) < ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) = ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R) ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R)
Table 3.11: The dominating models for the manufacturer under competition
Competition strengthens the dominance of the tax model with respect to both the
social welfare and the manufacturer profit. To compensate for the sales increase due to
quantity competition, the social planner applies more stringent legislative tools as the
degree of competition (n) increases. Under intense competition the thresholds which
require positive tax and positive take-back rate decreases, hence even at relatively lower
environmental cost or take-back cost, there is non-zero tax in the tax model and either
partial or perfect take-back in the rate model. In other words, it becomes more difficult
7See the proof of corollary 7 in Appendix B.1.2 for ²∗∗ and χ∗∗.
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for manufacturers to obtain no legislation case profit in both models. Consequently, the
regions where the two models are equivalent (with respect to both the social welfare
and the manufacturer profit) narrow down in favor of the regions where tax model
dominates.
Corollary 8 Table8 3.12 summarizes the comparison of the models with respect to the
environmental impact under competition. As the degree of competition (n) increases,
the dominance of the tax model weakens while the dominance of the rate model for the
environment strengthens.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
(n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²
² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< ² < ²†† ²†† < ² < 1− µ χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
(n+1)²
(n+2)
< χ ≤ 1−µ
(n+1)
1−µ
(n+1)
< χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
(n+1)²
(n+2)
< χ < 1− µ
ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) < ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R)
Table 3.12: The dominating models for the environment under competition
When unit take-back cost is lower than unit environmental cost, tax model re-
quires perfect collection and is either the equivalently favorable or the dominating model
for the environment. In this case, competition only enlarges the intervals where rate
model also requires perfect collection and the regions where the two models are equiv-
alent with zero environmental impact, get larger while the regions where tax model
dominates get smaller.
On the other hand, when take-back cost is higher than the environmental cost, as
n increases the equivalence region gets smaller, while the region where the tax model
dominates and the region where the rate model dominates get larger. Hence, the
dominance of the rate model for the environment increases under intense competition.
Although the tax region also gets larger in this case, overall the dominance of the tax
model weakens if we also consider the previous case.
Corollary 9 Table 3.13 shows the regions where the manufacturer and/or the environ-
ment is better off under the rate model in contrast to the social planner who is always
8See the proof of corollary 8 in Appendix-B.1.2 for ²††.
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better off under the tax model. Competition increases the misalignment of incentives
between the social planner and the other stakeholders. As the degree of competition
increases, the regions where for either the manufacturer or the environment the rate
model outperforms the tax model get larger.
² ≤ χ χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
(n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²
² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< ² < ²†† ²†† < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
2(n+1)
(n+2)(1−µ)
2(n+1)
< ² < 1− µ χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ 0 < χ < 1− µ
NONE MANUFACTURER
MANUFACTURER
ENVIRONMENT
NONE
ENVIRONMENT
Table 3.13: Stakeholders who are better off with the rate model under competition
In Table 3.13, since 1−µ
n+1
decreases as n increases, the regions where at least one
of the stakeholders is better off with the rate model get larger under intense compe-
tition. For the same reason, the region where the tax model dominates gets smaller.
Under competition, misalignment is observed between the incentives of stakeholders at
relatively lower environmental cost (²). In previous sections we have discussed that
competition strengthens the dominance of the rate model for the environment. Accord-
ingly, in Table 3.13, we observe that as the degree of competition increases, the region
where the environment is better off with the rate model gets larger. Similarly, the
dominance of the rate model for the manufacturers also increases with n. As a result,
misalignment between the preferences of the social planner and the other stakeholders
extends as the degree of competition increases.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we investigate the structural efficiency differences between two common
forms of take-back legislation, namely tax and rate models. We consider a Stackelberg
setting where first the social planner decides on the legislative structure and then,
given the choice of the social planner, each manufacturer decides on his own sales
quantity to maximize his total profit. We measure the efficiency of the two models
from the perspectives of different stakeholders (i.e. manufacturer(s), the social planner
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and the environment) in monopoly and competition settings. In the competition case,
we assume n identical manufacturers competing in quantity.
As a result of our analysis, we observe that tax model is either the dominating or
the equally favorable model for the social planner under both monopoly and competi-
tion cases. Competition does not affect the dominance of the tax model for the social
planner. In contrast, for manufacturers and consumers, rate model can outperform the
tax model especially when the unit environmental cost is less than the unit take-back
cost but high enough to necessitate a positive tax. Similarly, the environment is also
better off with the rate model in these settings. Moreover, the settings where the envi-
ronment is better off with the rate model expands, as the intensity of the competition
(the number of manufacturers competing, n) rises. Nevertheless, for manufacturers,
consumers, and the social planner we cannot observe the same effect; instead competi-
tion reinforces the dominance of the tax model for these stakeholders. Competition also
aggravates the misalignment between the incentives of the social planner and the other
stakeholders. As the degree of competition increases the parameter regions where either
the manufacturer or the environment is better off under the rate model get larger.
In conclusion, our findings show that social welfare can always be maximized with
the tax model. Given this result, the interesting question is why some governments,
especially those in Europe, still prefer the rate model (imposing target take-back rates
and assigning the take-back task to manufacturers). One possible reason behind this
choice can be the reluctance of the governments to deal with the collection and recovery
tasks. The set up cost of collection and recovery systems and the possible externalities
(i.e. education of consumers and promotion programs to publicize take-back schemes)
can also act as disincentives. Similarly, in contrast to their complaints manufacturers
seem to be better off under rate model under certain parameter settings. Again exter-
nalities like transaction costs or system set-up costs or simply their reluctance to deal
with take-back and recovery operations, which are not included in this analysis, may
be the underlying reason for this preference of manufacturers.
62
Chapter 4
REFURBISH vs HARVESTING DECISIONS OF A
REMANUFACTURER
In previous chapters, as a significant motivator of product recovery we focused on
environmental legislation and its implications on the recovery decisions of firms. Once
the firms start product recovery and can make profit by processing and making use
of their used products, more tactical issues come into the picture. At this stage, an
important decision for a firm is the allocation of available cores among alternative
recovery options, namely the disposition decision. That is the remanufacturers should
decide what product recovery options to use for the available cores. Hence, in this
chapter, we examine the disposition decisions of a firm with two alternative recovery
options: refurbishing the core and selling the refurbished product at some fraction of
the price for the new product or dismantling it and selling the harvested parts.
In practice, remanufacturers either prioritize one option over others and try to
meet the demand of that option in the first place or make their disposition decisions
according to the quality of returned products. Current practice of IBM, where the
primary recovery option is refurbishing, is a good example of the former approach.
After replacing the worn components and reloading the necessary software, the firm
tries to sell the refurbished products through its web site for about a month, and at
end of this period, salvage the remaining products with almost zero profit. Only if
the available cores are more than the demand estimates for refurbished products is
harvesting considered (Ferguson et al., 2009). Some other remanufacturers such as
Pitney Bowes and Xerox, ReCellular Inc. (Guide and Van Wassenhove, 2003), on the
other hand, use quality-based decision making. Particularly, they prefer to refurbish the
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highest quality cores while they dismantle the lower quality ones to harvest their parts.
Both of these approaches, however, may lead to loss of possible profits especially when
there is demand uncertainty. Particularly, if the returned products are of comparable
quality (i.e. end-of-lease cores are generally at similar quality due to the predetermined
terms of use and lifetimes) or if refurbishing and harvesting are of equal value for the
remanufacturer, a quality based decision making may not be optimal. Similarly when
demand for either parts or refurbished products is uncertain and excessive production
from one option has to be salvaged at no profit, prioritizing one recovery alternative
over the others may lead to a loss of possible revenue from the ignored alternative.
For instance, a static policy which requires a certain amount of refurbishing without
considering the actual demand may lead to loss of possible harvesting revenue, especially
when the available cores are not sufficient to meet both refurbishing and harvesting
demand. Hence, there is always an opportunity for a better decision making mechanism
between the possible disposition alternatives.
In this chapter, we consider this problem, which is relevant to many remanufac-
turers, from a revenue management perspective. We argue that a dynamic approach
based on bid price controls will help remanufacturers to cope with the demand-side
uncertainty. Rather than making an allocation decision at the beginning of the plan-
ning period, we recalculate the optimal decision each time after a demand is received.
When a demand is received for a particular recovery alternative (for either a refurbished
product or a harvested part type), first we evaluate the opportunity cost of using a core
for that alternative. We allocate the core for that alternative only if its current value
for the remanufacturer is higher than the opportunity cost of the core. We obtain the
opportunity costs from a Linear Programming (LP) model that considers the problem
over a T period planning horizon. This helps to employ a dynamic approach without
losing the long-term planning perspective. The use of a deterministic LP-based algo-
rithm for determining the bid prices requires that the problem be frequently resolved
to account for the uncertainty in demand. While the need for such frequent resolving
sometimes prevents the implementation of this method for large problems, we show that
our problem can be solved via an efficient solution procedure based on an alternative
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formulation of the LP model which makes it practical to resolve the problem after every
demand arrival.
4.1 Literature Review
Our study relates to two separate streams of research; disposition decisions in product
recovery systems and revenue management, particularly bid price controls. The first
stream can be classified under the broader topic of Close-Loop Supply Chains (CLSC)
which extends the traditional supply chains to the post-consumer life of products. In
addition to the traditional supply-chain problems, CLSC is concerned with the collec-
tion of used products from the end-consumers (reverse logistics), inspection and sorting
of them, selection and implementation of a suitable recovery alternative (disposition de-
cision) and the distribution/selling of recovered products. Guide and Van Wassenhove
(2003) provide a review of issues related to closed-loop supply chains and discuss its sim-
ilarities and differences from traditional supply-chains. Fleischmann et al. (1997) and
Dekker et al. (2003) cover a number of quantitative models proposed for CLSC prob-
lems. More recently, Sasikumar and Kannan (2008a), Sasikumar and Kannan (2009),
Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009), Atasu et al. (2008) and Rubio et al. (2008) review
the evolution of CLCS and product recovery research over the last decades. Among
these, Sasikumar and Kannan (2008a), who provide the most comprehensive and the
recent review specifically on product recovery and inventory management issues in re-
covery systems, point out that revenue management approach for recovered products
is a noteworthy subject that has not yet received sufficient attention. In this research,
by making use of bid price controls, an revenue management method, in disposition
decisions, we hope, at least, to contribute to fill this gap in the literature.
The disposition decision for product returns has been discussed in a number of
studies. Most of these studies propose that returns should be allocated among the
recovery alternatives according to their quality levels (Fleischmann et al., 1997, Guide
and Van Wassenhove, 2003, Guide et al., 2005 and Mitra, 2007). Guide et al. (2005)
adopt a more strategic perspective and investigate the impact of disposition process
design (centralized vs. decentralized). On the other hand, Guide et al. (2008) consider
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a capacitated remanufacturing facility and propose a two-step disposition policy taking
into account the varying processing times of the returns and the time-sensitivity of
remanufactured product prices. Fleischmann et al. (2003) examine the integration of
returns as a new source of spare parts with the regular supply system of the company
and propose an inventory control model to address this issue.
A few studies have focused on the disposition decision; Inderfurth et al. (2001) as-
sume stochastic returns and demand in a make-to-stock system and propose an optimal
control policy for allocating scarce returned products among multiple remanufacturing
options under the assumption of linear allocation of returns. Kleber et al. (2002),
on the other hand, consider deterministic returns and demand, and integrate forward
production with remanufacturing in an environment where all demand should be met.
Similar to Inderfurth et al. (2001), they propose optimal control rules for the allocation
of returns among different alternatives. In contrast to these two studies, Ferguson et al.
(2009) propose a disposition strategy based on expected opportunity cost of alternatives
instead of seasonal fluctuations. They handle demand uncertainty through a stochas-
tic dynamic optimization model and show that a capacity-based Revenue Management
(RM) approach (Littlewood’s model) to the disposition decision can significantly in-
crease profits. We also propose an RM approach but there are important differences
between our study and this paper; (i) while refurbishing is always the more profitable
but riskier alternative in Ferguson et al. (2009), we do not make such an assumption.
Instead we allow the value of harvesting to vary based on the demand for parts and thus
take into account the cases where harvesting can be more or less profitable than refur-
bishing; (ii) our implementation is an example of a make-to-order (MTO) system while
Ferguson et al. (2009) consider a make-to-stock (MTS) system and (iii) to take into
account demand uncertainty, Ferguson et al. (2009) propose a stochastic optimization
model which decides on the optimal disposition amounts based on expected demand
at the beginning of the planning horizon. Unlike their static approach, we suggest a
dynamic approach using bid price controls. In other words, rather than deciding at the
beginning of the planning horizon over expected demand, we reevaluate the situation
each time a demand is received and choose the best option accordingly.
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Bid price controls were first studied by Simpson (1989) and then by Williamson
(1992). Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004, chapters 2 and 3) provide a comprehensive expla-
nation of the method for both single resource and network capacity control problems
while Talluri and Van Ryzin (1998) discuss the theoretical foundations of the method
in the context of a origin-destination (OD) control problem (a network RM problem).
The authors conclude that bid prices are optimal only if the opportunity cost of each
itinerary (a path on the network) is equal to the sum of opportunity costs of selling
each leg separately; otherwise, bid prices are only asymptotically optimal as leg capac-
ities and sales volume get larger. Since our problem is equivalent to the single resource
capacity control problem, this condition holds for our problem. Comparing the perfor-
mance of a deterministic LP (DLP) based and probabilistic non-linear programming
(PNLP) based bid price approach, Talluri and Van Ryzin (1998) show that DLP out-
performs PNLP especially when the marginal revenue (fare) variance within each (fare)
class is low or zero. This is in fact the case in our model since we assume constant
part/refurbished product prices for each period. A number of studies implemented
bid-price controls to hotel room allocation and airline seat inventory control problems
(Higle, 2007 and Goldman et al., 2002). Finally, Klein (2007) argues that using bid
prices which are computed on forecasted demand by DLP and updated only a few times
during the planning horizon will lead to inferior decisions. Since we update the bid-
prices each time a demand is received, our decisions are not affected by disadvantages
of outdated bid-prices.
4.2 Base Model Formulation
4.2.1 Problem Definition and Basic Assumptions
In this section, we define our problem and formulate our base model. We consider a
remanufacturer who receives a known amount of returns (cores) each period and plans
production over a horizon of T periods. Due to the reasons stated in the introduction
section of this chapter, cores do not vary significantly in terms of their quality and,
thus quality ranking is not a suitable criterion for the disposition decision. The firm
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has two options to recover value from an available core; refurbish and sell at a discount
of a new unit’s price or dismantle it and sell (or internally use) the harvested parts.
A core includes multiple part types in varying amounts and all of these parts can be
attained with hundred percent yield rate after dismantling.
The company works on a Remanufacture-To-Order basis and cores can be kept in
stock for future use, however there is no inventory of refurbished products. There is a
per period unit holding cost for cores inventory. We assume that total available cores
over T periods is not enough to meet all demand (refurbished product and parts demand
over T periods). As is the case for some remanufacturers like IBM, we consider a setting
where the total demand for refurbishing and harvesting exceed the total available cores.
Still, available cores in any particular period may exceed that period’s total demand.
In this case, the firm may keep some portion of the excessive cores in stock for future
use if it is profitable (after subtracting the holding cost). If there are still remaining
cores after sparing for inventory, he may just salvage them at a zero or negligible profit.
For parts, there exists a certain amount of base stock for each type and the firm can
keep parts inventory only as much as the base stock amount. Inventory exceeding the
base stock is just discarded at the end of the period. Also the firm has the option of
outsourcing parts from an external supplier but we assume that the cost of outsourcing
to the firm is always higher than the part’s selling price (Ferguson et al., 2009).
We do not include unit refurbishing and harvesting costs explicitly in our model.
Since we assume that the quality of cores are similar, these costs will not vary much
between cores and can be ignored without loss of generality. Still, if one would like to
reflect these costs in the objective, unit prices can simply be seen as unit net profits.
Demand for both the parts and the refurbished products are uncertain and fore-
casted over the planning horizon. We formulate our LP model using expected demands
but the formulation can handle demand uncertainty through a dynamic implementa-
tion described later. In the next section, first we give our notation in Table 4.1 and
formulate our LP model, which we will call as Disposition Model (DM) from now on,
as follows,
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Indices
i product type index, i = 1, ..., N
j part type index, j = 1, ...,M
t time period, t = 1, ..., T
Parameters
Drit demand for refurbished product type i at period t
Dpjt demand for part type j at period t
Bit quantity of core type i available at period t
prit per unit price for refurbished product type i at period t
ppjt per unit price for part type j at period t
hi per unit per period inventory holding cost of core type i
cjt per unit cost of outsourcing part type j at period t
vit unit salvage value of cores for core type i at period t
aij number of part type j that can be harvested from
one unit of core type i
Oj base stock level for part type j
Ij initial inventory for part type j
Decision Variables
xit amount of core type i refurbished in period t
zit amount of core type i harvested in period t
qjt amount of part type j sold in period t
sit amount of core type i salvaged in period t
bit inventory of core type i at the end of period t
ojt amount of part type j outsourced at the end of period t
Shadow Prices
ycit shadow price (dual variable) associated with constraint set (4.2)
for product type i in period t
ypjt shadow price (dual variable) associated with constraint set (4.3)
for part type j
Table 4.1: Notation for the disposition model (DM)
(DM)
max
T∑
t=1
(
N∑
i=1
pritxit +
M∑
j=1
ppjtqjt +
N∑
i=1
vitsit −
M∑
j=1
cjtojt −
N∑
i=1
hibit) (4.1)
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s.t. bi(t−1) +Bit − (zit + xit + sit)− bit = 0 i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T (4.2)∑N
i=1 aijzi1 − qj1 + oj1 ≥ Oj − Ij j = 1, ...,M (4.3)∑N
i=1 aijzit − qjt + ojt ≥ 0 j = 1, ...,M ; t = 2, ..., T (4.4)
qjt ≤ Dpjt j = 1, ...,M ; t = 1, ..., T (4.5)
xit ≤ Drit i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T (4.6)
xit, zit, qjt, sit, bit, ojt ≥ 0 i = 1, .., N ; j = 1, ..M ; t = 1, ..T (4.7)
DM is formulated for multiple product types and can be used even if there is commonal-
ity between the parts of different core types. However, in our dynamic implementation
and in the alternative formulation of the disposition problem we consider only one core
type (N = 1) and thus skip the product type index i from our variables.
The objective function maximizes the net profit of the firm over a planning horizon
of T periods. It is the sum of the revenue obtained from refurbished products, parts
and salvaged cores minus the cores inventory holding cost and the parts’ outsourcing
cost. Constraint set (4.2) represents the cores inventory balance constraint. Constraints
(4.3) and (4.4) are parts inventory balance constraints for the first period and the other
periods, respectively. We structure the problem such that each period starts and ends
with base stock amount of parts for each type. (i.e. for the first period Ij = Oj).
However, in the dynamic implementation parts inventory Ij may differ from the base
stock, since we solve the problem at every demand realization, as will be explained in
the next section. Hence, Oj − Ij may not always be equal to zero for the first period
and we denote this period separately. Constraint set (4.3) and (4.4) ensure that the
firm starts and ends each period with at least the base-stock amount of inventory for
each part type. Any amount exceeding the base stock will not be carried to the next
period and discarded. Constraints (4.5) and (4.6) guarantee that the amount of parts
harvested and refurbished products sold are not more than the associated demands in
each period. We solve our model using a rolling horizon.
In the next section, we present two approaches to use the solutions of our dispo-
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sition model to help remanufacturers in their disposition decisions. The first approach
is a static implementation, where we directly implement the solution of DM while the
other is a dynamic implementation based on bid-price controls which make use of the
DM solution only to determine the current bid prices.
4.2.2 Model Implementations
Static implementation
In our static implementation, DM is solved based on expected demands for each period
and the optimal harvesting and refurbishing amounts for each period are determined at
the beginning of the planning horizon. Then, this solution is implemented throughout
the planning horizon regardless of the actual demand realizations. However, when
the actual demand is not equal to the expected demand, this approach will lead to
loss of potential revenues for the firm. Therefore, next we also suggest a dynamic
implementation where we decide each time a new demand is received instead of deciding
based on expected demand at the beginning of the planning horizon.
Dynamic implementation
In our dynamic implementation, we employ a revenue management approach based
on bid-price controls. As a common method in hotel room or airline seat allocation
problems, a bid price control sets a threshold price which generally denotes the unit
opportunity cost of remaining capacity or time, and accepts a request only if its revenue
exceeds this threshold (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004). We still make use of the DM
solution; however instead of directly implementing this solution, we use it only to
determine the current bid prices. Each time a demand is received for either a refurbished
product or a part type, we resolve the model with the updated parameters (demand
and available cores capacity) on a rolling horizon and determine the current shadow
prices (or the dual variables) associated with the cores and the parts inventory balance
constraints. These dual variables give the opportunity cost of using an available core
or part and are taken as the bid prices in our context.
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In our dynamic implementation, we consider only one core type, hence our analysis
skip the product type index i. In fact, if there is no parts commonality between core
types, the analysis we provide here, can easily be extended to include multiple cores
since DM can be decomposed into N single core models under this assumption.
The procedure in our dynamic implementation can be summarized as follows;
Step 1: When an order is received, update the forecasted demand values in the right
hand side of constraints (4.5) and (4.6) and resolve DM with the new values.
Step 2: Check whether the order is for a refurbished product or a part.
(i) If it is for a refurbished product, compare the price of the refurbished prod-
uct (prt ) with the current shadow price (y
c
t ) of the cores inventory balance
constraint. If prt ≥ yct , accept the demand and refurbish one core to meet it
and update the core availability in DM. Otherwise, reject the demand.
(ii) If it is for a part, first check the current inventory of that part type. If the
part’s current inventory (Ij) is higher than its base stock level (Oj), then
without dismantling, meet the demand from stock. Otherwise calculate the
revenue from dismantling one core as;1
TRdismantle =
M∑
j=1
ppjtmax(min(Oj − Ij, aj), 0)
• If TRdismantle > yct , dismantle a core and update the inventory quantities
for all part types.2 Resolve DM with updated levels for parts inventory.
Compare the price of the part (ppjt) with the absolute value of the new
shadow price (ypjt) of the associated parts inventory balance constraint.
3
If ppjt ≥ |ypjt|, accept the order and update the inventory of this part.
Otherwise reject the order.
1When calculating the revenue from dismantling a core we only consider parts that can be added
to the inventory up to the base stock. Revenue from any parts exceeding the base stock is ignored in
this calculation since these excessive parts are considered as redundant and discarded at the end of
the period.
2Add the pieces obtained from dismantling to the inventory of the associated part type.
3We take the absolute value because these dual variables are always non-positive.
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• If TRdismantle ≤ yct , do not dismantle.4 Compare the current bid price
with the part price. Accept if ppjt ≥ |ypjt|, and reject otherwise. If the
order is met, update the inventory of this part.
Step 3: Stop if all of the available cores (Bt) are used up or the end of the period is
reached. Otherwise go to Step 1.
At the end of the period, if the parts inventory is less than the base stock for any type,
it is replenished (i) first by harvesting from the remaining cores, and (ii) if remaining
cores are not sufficient, by outsourcing.
4.3 An Alternative Formulation
As discussed before, the need for frequent reoptimization of the LP model is one of the
main disadvantages of the bid-price approach. In our dynamic implementation, we need
to resolve DM frequently after every realization of demand. To avoid this drawback,
we develop an efficient solution procedure that provides an optimal solution without
resorting to an optimization software. To do so, we reformulate DM in the form of a
transportation model. We name this formulation as TFDM to stand for transportation
formulation of the disposition model.
4.3.1 Redefinition of Variables and Parameters
In TFDM, cores available in each period become our supplies. To reformulate the
disposition problem in the form of a transportation model, we exploit the fact that the
alternative disposition options (i.e. refurbished products, parts and salvage) share a
common source of supply and redefine the demand for harvested parts as demand for
dismantling a core for different part bundles. Part bundles refer to sets of parts like
{P1, P2}, {P2, P3} or {P1, P2, P3} where Pj for j = 1, ...,M denotes a part. We use these
part sets to redefine the individual part demands as aggregate dismantling demands.
In any period, we only consider the part bundles with a positive demand. Hence, from
4Note that there is no need to resolve DM since no parameters are updated in this case.
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all possible bundles we determine the smallest set of bundles with a positive demand.5
Based on this, let z¯kt′t denote the amount of part bundle k demand met in period t from
the cores of period t′. We determine the smallest set of bundles with a positive demand
and the associated demands for each bundle in this set using Parameter Derivation
Procedure (PDP) given below.
In PDP, first we determine all possible part bundles and their unit revenues. Unit
revenue of a part bundle is the total revenue that can be obtained from the sale of
all part pieces harvested from a core. Note that by dismantling a core we can obtain
multiple pieces from each part type and to find the unit revenue of a part bundle we
consider the revenue from all pieces of each part type included in the bundle. Given
the revenues, we determine the demand of each part bundle according to the part type
whose demand can be fully met with the smallest amount of harvesting. We start from
the highest revenue part bundle and continue until the demands of all part bundles are
determined. To clarify consider the following example;
Example 1 Assume that there are three part types that can be harvested from a core
and for some period t their respective prices and demands are given as pp1t = 20, p
p
2t = 15
and pp3t = 15 and D
p
1t = 60, D
p
2t = 40 and D
p
3t = 30. Furthermore, a1 = 2, a2 = 2 and
a3 = 3. In this case, the set of all possible part bundles (E) is written as,
E = {b1 = {1}, b2 = {2}, b3 = {3}, b4 = {1, 2}, b5 = {1, 3}, b6 = {2, 3}, b7 = {1, 2, 3}}
The unit revenues for these bundles are calculated as b1 = 20, b2 = 15, b3 = 15, b4 =
70, b5 = 85, b6 = 75 and b7 = 115. Part bundle 7 has the highest unit revenue and we
calculate its demand as follows;
D(b7) t = min
j∈Jb7
(
Dpjt
aj
) = min(60/2, 40/2, 30/3) = 10
where Jb7 is the set of parts in bundle 7. In this case, part 3 requires the smallest
amount of dismantling and it determines the demand of part bundle 7.
5The number of all possible part bundles is equal to the number of all subsets (except the zero
subset) of an M -element set (2M − 1) where M is the number of part types.
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In the next step, we update the set E by eliminating all the bundles with part 3;
E = {b1 = {1}, b2 = {2}, b4 = {1, 2}} and recalculate the demand for each part as
Dp1t = D
p
1t − (10× a1) = 60− 20 = 40 and Dp2t = Dp2t − (10× a2) = 40− 20 = 20. We
repeat the procedure until all bundles in E are eliminated and we find all the bundles
with a positive demand as; b4 and D(b4) t = 10; and b1 and D(b1) t = 10.
We do not need the cores inventory variables in TFDM. Instead, we explicitly
include the decision variables denoting the case of meeting one period’s demand from the
previous period’s cores as in the the transportation formulation of production planning
problems. For instance, x¯t′t denotes the amount of refurbished product demand met in
period t from the cores of period t′. Finally similar to DM, salvage variables are defined
as s¯t′ to denote the amount of cores salvaged in period t
′.
PDP formally states the derivation of the parameters in TFDM from the original
parameters in DM as explained above. Table 4.2 summarizes the notation for TFDM.
Parameter Derivation Procedure (PDP):
Step 0: Let E be the set of all possible bundles of parts that can be obtained from a
core and St be an empty set. For all bundles k ∈ E, calculate the unit revenue
(pbkt) by
∑
j∈Jk ajp
p
jt, where Jk denotes the set of parts in part bundle k.
Step 1: Take the highest revenue part bundle. Let this be k∗ and add bundle k∗ to set
St. Determine the demand for bundle k∗ as;
Dbk∗t = min
j∈Jk∗
(Dpjt/aj)
Step 2: Let j∗ be the part type with minj∈Jk∗ (D
p
jt/aj). Eliminate all part bundles with
part j∗ from the set E and update the demand for each part byDpjt = D
p
jt−ajDbk∗t.
Step 3: If set E is empty, stop. Otherwise, go to Step 1.
St gives the smallest set of bundles with a positive demand in period t. We repeat
the procedure for all t = 1, ..., T to find this set and the associated revenue of each bundle
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Indices
k parts bundle index, k ∈ St where St denotes the set of
feasible bundles in each period t
t′ and t time period index, t′ = 1, ..., T and t = t′...T
Parameters
Drt demand for the refurbished product at period t
Dbkt demand for part bundle k at period t
Bt quantity of available cores at period t
prt′t per unit revenue from meeting a refurbished product order
in period t from the cores of period t′
pbkt′t per unit revenue from meeting part bundle k demand
in period t from the cores of period t′
vt′ per unit revenue of salvaging in period t
′
h per unit per period inventory holding cost of a core, h = h1
aj amount of part type j that can be obtained by
dismantling a core, aj = a1j for all j
Variables
x¯t′t amount of refurbished product demand met
in period t from the cores of period t′.
z¯kt′t amount of part bundle k demand met
in period t from the cores of period t′.
s¯t′ amount of cores salvaged in period t
′.
Shadow Prices
ut shadow price (dual variable) associated with
constraint set (4.9) in period t.
wdt shadow price (dual variable) associated with
constraint sets (4.10-4.12) in period t.
Table 4.2: Notation for the transportation formulation of the disposition model
(TFDM)
in it for each period. Given prt and p
b
kt, p
r
t′t = p
r
t − h(t− t′) and pbkt′t = pbkt − h(t− t′).
In DM, we have written the right hand sides (RHS) of constraints (4.3) as Oj− Ij
stating that they are always zero since the firm starts and ends each period with the
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base stock for each part. However; during the dynamic implementation, within a period
these RHSs may become negative or positive. In other words, the inventory of part j
may be higher or lower than its base stock at some time. When this occurs, we need
to make some adjustments to make these RHSs zero before we reformulate DM as a
transportation model (see Appendix-C.1 for these adjustments). As Theorem 1 given
below states, DM and TFDM are equivalent in terms of finding the optimal solution for
the disposition problem, when Oj − Ij = 0. When Oj − Ij > 0, on the other hand, the
adjustments needed to restore the right hand of Oj − Ij to 0 may hurt the equivalency
of the two problems. Nevertheless, TFDM can still be used to find the shadow prices
for the adjusted problem and these shadow prices can be used as the bid prices in
the dynamic implementation. The difference that may arise between the two dynamic
implementations (using DM versus using TFDM) due to these adjustments needs to be
tested experimentally which is beyond the scope of this study and will be considered in
further research.
Given this setting, the reformulation of the disposition problem as a transportation
model is as follows,
(TFDM)
max
T∑
t′=1
T∑
t=t′
(x¯t′t p
r
t′t) +
∑
k∈St
T∑
t′=1
T∑
t=t′
(z¯kt′t p
b
kt′t) +
T∑
t′=1
(s¯t′ vt′) (4.8)
s.t.
∑T
t=t′(x¯t′t) +
∑
k∈St
∑T
t=t′(z¯kt′t) + s¯t′ = Bt′ t
′ = 1, ..., T (4.9)
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′t ≤ Drt t = 1, ..., T (4.10)
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t ≤ Dbkt t = 1, ..., T and ∀k ∈ St(4.11)
T∑
t′=1
s¯t′ ≤
T∑
t′=1
Bt′ (4.12)
x¯t′t, z¯kt′t, s¯t′ ≥ 0 t = 1, ..., T and ∀k ∈ St(4.13)
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The objective function maximizes the total revenue from the sale of refurbished
products and parts, and salvaging. Constraints (4.9) are the cores supply constraints
equivalent to supply constraints in a standard transportation model. Constraints (4.10),
(4.11) and (4.12) are the demand constraints for refurbished products, part bundles and
salvaging respectively. The firm can salvage at most as much as the available cores in
each period. Hence, we take Bt′ as the right hand sides of constraint (4.12).
Theorem 1 The optimal solution of TFDM is also optimal for DM when Oj − Ij = 0.
Proof. See Appendix-C.2 for all proofs.
4.3.2 An Optimal Solution Procedure for TFDM
In this section, we provide an efficient procedure (TPP) to obtain an optimal solution
for TFDM. First we explain the basic idea underlying our procedure and then we give
the formal statement.
The firm has three options to use the available cores; refurbished product demand,
part bundles demand, and salvaging. In any period t, the firm can either meet the
demand of an option for that period, or for future periods (i.e. t + 1, t + 2,...,T ) by
carrying some cores from period t.
In our solution procedure, given the unit revenue of all alternative demand options
and the total available cores in each period, we start from the last period. We choose
the highest revenue option and meet its demand as much as we can from the available
cores in that period. Then, if there are still cores left, we consider the second highest
revenue option and try to meet its demand. We continue in this manner until all the
available cores for the period are used. Then, we pass to the previous period and repeat
the same procedure. We continue until we complete the allocation in all periods.
Formal Statement of TPP:
Step 0: Start from the last period (T ). Set t = T .
Step 1: Choose the highest revenue option with a positive demand which can be met
from period t. Let it be h∗ and its demand is Dh∗ . Allocate min(Dh∗ , Bt) amount
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of cores to this option and update both its demand and the available cores.
Step 2: Still if there are available cores left (Bt > 0), go to step 1. Otherwise, set
t = t− 1. If t = 0, stop, if not, go to step 1.
To clarify consider the transportation tableau6 4.3; to balance the total demand
and the total supply (available cores) we add a dummy supply in the amount of∑T
t=1(D
r
t + D
b
kt + Bt) −
∑T
t=1Bt since we assume that the total amount of available
cores is less than total demand. As in a standard transportation tableau we denote the
supply (cores) for each period in rows and the demand for each option in each period
in columns of the tableau. Given the transportation tableau, TPP can be restated as,
Period 1 . . . Period T Avail. Cores
RfPr. B-1 . . . B-M . . . RfPr. B-1 . . . B-M Salv.
Dummy x¯d1 z¯1d1 z¯kd1 z¯Md1 . . . x¯dT z¯1dT z¯kdT z¯MdT sd
∑T
t=1(D
r
t +D
b
kt)
Period1 x¯11 z¯111 z¯k11 z¯M11 . . . x¯1T z¯11T z¯k1T z¯M1T s1 B1
Period2 NA NA NA NA . . . x¯2T z¯12T z¯k2T z¯M2T s2 B2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
PeriodT NA NA NA NA . . . x¯TT z¯1TT z¯kTT z¯MTT sT BT
Demand Dr1 D
b
11 D
b
k1 D
b
M1 . . . D
r
T D
b
1T D
b
kT D
b
MT
∑
tBt
Table 4.3: Example transportation tableau
Step 0: Start from the last row (period T ).
Step 1: Going across the columns that are not crossed out, choose the highest revenue
cell in this row, allocate the minimum of the row and the column totals to this
cell.
Step 2: Update the row and column totals accordingly and cross out either the row
or the column which drops to zero. Do not cross out both if they both become
zero. Stop if exactly one row or column is left uncrossed. Otherwise, continue
with Step 3.
6RfPr. stands for refurbished product, B-M for part bundle type M and Salv. for salvaging in the
table. Cells denoted by NA are not feasible.
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Step 3: If a row is crossed out in Step 2, proceed to the previous row and return to
Step 1. If a column is crossed out, remain in the same row and return to Step 1.
Our solution procedure generates a basic feasible solution for TFDM (see Dantzig,
1998). Given a solution by TPP, cells with an entry form the set of basic variables
and the cells with no entry form the set of non-basic variables in the transportation
tableau. Theorem 2 states the optimality of TPP. We prove the optimality of TPP by
LP duality.
Theorem 2 TPP provides the optimal solution of TFDM.
Statement of the DM solution in terms of the TFDM solution
Given an optimal solution for TFDM, let us call it S = (x¯t′t, z¯kt′t, s¯t′), we can write the
equivalent solution (S ′) for DM as follows;
xt =
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′t (4.14)
zt =
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′t (4.15)
qjt =
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj
aj z¯kt′twhere Ktj denotes the set of feasible (4.16)
bundles of period t which include part j (Ktj ⊂ St for ∀ t and j)
st = s¯t′ (4.17)
bt =
t∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t+1
x¯t′l +
t∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t+1
∑
k∈Sl
z¯kt′l (4.18)
ojt = 0 since we assume cjt > p
p
jt for all j and t and, we consider (4.19)
the case where Oj − Ij = 0 for all t
In the dynamic implementation we use the dual variables associated with the cores and
the parts inventory balance constraints of DM; namely yct and y
p
jt. As it will become
clear in the next section, we run the dynamic implementation only for the first period,
thus we need the dual variables associated with only the first period (yc1 and y
p
j1). We
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define these dual variables directly from the solution found by TPP. In the definition of
these dual variables we use the dual variable associated with the cores supply constraint
of TFDM for the first period (u1). The proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix-C.2 explains
how we determine the dual variables associated with the TFDM constraints. Given u1
and the solution S ′, we determine yc1 and y
p
j1 as follows;
(i) yc1 = u1
(ii) The value of ypj1 depends on whether the constraints (4.3) are binding or not for
N = 1,
(a) If ajz1 − qj1 + oj1 ≥ Oj − Ij then ypj1 = 0
(b) If ajz1 − qj1 + oj1 = Oj − Ij then ypj1 = max
(∑
h 6=j ahp
p
ht−u1
aj
,−ppj1
)
where h
denotes parts different from part j and for which Dph1 > qh1.
4.4 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we conduct an extensive numerical analysis to evaluate the performance
of bid price approach to the disposition decisions of remanufacturers. We compare
our dynamic implementation which makes use of bid price controls with our static
implementation which simply implements the DM solution over an experimental set
defined below. The objectives of this analysis are; (1) to assess the contribution of
bid price approach in terms of handling demand uncertainty, (2) to determine the
aspects (e.g., total revenue, unmet demand) the dynamic implementation significantly
outperforms the static implementation and, (3) to determine under which parameter
settings the discrepancy between the two approaches gets larger.
4.4.1 Experimental Design
We consider a planning horizon of 6 periods (T = 6) where a period is approximately
equal to a month. We assume a single core type (N = 1) with 3 different part types
(M = 3) that can be harvested from this core. The amount of parts that can be
obtained by dismantling one core is given as a1 = 2, a2 = 2 and a3 = 3.
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For the unit price of refurbished products, we scale down the value used in Fer-
guson et al. (2009) by 10% and assume that prt = 100 for all t. A constant price over
the planning horizon is realistic since our planning horizon is not long enough for price
changes in this industry. Similarly, we take the part prices as pp1 = 20, p
p
2 = 15 and
pp3 = 15. In our problem, outsourcing the parts is not preferable and always generates
a loss for the firm, hence we assume that the unit costs of outsourcing parts are greater
than their selling prices. We take outsourcing costs as 1.5 fold of the selling prices. Per
period unit holding cost of cores is considered as 10% of the refurbished product price
(h = 10) in our experimental set. Finally, we assume that salvage value (vt) is 0 for all
periods. For the rest of the parameters, we ran a full factorial experimental design. We
consider 24 scenarios based on,
1. Refurbished product demand pattern: We consider three patterns, namely stable,
non-stationary, seasonal, for refurbished product demand.
2. Parts demand pattern: We assume two patterns, increasing and stationary, for
parts demand over the planning horizon.
3. The ratio of total available cores to total expected demand: We consider two cases,
Total Cores (TC)/Total Expected Demand (TED)= 90% and TC/TED= 70%.
4. The ratio of total expected refurbishing demand to total expected dismantling
demand: We take into account the cases of both total refurbishing demand being
higher than the total dismantling demand and vice versa. In the first case, we
assume that total expected refurbishing demand (TERD)/total expected disman-
tling (TEDD)= 6/4 and in the second case TERD/TEDD= 4/6.
We vary our scenarios mainly according to the demand patterns and the amount of
available cores since we want to assess the contribution of bid price approach in handling
demand uncertainty. For the expected refurbished product demand, we have scaled
down the data in Denizel et al. (2009) which is very close to industrial data and
represents three demand patterns as in our analysis. Table 4.4 shows the data we used
for refurbished product demand.
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Stable Non-stationary Seasonal
Period 1 39 24 24
Period 2 38 24 28
Period 3 50 24 56
Period 4 36 34 61
Period 5 22 55 24
Period 6 31 55 23
Table 4.4: Refurbished product demand
Given the refurbishing demand, we consider two cases for dismantling demand;
total expected dismantling demand is higher than total expected refurbishing demand
(particularly TEDD = TERD× 6/4) and total expected dismantling demand is lower
than total refurbishing demand (particularly TEDD = TERD × 4/6). We calculate
the total demand for each part by multiplying TEDD by the bill of materials values
(aj) and taking a certain percentage (100% for part 1, 85% for part 2 and 90% for
part 3) of this amount to differentiate between the demand for different part types. In
CLSC, parts demand is generally more predictable and less variable than the refurbished
products’ demand (Ferguson et al. 2009). Hence, we allocate the total parts demand
either as equally among the periods (stationary pattern) or as increasing by only 10%
from one period to the other (increasing pattern).
We examine the case where total available cores are not sufficient to meet all
demand. Hence, in our experimental set, the amount of total available cores is always
less than the total demand. We conduct our numerical analysis for the cases of both
relatively abundant available cores, where TC = 0.9 × TED, and relatively scarce
amount of cores, where TC = 0.7 × TED. For each of the scenarios we simulate
the two approaches (static and dynamic policies) for the first period. A summary of
scenarios is given in Table 4.5.
To run our experiments, we assume that demand arrivals for the refurbished prod-
uct and the parts occur randomly according to a Poisson process with the rate of ex-
pected period demands (as given above) over the length of the simulation period. Since
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Refurbished Product Parts Demand TC/TED TERD/TEDD
Demand Pattern Pattern
Scenario-0 Stable 0.7 4/6 Stationary
Scenario-1 Stable 0.7 4/6 Increasing
Scenario-2 Stable 0.7 6/4 Stationary
Scenario-3 Stable 0.7 6/4 Increasing
Scenario-4 Stable 0.9 4/6 Stationary
Scenario-5 Stable 0.9 4/6 Increasing
Scenario-6 Stable 0.9 6/4 Stationary
Scenario-7 Stable 0.9 6/4 Increasing
Scenario-8 Non-stationary 0.7 4/6 Stationary
Scenario-9 Non-stationary 0.7 4/6 Increasing
Scenario-10 Non-stationary 0.7 6/4 Stationary
Scenario-11 Non-stationary 0.7 6/4 Increasing
Scenario-12 Non-stationary 0.9 4/6 Stationary
Scenario-13 Non-stationary 0.9 4/6 Increasing
Scenario-14 Non-stationary 0.9 6/4 Stationary
Scenario-15 Non-stationary 0.9 6/4 Increasing
Scenario-16 Seasonal 0.7 4/6 Stationary
Scenario-17 Seasonal 0.7 4/6 Increasing
Scenario-18 Seasonal 0.7 6/4 Stationary
Scenario-19 Seasonal 0.7 6/4 Increasing
Scenario-20 Seasonal 0.9 4/6 Stationary
Scenario-21 Seasonal 0.9 4/6 Increasing
Scenario-22 Seasonal 0.9 6/4 Stationary
Scenario-23 Seasonal 0.9 6/4 Increasing
Table 4.5: Summary of scenarios
the static implementation allocates the available cores among alternatives according to
the expected demand, in this implementation we may observe excessive or insufficient
refurbished products or parts when actual demand is realized. In case of insufficient
production of one alternative, the firm loses the profits from the unmet orders, hence
is already penalized due to her poor decision making. In case of excessive production,
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on the other hand, we explicitly charge a penalty cost for each refurbished product or
part exceeding the actual demand (or base stock in case of parts). We set the penalty
costs as 30% of the associated parts’ or refurbished product’s selling price. Note that in
the dynamic implementation we will never observe excessive refurbished products since
the firm refurbishes a core only when there is demand for it. Nevertheless, there can
be excessive parts because when a core is dismantled to meet the demand of a certain
part type, pieces of other part types are also obtained and these may remain unsold at
the end of the period. Hence, for the sake of comparability we also charge the penalty
costs on the parts’ inventory over the base stock in the dynamic implementation.
Given our experimental set, we consider a simulation period of 30 days and ran
a total of 350 replications for each scenario. We determined the replication number
based on a sufficiently narrow 95% confidence interval (Law, 2004). We specified the
replication number considering the first scenario’s average net revenue and stuck to it
in other scenarios. We coded DM and our implementations in C++ within the MS
Visual Studio 2008 environment in connection with the CPLEX 11.2 Callable Library.
We conducted all computations on a Toshiba PC with Intel Celeron 560 2.13 GHz.
Appendix-C.3 provides the results for a sample of 50 replications under scenario
0 as well as the demand arrivals and the disposition decisions under dynamic imple-
mentation for one simulation period (30 days). First, in Tables-C.1-C.4, we give the
solution and the net revenue of each implementation for 50 different demand realizations
occurred in a Poisson process. Then, in Tables C.5-C.13 we provide a representative
simulation period and the associated disposition decisions under dynamic implementa-
tion.
4.4.2 Comparison of Two Implementations
In this section, we compare the two policies with respect to the net revenue for all
scenarios. We calculate the net revenue for the static and the dynamic implimentations
as follows;
• For the static implementation, first we calculate the total revenue from sales of the
refurbished products and parts and salvaging. In this calculation, as the actual
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sales amount for either products or parts, we use the minimum of the actual
demand and the planned refurbishing/harvesting at the beginning of the period.
Then, we subtract the cost of outsourcing and cores inventory, and the penalty
cost for excessive parts and refurbished products from the total revenue to find
the net revenue.
• For the dynamic implementation, first we find the total revenue by summing the
revenue from each sale during the simulation period. In this implementation, we
may need to replenish deficient parts by either outsourcing or harvesting remain-
ing cores at the end of the period. After replenishment we decide whether to
salvage or keep the remaining cores for future periods. To find the net revenue at
the end of the period, we subtract the outsourcing cost, penalty cost for excessive
parts and the holding cost of the final cores inventory from the total sales revenue
and add salvaging revenue if there is any.
In each scenario, we compare the average net revenue of the two implementations
by paired t-tests with a hypothesized difference of zero. Tables 4.6-4.7 show the results
of our t-tests along with the mean revenue for each implementation and the percentage
difference between the mean revenues. These results indicate that in all scenarios the
net revenue of the dynamic implementation is significantly higher than that of the
static implementation. This result is intuitive since in the dynamic implementation we
consider demand uncertainty but in the static implementation we do not.
The percentage difference between the mean revenues varies among scenarios.
Figure 4.1 shows the change of the average percentage difference with respect to the
refurbished product demand patterns. As the figure indicates the difference increases
as the refurbished demand variability increases.
Parts demand pattern also has a similar effect on the average revenue difference
between the implementations. As Figure 4.2 shows the percentage difference between
the net revenues is higher under increasing parts demand pattern compared to the
stationary pattern.
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Scen0 Scen1 Scen2 Scen3 Scen4 Scen5
Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static
Mean 6888 6855 6756 6716 4435 4396 4368 4343 8591 8503 7803 7541
Variance 2857 16177 5191 18398 1542 12282 2219 8906 57018 117897 332921 258488
P(T ≤ t) one-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Difference % 0.48 0.61 0.89 0.59 1.03 3.46
Scen6 Scen7 Scen8 Scen9 Scen10 Scen11
Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static
Mean 5558 5514 5359 5293 6853 6828 6307 6136 4332 4269 3946 3787
Variance 43489 70853 110795 167440 22826 29964 159212 180765 46881 76819 219072 263702
P(T ≤ t) one-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Difference % 0.80 1.24 0.36 2.78 1.48 4.20
Table 4.6: Comparison of revenues for scenarios 0-11
Scen12 Scen13 Scen14 Scen15 Scen16 Scen17
Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static
Mean 7586 7296 6278 5957 4673 4387 4119 3807 6853 6832 6295 6049
Variance 344965 186413 358423 179022 260820 119154 283918 116786 21979 29117 170012 167236
P(T ≤ t) one-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Difference % 3.98 5.39 6.50 8.21 0.31 4.07
Scen18 Scen19 Scen20 Scen21 Scen22 Scen23
Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static
Mean 4331 4289 4004 3819 7571 7309 6285 5969 4629 4378 4057 3773
Variance 43781 57400 153399 146259 327239 169615 356126 173149 267160 120732 331560 157788
P(T ≤ t) one-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Difference % 0.97 4.84 3.58 5.30 5.74 7.51
Table 4.7: Comparison of revenues for scenarios 12-23
Finally, Figure 4.3 shows the change of the percentage difference between the
net revenues with respect to the available cores. From the figure we observe that the
percentage difference increases as the amount of available cores increases.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examine the disposition decisions of a remanufacturer who works
on a remanufacturer-to-order basis under demand-side uncertainty. We consider three
disposition alternatives namely refurbishing, dismantling and salvaging and investigate
how the available cores should be allocated among these alternatives when their de-
mands are uncertain and the quality levels of the cores are similar. In contrast to
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Figure 4.1: Refurbished product demand pattern vs. percentage difference between net
revenues
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Figure 4.2: Part demand patterns vs. percentage difference between net revenues
some common approaches, which make the allocation based on expected demand at
the beginning of the planning horizon, we propose a dynamic approach. To cope with
demand-side uncertainty and avoid excessive or insufficient production, we employ bid
price approach. To implement the approach and obtain the necessary bid prices (unit
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Figure 4.3: Core availability vs. percentage difference between net revenues
opportunity cost of an available core/part) we model the problem as an LP over T
periods. We avoid the drawback of frequent reoptimizations required by the bid price
method by reformulating the model as a transportation model and providing an efficient
solution procedure for this formulation. In a large experimental set we compare our
dynamic implementation with a static implementation which directly uses DM solution.
As a result of our numerical analysis we observe that the dynamic implementation sig-
nificantly outperforms the static one under all parameter settings and the discrepancy
between the two approaches gets larger as the demand variability increases. Our re-
sults show that a dynamic approach, which can continually evaluate and balance the
marginal revenue and opportunity cost of each disposition alternative, can serve re-
manufacturers as a better decision making mechanism than the current policies used
in practice. We compare our dynamic implementation with respect to the static im-
plementation of the DM solution which may also provide a close-to-optimal solution if
demand uncertainty is not very high and still observe a significant difference. Hence,
when compared to more simple approaches like priority ranking used in practice, the
advantage of the dynamic implementation will become more prominent.
We consider the case of one core type. When there is no parts commonality
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between the core types, through a simple decomposition of the models all the analysis
we have provided here can be used for multiple core types as well. In case of parts
commonality, on the other hand, DM is still valid and can be used to implement the
two approaches we suggest. In this case only the transportation formulation and its
solution procedure will need some modifications. In the future studies, this formulation
can also be extended to handle multiple core type cases.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation study, we focus on two interrelated decisions in the context of
product recovery systems: at the strategic level the implications of the environmental
legislation on the product recovery decisions of producers, and, at the tactical level the
disposition decisions of a remanufacturer who is already engaged in product recovery.
In the field of environmental policy, first we address the recovery rate and the
product recoverability decisions of a manufacturer under a legislative disposal fee. We
take into consideration the initial investment costs for system set-up and investigate
the impact of these costs on the manufacturer’s decisions. Specifically, we examine how
the recovery choices of the manufacturer may change when he is reluctant to or cannot
entirely cover these initial expenditures. We conduct our analysis under both fixed and
increasing unit disassembly and product recoverability improvement costs.
As a result of our analysis, we observe that the insufficiency of the allocated fund
for the initial investments may have a significant impact on the optimal recovery deci-
sions. Our results show that the initial expenditures and the lack of sufficient funds to
cover them may even completely deter the manufacturer from starting product recov-
ery. Hence, for effective environmental policies, these initial investment needs should
be carefully taken into account and perhaps through proper subsidies their negative
effects should be alleviated. The analysis in this chapter also reveals the importance
of information about the recovery costs and savings and the redesign opportunities for
relevant product groups. Our findings suggest that to be able to set an effective disposal
fee, the policy maker should take into account these costs/savings.
In our second problem on environmental policy, we focus on the current imple-
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mentations of product take-back legislation. To understand the impact of the structural
variations in current legislation on the welfare of different stakeholders, we compare two
common forms of product take-back legislation (tax and rate models) from the perspec-
tive of the social planner, the manufacturer(s) and the environment. We consider both
monopoly and competition cases and find that regardless of the market setting, tax
model is always the dominating legislative form for the social planner. Nevertheless,
the same result does not seem to be true for the manufacturers or the consumers.
Our results show that especially, when the unit environmental cost is lower than the
unit take-back cost, rate model is more profitable for both the manufacturers and the
environment. In other words, despite the complaints and the counterarguments of man-
ufacturers, the rate model seems to serve better to their interests in certain parameter
settings (i.e. when the unit environmental cost is less than the unit take-back cost
but high enough to necessitate a positive tax). Competition reinforces the dominance
of the tax model for all the stakeholders except for the environment. That is under
intense competition rate model can serve better to reduce the environmental impact
of used products than the tax model. Nevertheless, competition also aggravates the
misalignment between incentives of the different stakeholders. Our results provide im-
portant implications for policy makers to assess the efficiency of each legislative form
and design the most appropriate legislation structure in different settings. Still, there
are a number issues like external costs (i.e. costs for promoting take-back programs,
educating consumers and system set-up) which should be take into account in future
research.
Finally, our last problem considers the disposition decisions of a remanufacturer
with three disposition alternatives; namely refurbishing, dismantling and salvaging,
and investigate how the available cores should be allocated among these alternatives
under demand uncertainty. In contrast to some common approaches based on priority
ranking and quality, to cope with demand-side uncertainty, we propose a dynamic ap-
proach where we employ a common revenue management method of bid price controls.
We compare our dynamic implementation with a static implementation in a numerical
analysis. Our findings show that the dynamic implementation significantly outperforms
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the static one under all parameter settings and the discrepancy between the two ap-
proaches gets larger as the demand variability increases. That is a dynamic approach,
which continually evaluates and balances the marginal revenue and the opportunity
cost of each disposition alternative, can generate more revenue than the current poli-
cies used in practice. In this dissertation, we consider the case of only one core type.
Still, our analysis can be readily extended to handle the case of multiple core types
when there is no part commonalities between the different core types. The case of part
commonalities, on the other hand, can be the subject of further research. Moreover,
in future research the dynamic approach we have provided here, can be compared with
other approaches such as stochastic models.
Our findings provide important insights for both the policy makers and the firms
who are already engaged in product recovery and can make profit from these operations.
First, for policy makers or social planners, our analysis is useful in identifying the
factors that may influence the effectiveness of environmental legislation under different
settings as well as the efficiency implications of the current take-back legislation for
various stakeholders in a product recovery system. For the manufacturers, on the other
hand, our analysis in Chapter 4 suggests an efficient mechanism which can help in their
disposition decisions.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1. ΠM is linear in qr, hence optimal qr always occurs at
boundaries. When we rearrange ΠM to see the coefficient of qr;
ΠM = −dfq + (−c− q + 1)q + (cχq + dfq − cdq)qr
From this expression observe that when cd− cχ ≤ df , ΠM is increasing in qr, and
optimal qr (q
∗
r) is 1. When cd− cχ > df , on the other hand, ΠM is decreasing in qr and
q∗r = 0.
ΠM is concave in q and we find optimal q by the first order conditions;
∂ΠM
∂q
= χqrc− c− df − 2q − cdqr + dfqr + 1
∂2ΠM
∂q2
= −2 < 0
∂ΠM
∂q
= 0 ⇔ q = 1
2
(df (qr − 1)− cdqr + c(χqr − 1) + 1)
We can summarize these results as below;
• q∗ = 1
2
(1− cd + c(χ− 1)) if cd − cχ ≤ df
• q∗ = 1
2
(1− c− df ) if cr − cχ > df
Given these the optimal solution of the base model is given in Table 2.2.
Proof of Proposition 2. When the objective function (ΠM) is rearranged in terms
of a, the coefficient of a is written as q(qrσ − cr). Given this, when qr ≥ crσ (qr < crσ )
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in the optimal solution, objective is increasing (decreasing) in a and optimal a is 1 (0).
We solve the model for these two cases;
• When a = 1,
– if df ≥ cd − cχ− σ,
qr = 1
q = 1
2
(χc− c− cd − cr + σ + 1) and p = 12(−χc+ c+ cd + cr − σ + 1)
ΠM =
1
4
(−χc+ c+ cd + cr − σ − 1)2
Note that the condition of df ≥ cd−cχ−σ ensures that ΠM(a = 1) is always
increasing with qr, hence qr is set to its maximum value, 1. Given a = 1 and
qr = 1, we can easily find q as given above.
– if df < cd − cχ− σ,
qr =
cr
σ
q =
−cdcr+(cχ+df )cr−(c+df )σ+σ
2σ
and p =
cdcr−(cχ+df )cr+(c+df+1)σ
2σ
ΠM =
(cdcr−(cχ+df )cr+(c+df−1)σ)2
4σ2
The condition of df < cd − cχ − σ guarantees that ΠM(a = 1) is always
decreasing with qr, hence qr is set to its minimum value,
cr
σ
, this time. Given
a = 1 and qr =
cr
σ
, again we can easily find q as given above.
• When a = 0,
– if cr(cd−cχ)+σ(c−1)
cr−σ > df ≥ cd − cχ,
qr =
cr
σ
q =
−cdcr+(cχ+df )cr−(c+df )σ+σ
2σ
and p =
cdcr−(cχ+df )cr+(c+df+1)σ
2σ
ΠM =
(cdcr−(cχ+df )cr+(c+df−1)σ)2
4σ2
Similar to the previous cases, the second condition on df (df ≥ cd − cχ)
ensures that ΠM(a = 0) is increasing with qr, hence qr is set to its maximum
value, which is cr
σ
in this case. The first condition ( cr(cd−cχ)+σ(c−1)
cr−σ > df ),
on the other hand, requires q to be always nonnegative. Given a = 0 and
qr =
cr
σ
we find q as given above.
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– if df < cd − cχ,
qr = 0
q = 1
2
(−c− df + 1) and p = 1+c+df2
ΠM =
1
4
(c+ df − 1)2
In the final case, the condition of df < cd − cχ ensures that ΠM(a = 0) is
decreasing with qr, hence qr is 0. Given a = 0 and qr = 0 we find q as given
above.
Given these solution intervals, it is easy to see that when df < cd − cχ − σ,
ΠM(a = 0, qr = 0) is always greater than ΠM(a = 1, qr =
cr
σ
). Similarly, when
df ≥ cd − cχ, solution of {a = 1, qr = 1} always outperforms {a = 0, qr = crσ }. This
implies that interior solutions are always outperformed by the boundary solutions.
In the interval of cd − cχ− σ ≤ df < cd − cχ, we compare the two boundary solutions;
• a = 1 and qr = 1 is more profitable when cd − cχ− σ + cr ≤ df < 2− 2c+ cχ−
cr − cd + σ,
• 2− 2c+ cχ− cr − cd + σ > cd − cχ and cd − cχ− σ + cr > cd − cχ− σ.
Given above results we can conclude;
• When cd − cχ− σ + cr ≤ df , the optimal solution is a = 1, qm = 1
• When cd − cχ− σ + cr > df , the optimal solution is a = 0, qr = 0
The optimal solution of the model is summarized in Table 2.3.
Note that since σ > cr, σ−cr is always positive. Hence, in this model the threshold
on the disposal fee (cd − cχ − σ + cr) for full recovery is smaller than the one in the
base model.
Proof of Proposition 3. The lagrangian is written as;
L = q(p− c)− qqr(cd + βcdqqr)− q(1− qr)df + sqrq + λ(1− q) + µq + α(1− qr) + ρqr
where λ, µ, α, ρ are the lagrange multipliers. First order conditions are;
∂L
∂qr
= −βqrq2 + cχq + dfq − (cd + βqqr)q − α + ρ = 0
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∂L
∂q
= −βqq2r + cχqr − (cd + βqqr)qr − c+ µ− λ− 2q − df (1− qr) + 1 = 0
Complementary slackness equations are;
λ(1− q) = 0 µq = 0 α(1− qr) = 0 ρqr = 0
Solving first order conditions and complementary slackness equations simultaneously
and checking for dual and primal feasibility, we find the optimal solutions of the model
as in Table 2.7.
A.2 Experimental Design for the Model LAFIC under Linear Cost
Structure
We determined our parameter set through full factorial design with three values for df
and two values for all the other parameters. To determine the values for the param-
eters, we considered the relations between the total cost of technology improvement
and the total cost of recovery capacity investment or the total possible savings from
recoverability improvement and tried to cover all possible cases.
We set values for F such that F is always smaller than the amount required to
cover all the initial investments. To ensure this, we calculated the amount of funds
that would be required to cover all the initial investment costs of the optimal recovery
rate and the optimal product recoverability without a constraint and multiplied this
amount by 0.9 and 0.3. In Table A.1, F ∗ denotes the amount of funds needed. Given
the specifications mentioned in the chapter, our experimental set is given in Table A.1.
A.3 Regression and Chi-square Analysis for the Model IDR under Linear
Cost Structure
We have given the analytical solution of the model IDR with linear costs in the chapter
and used this solution for our discussions. To compare this model with the other models
which we solved numerically, we also conducted a numeric study for this model. We
used the same experimental set as in the previous cases. Table A.2 and A.3 summarize
the results from this statistical analysis.
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Parameters Values
df 0.12− 0.25− 0.37
cd 0.22− 0.40
c 0.25− 0.45
χ 0.05− 0.15
cr 0.06− 0.11
σ 0.12− 0.17
F F ∗ × 0.3− F ∗ × 0.9
γ 0.07− 0.10
δ 0.005− 0.02
Table A.1: Experimental set for the model LAFIC with linear costs
Parameters Adjusted R2
c 0.582
df 0.093
cd 0.156
Table A.2: Adjusted R2 values from simple regressions for the model IDR with linear
costs
Parameters/Decision Variables qr a p
df 0.644 0.644 0.274
c Not Signf Not Signf. 0.789
cd 0.462 0.462 0.451
Table A.3: Cramer’s V coefficients from chi-square analysis for the model IDR with
linear costs
98
Appendix B
B.1 Proofs of Chapter 3
B.1.1 Monopoly Case
Proof of Proposition 4. Given ΠE, ΠM and ΠC , the social planner’s problem is
written as,
max
τ,c
SW =
3
8
(−µ−τ+1)2− 1
2
cχ(−µ−τ+1)− 1
2
(1−c)²(−µ−τ+1)+ 1
2
τ(−µ−τ+1)
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
0 ≤ τ < 1− µ
The social planner’s objective function is concave in unit tax (τ);
∂SW
∂τ
=
1
4
(2c(χ− ²) + 2²+ µ− τ − 1) and ∂
2SW
∂τ 2
=
−1
4
We find optimal τ by the first order conditions as;
∂SW
∂τ
= 0 ⇔ 1
4
(2c(χ− ²) + 2²+ µ− τ − 1) = 0
⇔ τ = 2cχ− 2c²+ 2²+ µ− 1
On the other hand, the objective function is linear in take-back rate (c), and depending
on the relation between the take-back cost (χ) and the environmental cost (²), it is
either monotone increasing (∂SW
∂c
> 0) or monotone decreasing (∂SW
∂c
> 0) in c. Hence,
optimal take-back rate (c∗) always occurs on the boundaries.
∂SW
∂c
=
1
2
(χ− ²)(µ+ τ − 1)
(i) c∗ = 0 if χ ≥ ²
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(ii) c∗ = 1 if χ < ²
Substituting the optimal c values in τ = 2cχ− 2c²+ 2²+ µ− 1,
(i) τ = −1 + 2²+ µ when c∗ = 0
(ii) τ = −1 + 2χ+ µ when c∗ = 1
We also require that unit tax to be always nonnegative and lower than 1 − µ so
that there is always positive production in the market. τc=0 is greater than 0 if ² >
1−µ
2
and lower than 1−µ if ² < 1−µ. In this case since ² ≤ χ, and we assume that χ < 1−µ,
² < 1 − µ is already satisfied. Hence, for c∗ = 0, optimal τ is 0 when ² ≤ 1−µ
2
, and it
is −1 + 2² + µ when ² > 1−µ
2
. Similarly, τc=1 is greater than 0 if χ >
1−µ
2
and lower
than 1− µ if χ < 1− µ. By assumption χ < 1− µ and the second condition is always
satisfied. Thus, for c∗ = 1, optimal τ is 0 when χ ≤ 1−µ
2
and, −1+2χ+µ when χ > 1−µ
2
.
Optimal solution (c∗, τ ∗) for the tax model can be summarized as;
• c∗ = 0 and τ ∗ = 0, if χ ≥ ² and ² ≤ 1−µ
2
• c∗ = 0 and τ ∗ = −1 + 2²+ µ, if χ ≥ ² and ² > 1−µ
2
• c∗ = 1 and τ ∗ = 0, if χ < ² and χ ≤ 1−µ
2
• c∗ = 1 and τ ∗ = −1 + 2χ+ µ, if χ < ² and χ > 1−µ
2
Proof of Proposition 5. By taking the sum of ΠM , ΠE and ΠC , the social
planner’s objective is written as;
max
c
SW =
1
8
(cχ+ µ− 1)(3cχ− 4c²+ 4²+ 3µ− 3)
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
Partial derivatives of the social planner’s objective with respect to c are;
∂SW
∂c
=
1
4
(
3cχ2 + (−4c²+ 2²+ 3µ− 3)χ− 2²(µ− 1)) and ∂2SW
∂c2
=
1
4
χ(3χ− 4²)
Considering the second order partial derivatives,
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• SW is concave in c when 3χ < 4². In this case, by the first order conditions
c = 3χ(1−µ)−2²(1−µ+χ)
χ(3χ−4²) .
– if ² > 3χ
2
, the given expression is greater than 1, thus optimal take-back rate
(c∗) is 1.
– if 3χ(1−µ)
2(χ+1−µ) < ² <
3χ
2
, the given expression is between 0 and 1, and thus
c∗ = 3χ(1−µ)−2²(1−µ+χ)
χ(3χ−4²)
– if 3χ
4
< ² ≤ 3χ(1−µ)
2(χ+1−µ) , the expression is lower than 0 and c
∗ = 0
• SW is linear and decreasing in c when 3χ = 4², and c∗ = 0.
• SW is convex in c when 3χ ≥ 4², and c∗ = 0.
Given these results the optimal decisions of the social planner in rate model can be
summarized as in Table 3.3.
Proofs of Corollary 1-4. See the proofs for the comparison of the models under the
competition case. Monopoly case is a special case of the competition case with n = 1.
In Table 3.5, ²∗ = 3χ(1−µ)
2(χ−µ+1) and χ
∗ = 2²µ−2²
2²+3µ−3 .
Similarly, in Table 3.6, ²† is the root of −²(−²− µ+ 1) = ²2(2²−3χ)(χ+µ−1)2
χ(3χ−4²)2 .
B.1.2 Competition Case
Proof of Proposition 6. The social planner’s problem is written as,
max
c,τ
SW =
n(µ+ τ − 1)(2c(χ− ²)(n+ 1) + 2²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2)− nτ)
2(n+ 1)2
(B.1.1)
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 (B.1.2)
0 ≤ τ ≤ 1− µ (B.1.3)
The social planner’s objective function is concave in τ and linear in c. Hence, the
optimal take-back rate always occurs at the boundaries (either 0 or 1) while the optimal
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tax may take interior values.
The partial derivatives of the objective function with respect to τ are;
∂SW
∂τ
=
n(n²+ ²+ µ+ c(χ− ²)(n+ 1)− nτ − 1)
(n+ 1)2
and
∂2SW
∂τ 2
= − n
2
(n+ 1)2
Since the objective is concave in τ we find optimal τ by the first order conditions;
∂SW
∂τ
= 0 ⇔ τ = n²+ ²+ µ+ c(χ− ²)(n+ 1)− 1
n
The objective function is linear in c;
∂SW
∂c
=
(χ− ²)n(µ+ τ − 1)
n+ 1
Thus, optimal take-back rate (c∗) is either 0 or 1 depending on the relation between ²
and χ;
(i) c∗ = 0 if χ ≥ ²
(ii) c∗ = 1 if χ < ²
Substituting optimal c in τ = n²+²+µ+c(χ−²)(n+1)−1
n
,
(i) τ = ²+ ²+µ−1
n
when c∗ = 0
(ii) τ = χ+ χ+µ−1
n
when c∗ = 1
Unit tax should always be nonnegative and lower than 1−µ so that there is always
positive production in the market. τc=0 is greater than 0 if ² >
1−µ
n+1
and lower than
1 − µ if ² < 1 − µ. Since ² ≤ χ in this case and χ < 1 − µ by assumption, ² < 1 − µ
is always satisfied. Hence, for c∗ = 0, optimal unit tax (τ ∗) is 0 when ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, and
² + ²+µ−1
n
when ² > 1−µ
n+1
. Similarly, τc=1 is greater than 0 if χ >
1−µ
n+1
and lower than
1 − µ if χ < 1 − µ. By assumption χ < 1 − µ and the second condition is always
satisfied. Thus, for c∗ = 1, optimal τ is 0 when χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
and χ+ χ+µ−1
n
when χ > 1−µ
n+1
as summarized in Table 3.8.
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Optimal unit tax is increasing with n. The partial derivatives of the optimal unit
tax with respect to n are,
when 1−µ
n+1
< ² < 1− µ,
∂
(−1+(n+1)²+µ
n
)
∂n
=
1− µ− ²
n2
and
1− µ− ²
n2
> 0 since ² < 1− µ (B.1.4)
when 1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ,
∂
(−1+(n+1)χ+µ
n
)
∂n
=
1− µ− χ
n2
and
1− µ− χ
n2
> 0 since χ < 1− µ (B.1.5)
Similarly, optimal unit tax is also increasing with ² when ² ≤ χ and it is increasing
with χ when ² > χ. Note that it is 0 when 0 < ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
(0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
) and rises
to −1+(n+1)²+µ
n
(−1+(n+1)χ+µ
n
) when ² (χ) exceeds 1−µ
n+1
. Moreover, in the interval of
1−µ
n+1
< ² < 1 − µ (1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1 − µ), it is easy to see that unit optimal tax increases
with ² (χ).
Proof of Corollary 5.
We examine the behavior of the manufacturer profit and the social welfare in 4
solution intervals as in Table 3.8.
1 . (c∗ = 0 and τ ∗ = 0)
ΠMi =
(1− µ)2
(n+ 1)2
and SW =
(µ− 1)n(2²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))
2(n+ 1)2
When we take the derivative of ΠMi , nΠMi and SW with respect to n;
∂ΠMi
∂n
= −2(µ− 1)
2
(n+ 1)3
and
∂(nΠMi)
∂n
= −(µ− 1)
2(n− 1)
(n+ 1)3
∂SW
∂n
=
(µ− 1)(n²+ ²+ µ− 1)
(n+ 1)3
∂ΠMi
∂n
and
∂(nΠMi )
∂n
are negative given that n > 1. Hence, in this interval both the profit
of each manufacturer (ΠMi) and the total manufacturer profit (nΠMi) decreases in n.
On the other hand, ∂SW
∂n
> 0 since ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
. Thus, SW increases in n.
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2 . (c∗ = 0 and τ ∗ = ²+ ²+µ−1
n
)
ΠMi =
(1− ²− µ)2
n2
and SW =
1
2
(1− ²− µ)2
SW is independent of n, hence it is not affected by n. On the other hand, it is easy
to see that ΠMi and nΠMi decreases in n.
3 . (c∗ = 1 and τ ∗ = 0)
ΠMi and nΠMi are the same as in interval 1 and the analysis for interval 1 is valid
for this interval as well.
SW =
(µ− 1)n(2χ(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))
2(n+ 1)2
∂SW
∂n
=
(µ− 1)(nχ+ χ+ µ− 1)
(n+ 1)3
∂SW
∂n
> 0 since χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
in this interval. Thus, SW increases in n.
4 . (c∗ = 1 and τ ∗ = χ+ χ+µ−1
n
)
ΠMi =
(1− χ− µ)2
n2
and SW =
1
2
(1− χ− µ)2
SW is independent of n, hence it is not affected by n in this case. On the other hand,
it is easy to see that ΠMi and nΠMi decreases in n.
Given the above analysis, we conclude that the profit of each manufacturer (ΠMi)
and the total manufacturer profit (ΠM) always decrease as n increases. On the other
hand, when tax is positive the social welfare (SW ) is not affected by n while it increases
as n increases when tax is zero.
Proof of Proposition 7. Taking the sum of nΠMi , ΠC and ΠE, the social planner’s
problem is written as;
max
c
SW =
(cχ+ µ− 1)n(2²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2) + c(χ(n+ 2)− 2²(n+ 1)))
2(n+ 1)2
(B.1.6)
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s.t 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 (B.1.7)
The first and second order derivatives of the objective with respect to c are;
∂SW
∂c
=
n (c(n+ 2)χ2 + ((1− 2c)²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))χ− ²(µ− 1)(n+ 1))
(n+ 1)2
∂2SW
∂c2
=
χn(χ(n+ 2)− 2²(n+ 1))
(n+ 1)2
From the second order derivative, it is easy to see that;
• SW is concave in c when ² > χ(n+2)
2(n+1)
. In this case, from the first order conditions,
c = ²(µ−1)(n+1)−χ(²(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1)) .
– if ² ≥ χ (1 + 1
n+1
)
, the expression given for c is greater than or equal to 1
and optimal c (c∗) is set to 1.
– if − χ(µ−1)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) < ² < χ
(
1 + 1
n+1
)
, then the expression takes values between
0 and 1 and c∗ = ²(µ−1)(n+1)−χ(²(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1)) .
– if χ(n+2)
2(n+1)
< ² ≤ − χ(µ−1)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) , then the expression is smaller than or equal
to 0 and c∗ = 0.
• SW is linear and decreasing in c when ² = χ(n+2)
2(n+1)
and c∗ = 0.
• SW is convex in c when ² < χ(n+2)
2(n+1)
and c∗ = 0.
Given these results, the optimal decisions of the social planner in the rate model under
competition are as summarized in Table 3.9.
The thresholds on ² which determine the intervals in Table 3.9, decreases in the
degree of competition (n). That is;
∂( (1−µ)χ
1−µ+χ(
n+2
n+1
))
∂n
< 0 and
∂(χ(n+2
n+1
))
∂n
< 0
Moreover;
(∂ (1−µ)χ
1−µ+χ(
n+2
n+1
))
∂n
>
∂(χ(n+2
n+1
))
∂n
In other words, as n increases, the zero or the partial take-back regions shrink while
the perfect take-back interval enlarges. Hence, we can conclude that optimal take-back
105
rate increases in the degree of competition (n).
Proof of Corollary 6. We can evaluate the two models in terms of social welfare
under three cases; when ² ≤ χ, χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
and (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ².
• When ² ≤ χ:
– In the interval of ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, optimal solution for the tax model is{
c = 0, τ = 0, SW (T ) =
(µ− 1)n(2²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))
2(n+ 1)2
}
Similarly, optimal solution for the rate model is{
c = 0, SW (R) =
(µ− 1)n(2²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))
2(n+ 1)2
}
Hence SW (T ) = SW (R) in this interval.
– In the interval of ² > 1−µ
n+1
, optimal solution for the tax model is{
c = 0, τ = ²+
²+ µ− 1
n
}
In this interval there are two feasible optima for the rate model depending
on the value of ²;
(a) when ² ≤ χ(1−µ)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) , c = 0 and SW (R) =
(µ−1)n(2²(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
2(n+1)2
(b) when χ(n+2)
n+1
> ² > χ(1−µ)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) , c ∈ (0, 1) and
SW (R) = − ²2(χ+µ−1)2n
2χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1)) .
It is easy to see that SW (T ) > SW (R) in both of these two cases. Hence,
SW (T ) > SW (R) in this interval.
• When χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
:
– In the interval of 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, optimal solution for tax model is{
c = 1, τ = 0, SW (T ) =
(µ− 1)n(2χ(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))
2(n+ 1)2
}
On the other hand, there are three possible optima for the rate model de-
pending on the value of χ;
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(a) when χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
, c = 1 and SW (R) = (χ+µ−1)
2n(n+2)
2(n+1)2
(b) when ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) > χ >
²(n+1)
n+2
, c ∈ (0, 1) and
SW (R) = − ²2(χ+µ−1)2n
2χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))
(c) when ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) ≤ χ, c = 0 and
SW (R) = (µ−1)n(2²(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
2(n+1)2
.
It is easy to see that SW (T ) > SW (R) in all of these cases. Hence, SW (T ) >
SW (R) in this interval.
– In the interval of 1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ, optimal solution for the tax model is{
c = 1, τ = χ+
χ+ µ− 1
n
, SW (T ) =
1
2
(χ+ µ− 1)2
}
On the other hand, depending on the value of χ there are two possible optima
for the rate model;
(a) when χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
, c = 1 and SW (R) = (χ+µ−1)
2n(n+2)
2(n+1)2
(b) when ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) > χ >
²(n+1)
n+2
, c ∈ (0, 1) and
SW (R) = − ²2(χ+µ−1)2n
2χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))
It is easy to see that SW (T ) > SW (R) in both of these cases. Thus, as in
the previous intervals, SW (T ) > SW (R) in this interval.
• When (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²:
This case is very similar to the second case. The only difference is that there exists
only one possible optima for the rate model. Both in the interval of 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
and 1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ, optimal solution for the rate model is{
c = 1, SW (R) =
(χ+ µ− 1)2n(n+ 2)
2(n+ 1)2
}
Similar to the previous cases, optimal social welfare for the tax model (SW (T ))
= (µ−1)n(2χ(n+1)+(µ−1)(n+2))
2(n+1)2
when 0 < χ ≤ 1− µ
n+ 1
= 1
2
(χ+ µ− 1)2 when 1− µ
n+ 1
< χ
As in the second case SW (T ) > SW (R) in both of these intervals.
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Given this analysis, we can conclude that SW (T ) = SW (R) only when ² ≤ (1−µ)
n+1
and ² ≤ χ. SW (T ) > SW (R) otherwise as shown in Table 3.10.
As the degree of competition (n) increases, the upper threshold (1−µ
n+1
) on the
equality region decreases.
∂(1−µ
n+1
)
∂n
< 0
This implies that as n increases the equality region gets smaller while the region
where tax model dominates enlarges.
Proof of Corollary 7.
Similar to social welfare comparison, we can evaluate the two models in terms of
the manufacturer profit under three cases; when ² ≤ χ, χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
and
(n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ².
• When ² ≤ χ:
– In the interval of ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, optimal solution for tax model is{
c = 0, τ = 0, ΠM(T ) =
(µ− 1)2n
(n+ 1)2
}
Similarly, optimal solution for the rate model is{
c = 0, ΠM(R) =
(µ− 1)2n
(n+ 1)2
}
Hence ΠM(T ) = ΠM(R) in this interval.
– In the interval of ² > 1−µ
n+1
, optimal solution for the tax model is{
c = 0, τ = ²+
²+ µ− 1
n
}
For the rate model, on the other hand, there are two possible optima de-
pending on the value of ²;
(a) when ² ≤ ²∗∗ = χ(1−µ)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) , c = 0 and ΠM(R) =
(µ−1)2n
(n+1)2
.
Thus ΠM(R) > ΠM(T )
(b) when χ(n+2)
n+1
> ² > ²∗∗, optimal c ∈ (0, 1) and ΠM(R) = n²2(χ+µ−1)2(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2 .
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In this subinterval,
ΠM(R) > ΠM(T ) if ² <
(n+ 2)(1− µ)
(2n+ 2)
ΠM(R) < ΠM(T ) if ² >
(n+ 2)(1− µ)
(2n+ 2)
• When χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
:
– In the interval of 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, optimal solution for the tax model is{
c = 1, τ = 0, ΠM(T ) =
(µ− 1)2n
(n+ 1)2
}
Depending on the value of χ there are three possible optima for the rate
model;
(a) when χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
, c = 1 and ΠM(R) =
n(χ+µ−1)2
(n+1)2
. Thus ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R).
(b) when ²(n+1)
n+2
< χ < χ∗∗ = ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) , c ∈ (0, 1) and ΠM(R) =
n²2(χ+µ−1)2
(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2 . Similar to (a), ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R)
(c) when χ∗∗ ≤ χ, c = 0 and ΠM(R) = n(µ−1)2(n+1)2 . Hence, ΠM(T ) = ΠM(R).
– In the interval of 1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1− µ, optimal solution for the tax model is;{
c = 1, τ = χ+
χ+ µ− 1
n
, ΠM(T ) =
(χ+ µ− 1)2
n
}
Depending on the value of χ there are two possible optima for the rate model;
(a) when χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
, c = 1 and ΠM(R) =
n(χ+µ−1)2
(n+1)2
(b) when ²(n+1)
n+2
< χ < ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) , c ∈ (0, 1) and ΠM(R) = n²
2(χ+µ−1)2
(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2
It is easy to see that in both of these subintervals ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R).
• When (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²:
This case is very similar to the second case. The only difference is that there
exists only one possible optima for the rate model.
Both in the interval of 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
and 1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1 − µ, the optimal solution
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for the rate model is {
c = 1, ΠM(R) =
n(χ+ µ− 1)2
(n+ 1)2
}
Similar to the previous cases, the optimal manufacturer profit for the tax model
is
ΠM(T ) =
n(µ− 1)2
(n+ 1)2
when 0 < χ ≤ 1− µ
n+ 1
ΠM(T ) =
(χ+ µ− 1)2
n
when
1− µ
n+ 1
< χ < 1− µ
In both of these intervals, ΠM(T ) > ΠM(R).
Given this analysis, we can conclude that the comparison of the two models with respect
to manufacturer profit can be summarized as in Table 3.11.
To see how the regions in Table 3.11 are affected by the competition, we examine
the behavior of thresholds as n increases.
• As n increases, the upper threshold (1−µ
n+1
) on the first equality region (see Ta-
ble 3.11) decreases.
∂(1−µ
n+1
)
∂n
= − 1− µ
(n+ 1)2
< 0
This implies that as n increases this region gets smaller.
The upper threshold of the second equality region is also equal to 1−µ
n+1
and de-
creases in n. However; the lower threshold on this region (χ∗∗) increases in n.
∂χ∗∗
∂n
=
²(µ− 1)2
(²(n+ 1) + (µ− 1)(n+ 2))2 > 0
As a result of these two effects, the second equality region gets smaller as n
increases.
• The lower threshold of the first tax model dominating region ( (1−µ)(n+2)
2(n+1)
) decreases
and the upper threshold (χ∗∗) increases as n increases.
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∂( (1−µ)(n+2)
2(n+1)
)
∂n
=
µ− 1
2(n+ 1)2
< 0
Hence, this region enlarges as the degree of competition rise.
Similarly, the lower threshold of the second tax model dominating region ( 1−µ
n+1
)
is decreasing in n and the upper threshold does not change with n. Hence, this
region gets larger as the degree of competition rise too.
• Finally, note that the only rate model dominating region is expanding in n. Both
the upper ( (1−µ)(n+2)
2(n+1)
) and the lower (1−µ
n+1
) thresholds of this region are decreasing
in n. However the decrease in the lower threshold is greater than the decrease in
the upper threshold and we can say that the region expands by 1−µ
2(n+1)2
with unit
increase in n.
∂(1−µ
n+1
)
∂n
= − 1− µ
(n+ 1)2
<
∂( (1−µ)(n+2)
2(n+1)
)
∂n
= − 1− µ
2(n+ 1)2
− 1− µ
2(n+ 1)2
− (− 1− µ
(n+ 1)2
) =
1− µ
2(n+ 1)2
Nevertheless, compared to the tax model dominating regions, this expansion is
much lower, hence the dominance of tax model is reinforced when n increases as
stated in the corollary.
Overall, as n increases the regions where tax model dominates gets larger while the
equality regions gets smaller.
Proof of Corollary 8. Similar to previous comparisons, we evaluate the two models
under three cases;
• When ² ≤ χ:
– In the interval of ² ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, there is zero take-back in the tax model and
optimal environmental impact is − ²(1−µ)n
n+1
. Similarly, optimal environmental
impact for the rate model is also − ²(1−µ)n
n+1
. Hence, ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) in this
interval.
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– In the interval of 1−µ
n+1
< ², ΠE(T ) = −²(1− ²− µ). In this interval there are
two feasible optima for the rate model;
(a) when ² ≤ χ(1−µ)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) , zero take-back is optimal for the rate model and
ΠE(R) = − ²(1−µ)nn+1 . Thus, ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R).
(b) when χ(1−µ)(n+2)
(χ−µ+1)(n+1) < ² <
χ(n+2)
n+1
, partial take-back is optimal for the rate
model and ΠE(R) =
²2(χ+µ−1)2n(n²+²−χ(n+2))
χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2 . Given this,
ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R) if ² < ²
††
ΠE(T ) < ΠE(R) if ²
†† < ²
Here, ²†† is the root of ²(²+ µ− 1) = ²2(χ+µ−1)2n(n²+²−χ(n+2))
χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2 .
• When χ < ² < (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
:
– In the interval of 0 < χ ≤ 1−µ
n+1
, perfect take-back is optimal for the tax
model and ΠE(T ) = 0. For the rate model, on the other hand, there are
three feasible optima depending on χ value;
(a) when χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
, perfect take-back is optimal for the rate model too and
ΠE(R) = 0. Thus ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R).
(b) when ²(n+1)
n+2
< χ < ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) , partial take-back is optimal and
ΠE(R) =
²2(χ+µ−1)2n(n²+²−χ(n+2))
χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2 .
(c) When ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) ≤ χ, zero-take is optimal and ΠE(R) = − ²(1−µ)nn+1 .
In (b) and (c), with zero environmental impact tax model always dominates
rate model.
– In the interval of 1−µ
n+1
< χ < 1 − µ, still ΠE(T ) = 0. On the other hand,
there are two feasible optima for the rate model;
(a) When χ ≤ (n+1)²
(n+2)
, ΠE(R) = 0. Thus, ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R).
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(b) When ²(n+1)
n+2
< χ < ²(1−µ)(−n−1)
²(n+1)−(1−µ)(n+2) , ΠE(R) =
²2(χ+µ−1)2n(n²+²−χ(n+2))
χ(χ(n+2)−2²(n+1))2 .
It is easy to see that in this case ΠE(T ) > ΠE(R).
• When (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²:
In this case, perfect take-back is optimal both for the tax model and the rate
model. Hence, ΠE(T ) = ΠE(R) = 0 throughout the interval.
Given this analysis, the comparison of the two models with respect to the envi-
ronmental impact can be summarized as in Table 3.12.
To see how the regions in Table 3.12 are affected by the competition, we examine the
behavior of thresholds as n increases.
• When ² ≤ χ;
– As n increases, the equality region gets smaller since the upper threshold of
this region (1−µ
n+1
) is decreasing in n.
– Tax model dominating region gets larger as n increases. Note that both the
upper and the lower thresholds of this region are decreasing in n. Never-
theless, the decrease in the lower threshold is greater than the decrease in
the upper threshold, thus the region expands as the intensity of competition
increases.
– Rate model dominating region gets larger as n increases since the lower
threshold of this region (²††) is decreasing in n.
• When χ < ² ≤ (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
;
– Both of the two equality regions get larger as n increases. Common upper
threshold of these regions is (n+1)²
(n+2)
and this threshold is increasing in n. The
lower threshold of the second equality region (1−µ
n+1
) is decreasing in n. Thus,
the equality regions expand as the intensity of competition increases.
– In contrast to the equality regions, due to the same threshold behaviors tax
dominating regions get smaller as n increases.
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• When (n+2)(1−µ)
n+1
≤ ²;
The only region in this case is an equality region and it gets larger as n increases
since the lower threshold of the region is decreasing in n.
If we consider all of these comparison regions together, it is obvious that under in-
tense competition the regions where the rate model is at least equally favorable expand,
while the regions where tax model dominates get smaller. Thus, we can conclude that
as the degree of competition (n) increases, the dominance of the tax model weakens
while the dominance of the rate model increases for the environment.
Proof of Corollary 9. Observe that the lower threshold of the misalignment region is
1−µ
n+1
and this threshold is decreasing in n. Hence, as the degree of competition increases,
misalignment region gets larger.
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Appendix C
C.1 Data Adjustments in DM Before Transportation Formulation
To reformulate DM as a transportation model we need to make the RHSs of the con-
straints (4.3) zero as discussed in section 4.3.1. To do this, we employ the following
heuristic procedure,
(i) If Oj−Ij is negative for some j, this implies that there is excessive inventory from
part j and this excessive inventory can be readily used to meet some portion of
the demand for part j. Hence, we deduct min
( | Oj − Ij |, Dpj1) from Dpj1 for all
j such that Oj − Ij < 0. If min
( | Oj − Ij |, Dpj1) = Dpj1, then this implies that
we will have excessive pieces for part type j at the end of the period. Since in the
dynamic implementation, we charge a penalty fee for each excessive part piece at
the end of the period, we need to keep record of these excessive amounts. Hence,
we update ej, the end of period excessive amount of part j over the base stock,
to ej+ | Oj − Ij | −Dpj1 in this case.
(ii) If it is positive, this implies that we have deficient inventory for part j and we
need to replenish it. In this case, we can replenish the deficient parts by either (i)
outsourcing or (ii) dismantling cores. If we dismantle, we sacrifice one core but
we avoid outsourcing costs and can sell any part pieces exceeding the required
amount if there is enough demand for that type to get some revenue. Hence, by
dismantling one core, we can save;
Sd =
∑
j∈P
(
cj1min(Oj − Ij, aj)
)
+
∑
j∈K
(
ppj1min(D
p
j1, aj)
)
(C.1.1)
where P is the set of all parts such that Oj − Ij > 0 and K is the set of all parts
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such that Oj − Ij = 0.
If we outsource, on the other hand, we save the core that would be dismantled oth-
erwise, and can use this core for refurbishing if there is still demand for refurbished
products. Hence, by outsourcing the deficient parts, we can save;
So = min
(
1, Dr1
)
pr1 (C.1.2)
To decide how to replenish the deficient parts,
Step 0: Determine all parts j such that Oj − Ij > 0 and let the set of these parts
be P . Similarly, let the set of parts for which Oj − Ij = 0 be K.
Step 1: Check the amount of available cores (B1).
(a) If B1 = 0, then outsource all deficient parts (oj1 = Oj−Ij for all j ∈ P ).
Set Oj − Ij = 0 for all j ∈ P and eliminate them from P .
(b) If B1 > 0, calculate Sd and So as defined in (C.1.1) and (C.1.2), respec-
tively.
• If Sd ≥ So, dismantle as much as min
(
B1,minj∈P
(Oj−Ij
aj
))
. Update
the inventory of each part type (Ij), the cores inventory (B1) and
the end of period amount of each part type exceeding the base stock
(ej) as follows;
B1 = B1 −min
(
B1,min
j∈P
(Oj − Ij
aj
))
Ij = Ij + aj min
(
B1,min
j∈P
(Oj − Ij
aj
))
for all j ∈ P
ej = ej + aj min
(
B1,min
j∈P
(Oj − Ij
aj
))
for all j ∈ K
Eliminate all parts j for which Oj − Ij = 0 from the set P and add
them to the set K.
• If Sd < So, then outsource all deficient parts (oj1 = Oj − Ij for all
j ∈ P ). Set Oj − Ij = 0 for all j ∈ P and eliminate them from P .
Step 2: If P is empty, stop. Otherwise go to Step 1.
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After these adjustments, to determine the shadow prices (bid prices) needed in
the dynamic implementation we can solve TFDM using the optimal solution procedure
(TPP) provided in section 4.3.2 instead of DM.
Note that when B1 = 0, we do not even need to solve TFDM and determine the
bid prices. In this case, we cannot meet any refurbished product order, hence we do
not need the shadow prices associated with the core inventory balance constraint (yc1).
As for the part orders, it is straightforward that the shadow prices associated with the
parts inventory constraints (ypj1) for which Oj − Ij ≥ 0, are equal to cj1 since the firm
will have to outsource to replenish each part he sells in this case.
C.2 Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof of Theorem 1. To show that an optimal solution to TFDM is also optimal
to DM, first we prove that the feasible region of TFDM (F (TFDM)) is a subset of
the feasible region of DM (F (DM)) and the objective functions of the two models are
equivalent over F (TFDM). Then, we show that the feasible region of DM is larger
than that of TFDM; however the optimal solution to DM can never be in F (DM) \
F (TFDM).
Let S = (x¯t′t, z¯kt′t, s¯t′) be a solution for TFDM and let the equivalent solution for
DM for N = 1 be S ′. S ′ can be written as (4.14-4.19) given in Section 4.3.2. Moreover,
let f(S ′) and f(S) denote the objective function value of DM and TFDM for solutions
S ′ and S respectively.
Part 1:
(i) To prove F (TFDM) ⊂ F (DM), we show that S ∈ F (TFDM) is a feasible
solution to DM. To do this, we check the feasibility of S for each DM constraint.
Cores Inventory Balance Constraints: These constraints are
b(t−1) +Bt − (zt + xt + st)− bt = 0 t = 1, ..., T (C.2.3)
Substituting S from (4.14-4.19) in (C.2.3) we get,
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t−1∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t
x¯t′l +
t−1∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t
∑
k∈Sl
z¯kt′l︸ ︷︷ ︸
b(t−1)
−
( t∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t+1
x¯t′l +
t∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t+1
∑
k∈Sl
z¯kt′l
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
bt
(C.2.4)
+
T∑
l=t
(x¯tl) +
T∑
l=t
∑
k∈Sl
(z¯ktl) + s¯t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bt
−
∑
k∈St
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t︸ ︷︷ ︸
zt
−
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′t︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt
−s¯t′ = 0 (C.2.5)
We know Bt =
∑T
l=t(x¯tl) +
∑T
l=t
∑
k∈Sl(z¯ktl) + s¯t from TFDM by (4.9). We can
write the difference b(t−1) − bt as,
t−1∑
t′=1
x¯t′t −
T∑
l=t+1
x¯tl +
t−1∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′t −
T∑
l=t+1
∑
k∈Sl
z¯ktl
When we substitute b(t−1) − bt in (C.2.4) and add to (C.2.5), we get;
x¯tt + z¯ktt − x¯tt − z¯ktt = 0
which shows that the solution S satisfies the cores inventory balance constraints
of DM.
Parts Inventory Balance Constraints: These constraints are,
ajzt − qjt + ojt ≥ 0 j = 1, ...,M and t = 1, ..., T (C.2.6)
From (4.16) and (4.15), we know qjt =
∑t
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj aj z¯kt′t, zt =
∑t
t′=1
∑
k∈St z¯kt′t
and ojt = 0. When we multiply zt with aj,
ajzt = aj(
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′t) =
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
(aj z¯kt′t)
Ktj which denotes the smallest set of part bundles with a positive demand and
include part j in period t, is a subset of St, which denotes the smallest set of all
part bundles with a positive demand in period t. Hence, the summation in ajzt
is over a larger part bundle set than the summation in qjt and this implies that
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ajzt is always greater than or equal to qjt and the solution S also satisfies parts
inventory balance constraints.
Parts Demand Constraints: These constraints are,
qjt ≤ Dpjt j = 1, ...,M and t = 1, ..., T (C.2.7)
Substituting qjt =
∑t
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj aj z¯kt′t, we can write them as,
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj
aj z¯kt′t ≤ Dpjt (C.2.8)
From TFDM we know,
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t ≤ Dbkt (C.2.9)
Let Ltj be the set of part bundles with a positive demand in period t and includes
part j except for the bundle k. Then, from Parameter Derivation Procedure we
can write (C.2.9) as,
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t ≤ Dbkt = min
j∈Jk
(Dpjt − aj(∑m∈Ltj Dbmt)
aj
)
(C.2.10)
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t ≤
Dpjt − aj(
∑
m∈Ltj D
b
mt)
aj
(C.2.11)
aj
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t + aj
( ∑
m∈Ltj
Dbmt
)
≤ Dpjt (C.2.12)
aj
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t +
∑
m∈Ltj
ajD
b
mt ≤ Dpjt (C.2.13)
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Using Ltj we can also write (C.2.8) in a similar way,
t∑
t′=1
aj z¯kt′t +
∑
m∈Ltj
t∑
t′=1
aj z¯mt′t ≤ Dpjt (C.2.14)
t∑
t′=1
aj z¯kt′t +
∑
m∈Ltj
aj
( t∑
t′=1
z¯mt′t
)
≤ Dpjt (C.2.15)
From (C.2.9), for all part bundles m we know that,
t∑
t′=1
z¯mt′t ≤ Dbmt ⇔ aj
t∑
t′=1
z¯mt′t ≤ ajDbmt (C.2.16)
Hence, given (C.2.13) and (C.2.16), (C.2.15) will also hold and we can conclude
that part demand constraints are satisfied for the solution S.
Refurbished Product Demand Constraints: These constraints are,
xt ≤ Drt t = 1, ..., T (C.2.17)
When we substitute xt =
∑t
t′=1 x¯t′t from (4.14),
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′t ≤ Drt (C.2.18)
We know that (C.2.18) holds from TFDM. Hence, (C.2.17) also holds and we can
conclude that S satisfies refurbished product demand constraints in DM.
Nonnegativity Constraints: Given our definitions of the DM variables in terms
of the TFDM solution S (see equations 4.14-4.19) and the nonnegativity of the
TFDM solution, S, it is obvious that these constraints are also satisfied.
(ii) f(S ′) = f(S) where S ∈ F (TFDM):
f(S) =
T∑
t′=1
T∑
t=t′
(x¯t′tp
r
t′t) +
T∑
t′=1
T∑
t=t′
∑
k∈St
(z¯kt′tp
b
kt′t) +
T∑
t′=1
(st′vt′) (C.2.19)
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f(S ′) =
T∑
t=1
(
prtxt +
M∑
j=1
ppjtqjt + vtst −
M∑
j=1
cjtojt − hbt
)
(C.2.20)
=
T∑
t=1
[( t∑
t′=1
x¯t′t
)(
prt′t + h(t− t′)
)]
(C.2.21)
+
T∑
t=1
M∑
j=1
[( t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj
aj z¯kt′t
)p
b
kt′t + h(t− t′)−
∑
h∈Jk
h6=j
ahp
p
ht
aj
]
(C.2.22)
+
T∑
t′=1
vts¯t′ (C.2.23)
−
T∑
t=1
[
h
t∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t+1
x¯t′l + h
t∑
t′=1
T∑
l=t+1
∑
k∈Sl
z¯kt′l
]
(C.2.24)
In f(S ′), (C.2.21) corresponds to
∑T
t=1 p
r
txt, namely the total revenue from the
sale of refurbished products. Similarly, (C.2.22) corresponds to
∑M
j=1 p
p
jtqjt, the
total revenue from harvested parts. Finally, (C.2.23) and (C.2.24) correspond to
total salvaging revenue and total cores inventory holding cost.
In (C.2.22), the fractional term redefines the price of part j in terms of part bundle
prices (pbkt′t). In PDP, we have defined the price of a part bundle as the sum of
the prices of parts included in the bundle,
pbkt′t = p
b
kt − h(t− t′) where pbkt =
∑
j∈Jk
ajp
p
jt (C.2.25)
When we reverse these operations, we can write the price of a part j in bundle k,∑
j∈Jk
ajp
p
jt = p
b
kt′t + h(t− t′) (C.2.26)
ppjt =
(pbkt′t + h(t− t′)−
∑
h∈Jkh6=j ahp
p
ht)
aj
(C.2.27)
where h denotes the parts in bundle k other than part j.
To show the equivalence of f(S ′) to f(S), first we will consider the first term,
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(C.2.21), in f(S ′). We can rearrange this term as,
T∑
t=1
( t∑
t′=1
x¯t′tp
r
t′t +
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′th(t− t′)
)
(C.2.28)
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′tp
r
t′t︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′th(t− t′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(C.2.29)
Note that B gives the total cost of meeting refurbished product demand by
carrying cores from previous periods and is equal to the first term of (C.2.24)
(h
∑T
t=1
∑t
t′=1
∑T
l=t+1 x¯t′l) which gives the total holding cost of cores used for re-
furbished products. Hence, these two terms cancel out each other. A, on the other
hand, corresponds to the total revenue from the sale of refurbished products and
is equal to the first term in f(S).
Similarly, we can rearrange (C.2.22) as,
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
M∑
j=1
∑
k∈Ktj
z¯kt′t
[
pbkt′t + h(t− t′)−
(∑
h∈Jk
h6=j
ahp
p
ht
)]
(C.2.30)
Note that the expression inside the brackets gives the total revenue from all pieces
of a given part type j included in the bundle k. Hence, if we calculate this revenue
for each part bundle k ∈ Ktj and add them up (the first summation), we get the
total revenue from part type j in all bundles. Similarly, in the second summation
when we add these total revenues for all part types (j = 1, ...,M), we simply
obtain the total revenue of all bundles. Hence, instead of these two summations
(summation over j and k ∈ Ktj), we can substitute the summation over all part
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bundles with a positive demand (k ∈ St) and restate (C.2.30) as;
=
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′tp
b
ktt (C.2.31)
=
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′t
(
pbkt′t + h(t− t′)
)
(C.2.32)
=
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′tp
b
kt′t︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+
T∑
t=1
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈St
z¯kt′th(t− t′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
(C.2.33)
Similar to A in (C.2.29), C corresponds to the total revenue from the sales of part
bundles and is equivalent to the second term in f(S). D, on the other hand, is
the cost of meeting parts demand by carrying cores from previous periods and
simplify with the second term in (C.2.24) (h
∑T
t=1
∑
k∈Sl
∑t
t′=1
∑T
l=t+1 z¯kt′l).
Finally, (C.2.23) denotes the total salvaging revenue and is obviously equivalent
to the last term of f(S).
This analysis shows that the objectives of the two models are equivalent for S ∈
F (TFDM).
Part 2: In this part, we show that any solution in F (DM)\F (TFDM) is never optimal
for DM.
First, observe that given the solution S ′ ∈ F (DM) and the equivalent solution S
for TFDM, the demand constraints for refurbished products and salvage in TFDM are
satisfied.
TFDM demand constraints for refurbished products are:
t∑
t′=1
x¯t′t ≤ Drt for t = 1, ..., T (C.2.34)
Substituting xt =
∑t
t′=1 x¯t′t from (4.14), we can write (C.2.34) as,
xt ≤ Drt for t = 1, ..., T (C.2.35)
which is equivalent to the refurbished product demand constraint in DM. Thus, we can
conclude that S ′ satisfies the demand constraints for refurbished products in TFDM.
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TFDM salvage demand constraint is:
T∑
t′=1
s¯t′ ≤
T∑
t′=1
Bt′ (C.2.36)
This constraint is also satisfied since the total amount of salvaging cannot be larger
than total amount of available cores.
To show the feasibility of S ′ for cores supply constraint of TFDM, we need the following
equalities which are derived from (4.18), (4.14) and (4.15) respectively;
T∑
t=t′+1
x¯t′t −
t′−1∑
l=1
x¯lt′ +
∑
k∈St
T∑
t=t′+1
z¯kt′t −
∑
k∈St′
t′−1∑
l=1
z¯klt′ = bt′ − bt′−1 (C.2.37)
t′∑
l=1
x¯lt′ = xt′ (C.2.38)
t′∑
l=1
∑
k∈St
z¯klt′ = zt′ (C.2.39)
Rearranging (C.2.37) we obtain,
T∑
t=t′
x¯t′t −
t′∑
l=1
x¯lt′ +
∑
k∈St
T∑
t=t′
z¯kt′t −
∑
k∈St′
t′∑
l=1
z¯klt′ = bt′ − bt′−1 (C.2.40)
Since S ′ is feasible for DM, we also know,
bt′ − b(t′−1) = Bt′ − (zt′ + xt′ + st′) (C.2.41)
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Substituting bt′ − b(t′−1) from (C.2.41) in (C.2.40) we get,
T∑
t=t′
x¯t′t −
t′∑
l=1
x¯lt′︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt′
+
∑
k∈St
T∑
t=t′
z¯kt′t −
∑
k∈St′
t′∑
l=1
z¯klt′︸ ︷︷ ︸
zt′
= Bt′ − (zt′ + xt′ + st′︸︷︷︸
s¯t′
) (C.2.42)
T∑
t=t′
x¯t′t − xt′ +
∑
k∈St
T∑
t=t′
z¯kt′t − zt′ = Bt′ − (zt′ + xt′ + s¯t′) (C.2.43)
T∑
t=t′
x¯t′t +
∑
k∈St
T∑
t=t′
z¯kt′t + s¯t′ = Bt′ (C.2.44)
Equation (C.2.44) is equivalent to cores supply constraint of TFDM and this shows
that S ′ also satisfies the cores inventory constraint of TFDM.
Finally, we consider the part bundle demand constraints which are written as;
t∑
t′=1
z¯kt′t ≤ Dbkt for t = 1, ..., T and ∀k ∈ St (C.2.45)
Since S ′ is feasible for DM, we know that;
qjt ≤ Dpjt for j = 1, ...,M and t = 1, ..., T (C.2.46)
Substituting qjt =
∑t
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj aj z¯kt′t from (4.16) in (C.2.46) we get;
t∑
t′=1
∑
k∈Ktj
aj z¯kt′t ≤ Dpjt (C.2.47)
Note that in parameter derivation procedure (PDP) we determine the demand
for each bundle by Dbkt = minj∈Jk
(
Djt
aj
)
where Jk denotes the set of parts included
in bundle k (see PDP). Let km be the part bundle which includes all part types, j =
1, ...,M and jm be the part type with minj∈Jkm
(
Djt
aj
)
, in other words the part type
whose demand can be met with the smallest amount of dismantling. Then, we can
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write (C.2.47) for jm as,
t∑
t′=1
ajm z¯kmt′t ≤ Dpjmt for t = 1, ..., T (C.2.48)
t∑
t′=1
z¯kmt′t ≤
Dpjmt
ajm
(C.2.49)
Right hand side of (C.2.49) is equal to Dbkmt, hence we have shown the feasibility of
demand constraint for bundle km which includes all part types.
Similarly, let ks denote the (m − s + 1)th highest revenue bundle which includes
s part types and js be the part type with minj∈Jks
(
Djt
aj
)
. Now we can write (C.2.47)
for js as,
∑
k∈Ktjs
t∑
t′=1
ajs z¯kst′t ≤ Dpjst for t = 1, ..., T (C.2.50)
∑
k∈Ktjs
t∑
t′=1
ajs z¯kst′t ≤ ajs
∑
k∈Ktjs
Dbkt (C.2.51)
t∑
t′=1
(z¯kmt′t + z¯km−1t′t + ...+ z¯kst′t) ≤ Dbkmt +Dbkm−1t + ...+Dbkst (C.2.52)
Note that (C.2.52) is the expanded form of (C.2.51). In this inequality, we know
that z¯kmt′t ≤ Dbkmt holds. However, this does not require z¯kst′t ≤ Dbkst or, in general,
z¯kt′t ≤ Dbkt for ∀k ∈ St which we need to show to prove the feasibility of S ′ for the
bundle demand constraints. Note that we have derived (C.2.52) from the parts demand
constraints of DM and these constraints only require that the total amount of sales of
a part type is smaller than its demand. In other words, for a given part type a solution
where its total sales is lower than its total harvested pieces even if there is more demand
for it, is feasible in DM. Given this, it is easy to see that the feasible region defined by
(C.2.50) is larger than the one defined by (C.2.45).
Nevertheless, in an optimal solution to DM, all the part pieces harvested will
be sold if there is demand for them. This implies that, in the corresponding TFDM
solution, the demand of higher revenue part bundles will be met first and the remanu-
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facturer will never dismantle for the part types included in lower revenue bundles before
meeting all demand of a part type included in a higher revenue bundle. Hence, for all
optimal solutions to DM, z¯kt′t ≤ Dbkt holds for ∀k ∈ St given (C.2.52) and (C.2.49). In
other words, all optimal solutions to DM is feasible for TFDM and F (DM)\F (TFDM)
only consists of non-optimal solution points to DM.
Thus, along with the previous results from Part 1, we can conclude that the
optimal solution of TFDM is also optimal for DM.
Proof of Theorem 2. We show the optimality of TPP by LP duality. In general,
a basic feasible solution for a transportation problem is optimal when the objective
equation coefficients (z-values) in the simplex tableau are nonnegative (ui+vj−cij ≥ 0).
In this inequality, ui and vj are simplex multipliers and denote the implicit prices (dual
variables) associated with ith supply constraint (or row in a transportation tableau) and
jth demand constraint (or column) and cij denote the objective function coefficient of
the associated variable. Hence, to show the optimality of TPP, first we define the dual
variables (simplex multipliers) associated with each constraint in TFDM and then show
the nonnegativity of the z-values. We denote the dual variables associated with the cores
supply constraints in TFDM by ut′ and the dual variables associated with the demand
constraints by wdt. In our transportation formulation, we denote different demand types
(refurbished product demand, part bundles demand and salvage demand) by different
symbols, namely with x¯, z¯ and s¯ respectively. However; for the sake of brevity, in this
section, we will use a single symbol, X, and a single type of index, d, to denote all
demand types. Particularly, we denote the amount of demand type d met in period t
from the cores of period t′ by Xdt′t and its unit revenue and demand by Pdt′t and Ddt
respectively, where d ∈ DT t = {rfpr, b1, ..., bM, slv}. In the set of demand types in
period t, DT t, rfpr denotes refurbished products, b denotes part bundles with positive
demand and slv denotes salvaging.
In the procedures, Procu and Procw, described below, we use the transportation tableau
4.3 for clarification.
Determination of ut′
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Given a solution S on the transportation tableau, we find ut′ by procedure Procu. We
repeat the procedure for all t′ = 1, ..., T .
To ease understanding, before the formal procedure, we provide the intuition
behind Procu. To determine ut′ , we consider the change in the objective function value
by a unit increase in the amount of available cores in period t′ (RHSs of the cores supply
constraints in TFDM). An additional core in period t′ will be first used to meet one
more unit of a not fully satisfied demand type for some period t∗ = t′, ..., T (condition
B in Procu) if there is any such demand type. If this is the case, then ut′ will be equal
to the unit revenue associated with this demand type (Pd∗kt∗ as defined in Procu). If
there is no such demand type, the additional core can be used to meet one more unit
of a demand type which is partially met from periods before t′ (Condition A). In this
case, we can avoid the associated holding cost and save one core in the period from
where the core is carried. This saved core can then be used to meet another demand
type which is not fully met. Therefore, in this case ut′ will be equal to the sum of the
avoided holding cost and the unit revenue associated with the demand type met by the
saved core (Pd∗kt∗ + (t
′ − k)h in Procu).
Procu:
Step 0: Set k = t′.
Step 1: In row k, find d∗ and t∗ such that
argmax
k≤t∗≤T
d∗∈DT t∗
{
Pd∗kt∗ |
k−1∑
l=1
Xd∗lt∗ > 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
or
t∗∑
l=1
Xd∗lt∗ < Dd∗t∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
}
Step 2: If B holds, then ut′ = Pd∗kt∗ + (t
′ − k)h.
If A holds, then find l′ = min1≤t≤t∗{t|Xd∗tt∗ > 0}. Set k = l′ and go to Step 1.
Determination of wdt
Given the solution S, we find wdt by procedure Procw. We repeat the procedure for all
d ∈ DT t and t = 1, ..., T .
Similar to ut′ , before the formal procedure, we provide the intuition behind Procw.
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To determine wdt, we investigate the change in the objective function value by a unit
increase in the demand of type d for period t. To meet this additional demand, we
need to sacrifice a unit of demand met from period t or a period before t, and save a
core in this period. To make this exchange in the most profitable way, we need to find
the minimum revenue demand type. Procw seeks this minimum revenue demand type
and equates wdt to the difference between the unit revenue of this demand type (Pdˆtˆlˆ
in Procw) and the unit revenue from meeting the additional unit of demand type d for
period t from the cores of period tˆ.
Procw:
• If Ddt >
∑t
t′=1Xdt′t, then wdt = 0.
• If not (i.e. if Ddt =
∑t
t′=1Xdt′t),
Step 0: Set k′ = t and d′ = d.
Step 1: Find tˆ = min1≤l≤k′{l|Xd′lk′ > 0}. In row (period) tˆ, find lˆ and dˆ such
that1
argmin
tˆ≤lˆ≤T
dˆ∈DT lˆ
{Pdˆtˆlˆ|Xdˆtˆlˆ > 0 and Pdˆtˆlˆ < Pd′ tˆk′}
Step 2: If tˆ = 1 or
∑lˆ
m=1Xdˆmlˆ < Ddˆlˆ, stop and set wdt = Pdtˆt − Pdˆtˆlˆ. Otherwise,
set k′ = lˆ and d′ = dˆ and go to Step 1.
Given ut′ and wdt for t
′ = 1, ..., T , t = t′, ..., T and d ∈ DT t as above, now we need
to show;
ut′ + wdt − Pdt′t ≥ 0 ⇔ Pd∗kt∗ + (t′ − k)h︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut′
+Pdtˆt − Pdˆtˆlˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
wdt
−Pdt′t ≥ 0 (C.2.53)
1If there is no such lˆ and dˆ, in other words if there is no cell with a positive entry and unit revenue
less than Pd′ tˆk′ , this is the degeneracy case. In this case, starting from the previous period (tˆ − 1)
search each period until a cell satisfying these two conditions is found and set the period where this
cell is found as tˆ.
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First note that tˆ ≤ t; tˆ ≤ lˆ; k ≤ t∗ and k ≤ t′ ≤ t by definition. For tˆ and t′, on the
other hand, there are two possibilities; (i) tˆ ≤ t′ or (ii) t′ ≤ tˆ. In Case (ii), we have
k ≤ t′ ≤ tˆ since k is smaller than or equal to t′. In case (i), again k is the smallest one
since k ≤ tˆ. The intuition behind this is that k is the first period where we find the
max revenue demand type which is not fully met for some period t∗ = k, ..., T ; tˆ is the
first period from where the demand of type d′ for period k′ is first met (Xd′ tˆk′ > 0). To
find k, we start from period (row) t′ and check the demand types for all periods (e.g. in
row t′ we check all columns t′, ..., T ) whose demand is either not fully met or partially
met from periods before t′. Hence, demand type d′ for period k′ is always among the
columns checked since its demand is partially met from tˆ ≤ t′. Starting from period
t′, if we find k before tˆ, this implies that in period k there exists a demand type (d∗)
with a higher unit revenue than the unit revenue of type d′ in that period and whose
demand for period t∗ is not fully met. However, this is not possible since our solution
procedure meets the demand for highest revenue types first and the demand for a less
revenue type will never be met before all demand of a higher revenue option is fulfilled.
Hence, k ≤ tˆ.
In case (i): We can write the third term in (C.2.53), Pdtˆt, as Pdt′t− (t′− tˆ)h. With
this substitution (C.2.53) is written as;
Pd∗kt∗ + (t
′ − k)h+ Pdt′t − (t′ − tˆ)h− Pdˆtˆlˆ − Pdt′t ≥ 0
Pd∗kt∗ + (t
′ − k)h− (t′ − tˆ)h︸ ︷︷ ︸
(tˆ−k)h
−Pdˆtˆlˆ ≥ 0
Pd∗kt∗ + (tˆ− k)h− Pdˆtˆlˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Pdˆklˆ
≥ 0
Pd∗kt∗ − Pdˆklˆ ≥ 0
Since Pd∗kt∗ is the max demand type in period k (see Procu), the last inequality always
holds.
In case (ii): We substitute Pdtˆt with Pdt′t + (tˆ− t′)h and (C.2.53) is written as;
Pd∗kt∗ + (t
′ − k)h+ Pdt′t + (tˆ− t′)h− Pdˆtˆlˆ − Pdt′t ≥ 0
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Pd∗kt∗ + (t
′ − k)h+ (tˆ− t′)h︸ ︷︷ ︸
(tˆ−k)h
−Pdˆtˆlˆ ≥ 0
Then similar to case (i), we can conclude that (C.2.53) holds for all t′ = 1, ..., T ,
t = t′, ..., T and d ∈ DT t.
C.3 A Sample of Numerical Results
Tables C.1-C.2 and C.3-C.4 give the results for a sample of 50 replications under scenario
0 for static and dynamic implementations, respectively. In the tables, the first four
columns give the refurbished product and the parts demand received over the length of
one simulation period. The fifth and the following three columns show the amount of
refurbished product demand and parts’ demand met, respectively. Then columns nine
to eleven denote the amount of outsourcing for parts while columns twelve to fourteen
give the amount of excessive parts inventory over base stock at the end of the simulation
period. Finally, the last two columns show the salvaging amount and the net revenue
which is calculated as described in section 4.4.2.
Tables C.5-C.13, on the other hand, show the demand arrivals and the associated
disposition decisions for one simulation period (30 days) under dynamic implementa-
tion. In the tables, the first two columns denote the simulation time and the order type,
respectively. Here, P1, P2, P3, and Pr stand for Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, and refurbished
product, respectively. Columns three to six show the remaining demands for refurbished
products and parts at each simulation time. Shadow prices associated with parts in-
ventory constraints and cores inventory balance constraints are given in columns seven
and eight, respectively. Column nine shows the decision made for the received order.
Note that when a refurbished product order is received, the firm decides only whether
to accept or reject it while when a part order is received first he decides whether to
dismantle a core or not and then determine whether to meet the order or not. In this
column, acronyms, DisAcc, DisRej, NoDisAcc, NoDisRej, Acc, and Rej stand for the
decisions of accepting a part order after dismantling a core, dismantling but rejecting a
part order, accepting a part order without dismantling, rejecting a part order and not
dismantling, accepting a refurbished product order, and rejecting a refurbished product
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order, respectively. Finally, columns ten to thirteen denote the remaining inventory of
cores and each part type after each decision and column fourteen gives the cumulative
revenue.
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Demand Data from Simulation Static Implementation
Excessive inventory
Refurbish product Parts’ demand Refurbish product Parts’ demand Outsourced over base stock at Salvaged Net
demand received received demand met met the end of the period Revenue
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
43 104 93 119 17 92 92 119 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 6624
47 103 92 141 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
36 117 96 159 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
27 122 91 145 17 92 91 137 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6956
30 94 98 145 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
38 98 89 137 17 92 89 137 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6917
54 89 84 141 17 89 84 137 0 0 0 3 8 0 0 6741
48 119 87 132 17 92 87 132 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 6780
30 115 84 139 17 92 84 137 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 6819
43 97 83 153 17 92 83 137 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 6800
41 112 83 141 17 92 83 137 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 6800
39 113 89 145 17 92 89 137 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6917
43 99 89 141 17 92 89 137 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6917
34 110 92 159 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
32 97 91 152 17 92 91 137 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6956
42 112 99 142 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
30 129 87 156 17 92 87 137 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 6878
40 98 103 145 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
38 104 83 152 17 92 83 137 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 6800
32 96 82 149 17 92 82 137 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 6780
42 105 68 139 17 92 68 137 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 6507
37 114 104 166 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
35 119 102 146 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
29 112 95 152 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
34 112 104 172 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
42 108 91 131 17 92 91 131 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 6839
33 105 82 137 17 92 82 137 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 6780
41 96 87 162 17 92 87 137 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 6878
43 124 85 135 17 92 85 135 0 0 0 0 7 2 0 6800
43 110 86 147 17 92 86 137 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6858
29 106 102 154 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
30 96 91 147 17 92 91 137 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6956
35 99 92 137 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
39 87 93 137 17 87 92 137 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 6845
39 103 84 118 17 92 84 118 0 0 0 0 8 19 0 6449
41 115 86 126 17 92 86 126 0 0 0 0 6 11 0 6644
44 117 76 136 17 92 76 136 0 0 0 0 16 1 0 6644
39 111 86 153 17 92 86 137 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6858
32 121 79 135 17 92 79 135 0 0 0 0 13 2 0 6683
29 116 98 168 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
30 125 86 160 17 92 86 137 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6858
39 103 73 146 17 92 73 137 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 6605
34 106 85 139 17 92 85 137 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 6839
52 125 79 136 17 92 79 136 0 0 0 0 13 1 0 6702
42 104 105 153 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
30 100 94 135 17 92 92 135 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6936
Table C.1: Results of scenario 0 for static implementation
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Demand Data from Simulation Static Implementation
Excessive inventory
Refurbish product Parts’ demand Refurbish product Parts’ demand Outsourced over base stock at Salvaged Net
demand received received demand met met the end of the period Revenue
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
31 102 80 136 17 92 80 136 0 0 0 0 12 1 0 6722
41 120 85 138 17 92 85 137 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 6839
31 112 99 158 17 92 92 137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6975
33 90 103 137 17 90 92 137 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6923
Table C.2: Results of scenario 0 for static implementation (continued)
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Demand Data from Simulation Dynamic Implementation
Excessive inventory
Refurbish product Parts’ demand Refurbish product Parts’ demand Outsourced over base stock at Salvaged Net
demand received received demand met met the end of the period Revenue
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
43 104 93 119 25 79 78 114 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 6803
47 103 92 141 19 89 89 132 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6920
36 117 96 159 17 93 93 138 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6950
27 122 91 145 15 98 91 144 2 0 1 0 5 0 0 6880
30 94 98 145 21 85 85 126 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6890
38 98 89 137 20 87 87 129 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6905
54 89 84 141 21 85 84 126 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6898
48 119 87 132 19 90 87 132 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 6894
30 115 84 139 19 90 84 132 2 0 1 0 4 0 0 6840
43 97 83 153 21 85 83 126 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6878
41 112 83 141 20 87 83 129 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 6854
39 113 89 145 21 85 85 126 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6890
43 99 89 141 20 87 87 129 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6905
34 110 92 159 18 91 91 135 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6935
32 97 91 152 19 89 89 132 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6920
42 112 99 142 18 91 91 135 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6935
30 129 87 156 17 93 87 138 1 0 1 0 5 0 0 6860
40 98 103 145 20 87 87 129 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6905
38 104 83 152 20 87 83 129 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 6854
32 96 82 149 22 83 82 123 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6883
42 105 68 139 29 69 68 102 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 6778
37 114 104 166 17 93 93 138 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6950
35 119 102 146 16 95 95 141 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6965
29 112 95 152 15 97 95 144 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6968
34 112 104 172 14 99 99 147 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6995
42 108 91 131 20 87 87 129 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6905
33 105 82 137 21 85 82 126 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 6859
41 96 87 162 20 87 87 129 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6905
43 124 85 135 21 85 85 126 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6890
43 110 86 147 23 81 81 120 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6860
29 106 102 154 16 95 95 141 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6965
30 96 91 147 19 89 89 132 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6920
35 99 92 137 19 89 89 132 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6920
39 87 93 137 21 85 87 126 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 6875
39 103 84 118 22 83 83 118 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 6800
41 115 86 126 24 79 79 117 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6845
44 117 76 136 22 83 76 123 1 0 1 0 6 0 0 6766
39 111 86 153 24 79 79 117 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6845
32 121 79 135 21 85 79 126 1 0 1 0 5 0 0 6800
29 116 98 168 14 99 98 147 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 7003
30 125 86 160 19 89 86 132 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 6889
39 103 73 146 26 75 73 111 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6803
34 106 85 139 23 83 81 120 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 6840
52 125 79 136 23 81 79 120 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 6848
42 104 105 153 16 95 95 141 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6965
30 100 94 135 18 95 92 135 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 6883
Table C.3: Results of scenario 0 for dynamic implementation
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Demand Data from Simulation Dynamic Implementation
Excessive inventory
Refurbish product Parts’ demand Refurbish product Parts’ demand Outsourced over base stock at Salvaged Net
demand received received demand met met the end of the period Revenue
P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3
31 102 80 136 22 83 80 123 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 6844
41 120 85 138 21 85 85 126 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6890
31 112 99 158 16 95 95 141 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6965
33 90 103 137 21 85 85 126 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 6890
Table C.4: Results of scenario 0 for dynamic implementation (continued)
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Simulation Order Remaining Demands Shadow Price Remaining Inventory Total
Time Type Refr.Prod. P1 P2 P3 Parts Cores Decision Cores P1 P2 P3 Revenue
0.058 P3 38.92 107.79 91.82 145.72 -15 100 NoDisAcc 63 27 23 34 15
0.070 P1 38.91 107.75 91.78 145.66 -20 100 NoDisAcc 63 26 23 34 35
0.085 P3 38.89 107.69 91.74 145.59 -15 100 NoDisAcc 63 26 23 33 50
0.111 Pr 38.86 107.60 91.66 145.46 - 100 Acc 62 26 23 33 150
0.231 P2 38.70 107.17 91.29 144.87 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 62 26 22 33 165
0.347 P1 38.55 106.75 90.94 144.31 -20 100 NoDisAcc 62 25 22 33 185
0.472 P1 38.39 106.30 90.55 143.70 -20 100 HarvAcc 61 26 24 36 205
0.475 P1 38.38 106.29 90.54 143.69 -20 100 NoDisAcc 61 25 24 36 225
0.542 P2 38.30 106.05 90.34 143.36 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 61 25 23 36 240
0.600 P3 38.22 105.84 90.16 143.08 -15 100 NoDisAcc 61 25 23 35 255
0.788 Pr 37.98 105.16 89.58 142.16 - 100 Acc 60 25 23 35 355
0.792 P3 37.97 105.15 89.57 142.15 -15 100 NoDisAcc 60 25 23 34 370
0.796 P2 37.97 105.13 89.56 142.12 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 60 25 22 34 385
0.819 P3 37.94 105.05 89.49 142.01 -15 100 NoDisAcc 60 25 22 33 400
0.895 P1 37.84 104.78 89.26 141.65 -20 100 DisAcc 59 26 24 36 420
1.116 P3 37.55 103.98 88.58 140.57 -15 100 NoDisAcc 59 26 24 35 435
1.161 Pr 37.49 103.82 88.44 140.35 - 100 Acc 58 26 24 35 535
1.182 P1 37.46 103.74 88.38 140.25 -20 100 NoDisAcc 58 25 24 35 555
1.204 P3 37.44 103.67 88.31 140.14 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 25 24 34 570
1.212 P3 37.42 103.64 88.28 140.10 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 25 24 33 585
1.244 P3 37.38 103.52 88.19 139.95 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 25 24 32 600
1.425 P3 37.15 102.87 87.63 139.06 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 25 24 31 615
1.531 P1 37.01 102.49 87.31 138.55 -20 100 NoDisAcc 58 24 24 31 635
1.570 P1 36.96 102.35 87.19 138.36 -20 100 NoDisAcc 58 23 24 31 655
1.772 P3 36.70 101.62 86.57 137.38 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 23 24 30 670
1.825 P3 36.63 101.43 86.40 137.12 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 23 24 29 685
2.310 P3 36.00 99.68 84.92 134.76 -15 100 NoDisAcc 58 23 24 28 700
2.489 Pr 35.77 99.04 84.37 133.89 - 100 Acc 57 23 24 28 800
2.572 P1 35.66 98.74 84.11 133.49 -20 100 NoDisAcc 57 22 24 28 820
2.582 P3 35.64 98.71 84.08 133.44 -15 100 NoDisAcc 57 22 24 27 835
2.693 P1 35.50 98.30 83.74 132.89 -20 100 NoDisAcc 57 21 24 27 855
2.746 P1 35.43 98.11 83.58 132.64 -20 100 NoDisAcc 57 20 24 27 875
2.943 P2 35.17 97.40 82.97 131.68 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 57 20 23 27 890
3.015 Pr 35.08 97.15 82.76 131.33 - 100 Acc 56 20 23 27 990
3.271 P3 34.75 96.23 81.97 130.08 -15 100 NoDisAcc 56 20 23 26 1005
3.279 P2 34.74 96.20 81.95 130.04 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 56 20 22 26 1020
3.427 P1 34.55 95.66 81.49 129.32 -20 100 DisAcc 55 21 24 29 1040
3.598 P3 34.32 95.05 80.97 128.49 -15 100 NoDisAcc 55 21 24 28 1055
3.608 P1 34.31 95.01 80.94 128.44 -20 100 NoDisAcc 55 20 24 28 1075
3.631 P1 34.28 94.93 80.86 128.33 -20 100 NoDisAcc 55 19 24 28 1095
3.656 P1 34.25 94.84 80.79 128.21 -20 100 NoDisAcc 55 18 24 28 1115
3.686 P1 34.21 94.73 80.70 128.06 -20 100 NoDisAcc 55 17 24 28 1135
3.722 P3 34.16 94.60 80.59 127.89 -15 100 NoDisAcc 55 17 24 27 1150
3.764 P1 34.11 94.45 80.46 127.68 -20 100 NoDisAcc 55 16 24 27 1170
Table C.5: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
period
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Simulation Order Remaining Demands Shadow Price Remaining Inventory Total
Time Type Refr.Prod. P1 P2 P3 Parts Cores Decision Cores P1 P2 P3 Revenue
3.768 Pr 34.10 94.43 80.44 127.66 - 100 Acc 54 16 24 27 1270
3.814 P2 34.04 94.27 80.30 127.44 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 54 16 23 27 1285
3.902 P1 33.93 93.95 80.03 127.01 -20 100 NoDisAcc 54 15 23 27 1305
3.912 P1 33.91 93.92 80 126.96 -20 100 NoDisAcc 54 14 23 27 1325
3.960 P1 33.85 93.75 79.86 126.73 -20 100 NoDisAcc 54 13 23 27 1345
4.036 P3 33.75 93.47 79.62 126.36 -15 100 NoDisAcc 54 13 23 26 1360
4.100 P3 33.67 93.24 79.43 126.05 -15 100 NoDisAcc 54 13 23 25 1375
4.125 P3 33.64 93.15 79.35 125.93 -15 100 NoDisAcc 54 13 23 24 1390
4.187 P3 33.56 92.93 79.16 125.62 -15 100 NoDisAcc 54 13 23 23 1405
4.191 P1 33.55 92.91 79.15 125.60 -20 100 NoDisAcc 54 12 23 23 1425
4.202 P3 33.54 92.87 79.11 125.55 -15 100 NoDisAcc 54 12 23 22 1440
4.256 P1 33.47 92.68 78.95 125.29 -20 100 NoDisAcc 54 11 23 22 1460
4.280 P2 33.44 92.59 78.88 125.17 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 54 11 22 22 1475
4.409 P3 33.27 92.13 78.48 124.54 -15 100 DisAcc 53 13 24 24 1490
4.487 P3 33.17 91.85 78.24 124.16 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 13 24 23 1505
4.610 P3 33.01 91.40 77.86 123.56 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 13 24 22 1520
4.708 P3 32.88 91.05 77.56 123.09 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 13 24 21 1535
4.708 P1 32.88 91.05 77.56 123.09 -20 100 NoDisAcc 53 12 24 21 1555
4.733 P3 32.85 90.96 77.48 122.96 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 12 24 20 1570
4.879 P1 32.66 90.43 77.04 122.25 -20 100 NoDisAcc 53 11 24 20 1590
5.000 P1 32.50 90.00 76.67 121.66 -20 100 NoDisAcc 53 10 24 20 1610
5.011 P3 32.49 89.96 76.63 121.61 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 10 24 19 1625
5.049 P2 32.44 89.83 76.52 121.43 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 53 10 23 19 1640
5.088 P3 32.39 89.68 76.40 121.24 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 10 23 18 1655
5.143 P1 32.31 89.49 76.23 120.97 -20 100 NoDisAcc 53 9 23 18 1675
5.184 P3 32.26 89.34 76.10 120.77 -15 100 NoDisAcc 53 9 23 17 1690
5.201 P2 32.24 89.28 76.05 120.69 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 53 9 22 17 1705
5.208 P1 32.23 89.25 76.03 120.65 -20 100 DisAcc 52 10 24 20 1725
5.366 P2 32.03 88.68 75.55 119.89 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 52 10 23 20 1740
5.375 P1 32.01 88.65 75.52 119.84 -20 100 NoDisAcc 52 9 23 20 1760
5.500 P3 31.85 88.20 75.13 119.23 -15 100 NoDisAcc 52 9 23 19 1775
5.655 Pr 31.65 87.64 74.66 118.48 - 100 Acc 51 9 23 19 1875
5.847 P3 31.40 86.95 74.07 117.54 -15 100 NoDisAcc 51 9 23 18 1890
5.861 P3 31.38 86.90 74.03 117.48 -15 100 NoDisAcc 51 9 23 17 1905
5.944 P1 31.27 86.60 73.77 117.07 -20 100 NoDisAcc 51 8 23 17 1925
5.954 P1 31.26 86.57 73.74 117.03 -20 100 NoDisAcc 51 7 23 17 1945
5.984 P3 31.22 86.46 73.65 116.88 -15 100 NoDisAcc 51 7 23 16 1960
6.123 P2 31.04 85.96 73.22 116.20 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 51 7 22 16 1975
6.237 P1 30.89 85.55 72.87 115.65 -20 100 DisAcc 50 8 24 19 1995
6.250 P3 30.87 85.50 72.83 115.58 -15 100 NoDisAcc 50 8 24 18 2010
6.283 P2 30.83 85.38 72.73 115.42 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 50 8 23 18 2025
6.517 P3 30.53 84.54 72.01 114.28 -15 100 NoDisAcc 50 8 23 17 2040
6.573 P3 30.46 84.34 71.84 114.01 -15 100 NoDisAcc 50 8 23 16 2055
6.787 P2 30.18 83.57 71.19 112.97 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 50 8 22 16 2070
Table C.6: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
period (continued)
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Simulation Order Remaining Demands Shadow Price Remaining Inventory Total
Time Type Refr.Prod. P1 P2 P3 Parts Cores Decision Cores P1 P2 P3 Revenue
6.834 P3 30.12 83.40 71.04 112.74 -15 100 DisAcc 49 10 24 18 2085
6.888 P1 30.05 83.27 70.88 112.48 -20 100 NoDisAcc 49 9 24 18 2105
7.035 P3 29.85 82.67 70.43 111.76 -15 100 NoDisAcc 49 9 24 17 2120
7.049 P3 29.84 82.62 70.38 111.69 -15 100 NoDisAcc 49 9 24 16 2135
7.057 P3 29.83 82.59 70.36 111.65 -15 100 NoDisAcc 49 9 24 15 2150
7.179 P2 29.67 82.16 69.99 111.07 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 49 9 23 15 2165
7.219 P2 29.62 82.01 69.86 110.87 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 49 9 22 15 2180
7.263 P3 29.56 81.86 69.73 110.66 -15 100 DisAcc 48 11 24 17 2195
7.278 P2 29.54 81.80 69.68 110.58 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 48 11 23 17 2210
7.450 P1 29.32 81.18 69.15 109.74 -20 100 NoDisAcc 48 10 23 17 2230
7.517 P1 29.23 80.94 68.95 109.42 -20 100 NoDisAcc 48 9 23 17 2250
7.523 P2 29.22 80.92 68.93 109.39 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 48 9 22 17 2265
7.527 P2 29.22 80.90 68.92 109.37 -7.5 100 DisAcc 47 11 23 20 2280
7.567 P2 29.16 80.76 68.80 109.17 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 47 11 22 20 2295
7.623 Pr 29.09 80.56 68.62 108.90 - 100 Acc 46 11 22 20 2395
7.769 P1 28.90 80.03 68.17 108.19 -20 100 DisAcc 45 12 24 23 2415
7.821 P1 28.83 79.84 68.02 107.94 -20 100 NoDisAcc 45 11 24 23 2435
7.849 P2 28.80 79.74 67.93 107.80 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 45 11 23 23 2450
7.992 P2 28.61 79.23 67.49 107.11 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 45 11 22 23 2465
8.040 P2 28.55 79.06 67.34 106.87 -7.5 100 DisAcc 44 13 23 26 2480
8.054 Pr 28.53 79.00 67.30 106.80 - 100 Acc 43 13 23 26 2580
8.186 P3 28.36 78.53 66.90 106.16 -15 100 NoDisAcc 43 13 23 25 2595
8.234 P1 28.30 78.36 66.75 105.93 -20 100 NoDisAcc 43 12 23 25 2615
8.286 P1 28.23 78.17 66.59 105.68 -20 100 NoDisAcc 43 11 23 25 2635
8.291 P2 28.22 78.15 66.57 105.65 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 43 11 22 25 2650
8.318 P3 28.19 78.05 66.49 105.52 -15 100 DisAcc 42 13 24 27 2665
8.397 P3 28.08 77.77 66.25 105.13 -15 100 NoDisAcc 42 13 24 26 2680
8.431 P3 28.04 77.65 66.15 104.97 -15 100 NoDisAcc 42 13 24 25 2695
8.446 P1 28.02 77.59 66.10 104.90 -20 100 NoDisAcc 42 12 24 25 2715
8.449 P3 28.02 77.58 66.09 104.88 -15 100 NoDisAcc 42 12 24 24 2730
8.480 P2 27.98 77.47 66.00 104.73 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 42 12 23 24 2745
8.649 P1 27.76 76.86 65.48 103.91 -20 100 NoDisAcc 42 11 23 24 2765
8.933 P1 27.39 75.84 64.61 102.53 -20 100 NoDisAcc 42 10 23 24 2785
8.950 P2 27.37 75.78 64.55 102.44 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 42 10 22 24 2800
9.032 P2 27.26 75.49 64.30 102.05 -7.5 100 DisAcc 41 12 23 27 2815
9.055 P1 27.23 75.40 64.23 101.93 -20 100 NoDisAcc 41 11 23 27 2835
9.174 P3 27.07 74.97 63.87 101.35 -15 100 NoDisAcc 41 11 23 26 2850
9.251 P2 26.97 74.70 63.63 100.98 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 41 11 22 26 2865
9.279 P3 26.94 74.60 63.54 100.84 -15 100 DisAcc 40 13 24 28 2880
9.387 P3 26.80 74.21 63.22 100.32 -15 100 NoDisAcc 40 13 24 27 2895
9.516 P1 26.63 73.74 62.82 99.69 -20 100 NoDisAcc 40 12 24 27 2915
9.527 P2 26.62 73.70 62.79 99.64 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 40 12 23 27 2930
9.618 P3 26.50 73.38 62.51 99.19 -15 100 NoDisAcc 40 12 23 26 2945
9.653 P3 26.45 73.25 62.40 99.02 -15 100 NoDisAcc 40 12 23 25 2960
Table C.7: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
period (continued)
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Simulation Order Remaining Demands Shadow Price Remaining Inventory Total
Time Type Refr.Prod. P1 P2 P3 Parts Cores Decision Cores P1 P2 P3 Revenue
9.654 P1 26.45 73.25 62.40 99.02 -20 100 NoDisAcc 40 11 23 25 2980
9.835 P3 26.22 72.59 61.84 99.14 -15 100 NoDisAcc 40 11 23 24 2995
9.861 P1 26.18 72.50 61.76 99.01 -20 100 NoDisAcc 40 10 23 24 3015
10.009 P2 25.99 71.97 61.31 97.29 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 40 10 22 24 3030
10.126 P3 25.84 71.55 60.95 96.72 -15 100 DisAcc 39 12 24 26 3045
10.210 P2 25.73 71.24 60.69 96.31 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 39 12 23 26 3060
10.347 P1 25.55 70.75 60.27 95.64 -20 100 NoDisAcc 39 11 23 26 3080
10.404 P2 25.48 70.55 60.09 95.37 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 39 11 22 26 3095
10.504 P1 25.35 70.19 59.79 94.88 -20 100 DisAcc 38 12 24 29 3115
10.554 P1 25.28 70.00 59.63 94.64 -20 100 NoDisAcc 38 11 24 29 3135
10.628 P3 25.18 69.74 59.41 94.28 -15 100 NoDisAcc 38 11 24 28 3150
10.641 P3 25.17 69.69 59.37 94.21 -15 100 NoDisAcc 38 11 24 27 3165
10.731 P2 25.05 69.37 59.09 93.78 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 38 11 23 27 3180
10.740 P1 25.04 69.34 59.06 93.73 -20 100 NoDisAcc 38 10 23 27 3200
10.836 P2 24.91 68.99 58.77 93.27 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 38 10 22 27 3215
10.958 P1 24.76 68.55 58.40 92.67 -20 100 DisAcc 37 11 24 30 3235
11.041 P2 24.65 68.25 58.14 92.27 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 37 11 23 30 3250
11.066 P3 24.61 68.16 58.07 92.15 -15 100 NoDisAcc 37 11 23 29 3265
11.080 P3 24.60 68.11 58.02 92.08 -15 100 NoDisAcc 37 11 23 28 3280
11.458 P1 24.11 66.75 56.86 90.24 -20 100 NoDisAcc 37 10 23 28 3300
11.553 P1 23.98 66.41 56.57 89.78 -20 100 NoDisAcc 37 9 23 28 3320
11.576 P2 23.95 66.33 56.50 89.66 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 37 9 22 28 3335
11.598 P3 23.92 66.25 56.43 89.56 -15 100 DisAcc 36 11 24 30 3350
11.628 P2 23.88 66.14 56.34 89.41 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 36 11 23 30 3365
11.679 P2 23.82 65.96 56.18 89.16 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 36 11 22 30 3380
11.685 P1 23.81 65.94 56.17 89.13 -20 100 DisAcc 35 12 24 33 3400
11.744 P2 23.73 65.72 55.98 88.85 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 35 12 23 33 3415
11.861 P3 23.58 65.30 55.63 88.27 -15 100 NoDisAcc 35 12 23 32 3430
12.001 P3 23.40 64.80 55.20 87.60 -15 100 NoDisAcc 35 12 23 31 3445
12.058 P2 23.33 64.59 55.02 87.32 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 35 12 22 31 3460
12.237 P2 23.09 63.95 54.48 86.45 -7.5 100 DisAcc 34 14 23 34 3475
12.238 P1 23.09 63.94 54.47 86.44 -20 100 NoDisAcc 34 13 23 34 3495
12.367 P3 22.92 63.48 54.07 85.81 -15 100 NoDisAcc 34 13 23 33 3510
12.486 P3 22.77 63.05 53.71 85.24 -15 100 NoDisAcc 34 13 23 32 3525
12.528 P2 22.71 62.90 53.58 85.03 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 34 13 22 32 3540
12.554 P1 22.68 62.80 53.50 84.90 -20 100 DisAcc 33 14 24 35 3560
12.670 P1 22.53 62.39 53.15 84.34 -20 100 NoDisAcc 33 13 24 35 3580
12.812 P2 22.34 61.88 52.71 83.65 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 33 13 23 35 3595
12.815 P1 22.34 61.87 52.70 83.64 -20 100 NoDisAcc 33 12 23 35 3615
12.880 P2 22.26 61.63 52.50 83.32 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 33 12 22 35 3630
12.909 Pr 22.22 61.53 52.41 83.18 - 100 Acc 32 12 22 35 3730
12.918 P2 22.21 61.50 52.39 83.13 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 32 12 21 35 3745
12.990 P3 22.11 61.24 52.17 82.78 -15 100 NoDisAcc 32 12 21 34 3760
13.004 P3 22.10 61.19 52.12 82.71 -15 100 DisAcc 31 14 23 36 3775
Table C.8: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
period (continued)
140
Simulation Order Remaining Demands Shadow Price Remaining Inventory Total
Time Type Refr.Prod. P1 P2 P3 Parts Cores Decision Cores P1 P2 P3 Revenue
13.054 P3 22.03 61.01 51.97 82.47 -15 100 NoDisAcc 31 14 23 35 3790
13.105 P3 21.96 60.82 51.81 82.22 -15 100 NoDisAcc 31 14 23 34 3805
13.120 P1 21.94 60.77 51.77 82.15 -20 100 NoDisAcc 31 13 23 34 3825
13.162 P3 21.89 60.62 51.64 81.94 -15 100 NoDisAcc 31 13 23 33 3840
13.384 P3 21.60 59.82 50.96 80.87 -15 100 NoDisAcc 31 13 23 32 3855
13.420 Pr 21.55 59.69 50.84 80.69 - 100 Acc 30 13 23 32 3955
13.425 P1 21.55 59.67 50.83 80.66 -20 100 NoDisAcc 30 12 23 32 3975
13.481 Pr 21.48 59.47 50.66 80.39 - 100 Acc 29 12 23 32 4075
13.603 P1 21.32 59.03 50.28 79.80 -20 100 NoDisAcc 29 11 23 32 4095
13.749 Pr 21.13 58.50 49.84 79.09 - 100 Acc 28 11 23 32 4195
13.760 P3 21.11 58.47 49.80 79.04 -15 100 NoDisAcc 28 11 23 31 4210
13.794 P3 21.07 58.34 49.70 78.87 -15 100 NoDisAcc 28 11 23 30 4225
14.032 P1 20.76 57.49 48.97 77.71 -20 100 NoDisAcc 28 10 23 30 4245
14.076 P3 20.70 57.33 48.84 77.50 -15 100 NoDisAcc 28 10 23 29 4260
14.272 P1 20.45 56.62 48.23 76.55 -20 100 NoDisAcc 28 9 23 29 4280
14.298 P1 20.41 56.53 48.15 76.42 -20 100 NoDisAcc 28 8 23 29 4300
14.361 P2 20.33 56.30 47.96 76.11 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 28 8 22 29 4315
14.417 P3 20.26 56.10 47.79 75.84 -15 100 DisAcc 27 10 24 31 4330
14.471 P2 20.19 55.91 47.62 75.58 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 27 10 23 31 4345
14.477 P2 20.18 55.88 47.61 75.55 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 27 10 22 31 4360
14.520 P2 20.13 55.73 47.47 75.34 -7.5 100 DisAcc 26 12 23 34 4375
14.579 P1 20.05 55.52 47.29 75.05 -20 100 NoDisAcc 26 11 23 34 4395
14.656 P3 19.95 55.24 47.06 74.67 -15 100 NoDisAcc 26 11 23 33 4410
14.669 P2 19.93 55.19 47.02 74.61 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 26 11 22 33 4425
14.697 P2 19.89 55.09 46.93 74.48 -7.5 100 DisAcc 25 13 23 36 4440
14.697 P3 19.89 55.09 46.93 74.47 -15 100 NoDisAcc 25 13 23 35 4455
14.810 P2 19.75 54.69 46.58 73.93 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 25 13 22 35 4470
14.825 P2 19.73 54.63 46.54 73.85 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 25 13 21 35 4485
14.865 P3 19.68 54.49 46.41 73.66 -15 100 NoDisAcc 25 13 21 34 4500
14.881 P3 19.66 54.43 46.37 73.58 -15 100 DisAcc 24 15 23 36 4515
14.939 P2 19.58 54.22 46.19 73.30 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 24 15 22 36 4530
14.969 P3 19.54 54.11 46.10 73.15 -15 100 NoDisAcc 24 15 22 35 4545
15.026 P1 19.47 53.91 45.92 72.87 -20 100 NoDisAcc 24 14 22 35 4565
15.133 P2 19.33 53.52 45.59 72.35 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 24 14 21 35 4580
15.283 P3 19.13 52.98 45.13 71.62 -15 100 NoDisAcc 24 14 21 34 4595
15.367 P3 19.02 52.68 44.88 71.22 -15 100 DisAcc 23 16 23 36 4610
15.387 P1 19.00 52.61 44.81 71.12 -20 100 NoDisAcc 23 15 23 36 4630
15.412 P1 18.96 52.52 44.74 70.99 -20 100 NoDisAcc 23 14 23 36 4650
15.507 P3 18.84 52.18 44.45 70.53 -15 100 NoDisAcc 23 14 23 35 4665
15.599 P2 18.72 51.85 44.17 70.09 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 23 14 22 35 4680
15.604 P1 18.72 51.83 44.15 70.06 -20 100 NoDisAcc 23 13 22 35 4700
15.887 P3 18.35 50.81 43.28 68.68 -15 100 NoDisAcc 23 13 22 34 4715
15.906 P2 18.32 50.74 43.22 68.59 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 23 13 21 34 4730
16.032 P2 18.16 50.29 42.84 67.98 -7.5 100 DisAcc 22 15 22 37 4745
Table C.9: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
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16.032 P3 18.16 50.29 42.84 67.98 -15 100 NoDisAcc 22 15 22 36 4760
16.066 P3 18.11 50.16 42.73 67.81 -15 100 NoDisAcc 22 15 22 35 4775
16.135 P2 18.02 49.91 42.52 67.48 -7.5 100 NoDisAcc 22 15 21 35 4790
16.137 Pr 18.02 49.91 42.51 67.47 - 115 Rej 22 15 21 35 4790
16.221 P2 17.91 49.61 42.26 67.06 -15 115 NoDisAcc 22 15 20 35 4805
16.297 P3 17.81 49.33 42.02 66.69 -15 115 NoDisAcc 22 15 20 34 4820
16.521 P3 17.52 48.53 41.34 65.60 -15 115 NoDisAcc 22 15 20 33 4835
16.533 P2 17.51 48.48 41.30 65.54 -15 115 DisAcc 21 17 21 36 4850
16.592 P1 17.43 48.27 41.12 65.25 -20 115 NoDisAcc 21 16 21 36 4870
16.593 P3 17.43 48.27 41.12 65.25 -15 115 NoDisAcc 21 16 21 35 4885
16.637 P1 17.37 48.11 40.98 65.03 -20 115 NoDisAcc 21 15 21 35 4905
16.671 P2 17.33 47.98 40.88 64.87 -15 115 NoDisAcc 21 15 20 35 4920
16.678 P1 17.32 47.96 40.85 64.83 -20 115 NoDisAcc 21 14 20 35 4940
16.892 P2 17.04 47.19 40.20 63.79 -15 115 NoDisAcc 21 14 19 35 4955
16.917 P3 17.01 47.10 40.12 63.67 -15 115 NoDisAcc 21 14 19 34 4970
17.022 P2 16.87 46.72 39.80 63.16 -15 115 NoDisAcc 21 14 18 34 4985
17.033 P1 16.86 46.68 39.77 63.11 -20 115 NoDisAcc 21 13 18 34 5005
17.180 P1 16.67 46.15 39.32 62.39 -20 115 NoDisAcc 21 12 18 34 5025
17.198 P1 16.64 46.09 39.26 62.30 -20 115 NoDisAcc 21 11 18 34 5045
17.400 P3 16.38 45.36 38.64 61.32 -15 115 NoDisAcc 21 11 18 33 5060
17.480 P2 16.28 45.07 38.40 60.93 -15 115 DisAcc 20 13 19 36 5075
17.523 P1 16.22 44.92 38.26 60.72 -20 115 NoDisAcc 20 12 19 36 5095
17.592 P2 16.13 44.67 38.05 60.39 -15 115 NoDisAcc 20 12 18 36 5110
17.681 P1 16.02 44.35 37.78 59.95 -20 100 NoDisAcc 20 11 18 36 5130
17.771 P3 15.90 44.03 37.50 59.52 -10 100 NoDisAcc 20 11 18 35 5145
17.819 P3 15.84 43.85 37.36 59.28 -15 115 NoDisAcc 20 11 18 34 5160
17.869 P3 15.77 43.67 37.20 59.04 -15 115 NoDisAcc 20 11 18 33 5175
17.995 P1 15.61 43.22 36.82 58.43 -20 115 DisAcc 19 12 20 36 5195
18.054 P1 15.53 43.00 36.63 58.14 -20 115 NoDisAcc 19 11 20 36 5215
18.262 Pr 15.26 42.26 36.00 57.12 - 115 Rej 19 11 20 36 5215
18.269 Pr 15.25 42.23 35.98 57.09 - 115 Rej 19 11 20 36 5215
18.315 P1 15.19 42.07 35.83 56.87 -20 100 NoDisAcc 19 10 20 36 5235
18.368 P1 15.12 41.88 35.67 56.61 -20 100 NoDisAcc 19 9 20 36 5255
18.506 P2 14.94 41.38 35.25 55.94 -15 100 NoDisAcc 19 9 19 36 5270
18.515 P1 14.93 41.35 35.22 55.89 -20 100 NoDisAcc 19 8 19 36 5290
18.686 P2 14.71 40.73 34.70 55.06 -15 100 NoDisAcc 19 8 18 36 5305
18.721 P2 14.66 40.60 34.59 54.89 -15 100 NoDisAcc 19 8 17 36 5320
18.849 P3 14.50 40.14 34.20 54.27 -10 100 NoDisAcc 19 8 17 35 5335
18.972 Pr 14.34 39.70 33.82 53.67 - 100 Acc 18 8 17 35 5435
19.048 P3 14.24 39.43 33.59 53.30 -15 115 NoDisAcc 18 8 17 34 5450
19.101 P1 14.17 39.24 33.42 53.04 -20 115 NoDisAcc 18 7 17 34 5470
19.169 P1 14.08 38.99 33.22 52.71 -20 115 NoDisAcc 18 6 17 34 5490
19.177 P1 14.07 38.96 33.19 52.67 -20 115 NoDisAcc 18 5 17 34 5510
19.196 P1 14.05 38.89 33.13 52.58 -20 115 NoDisAcc 18 4 17 34 5530
Table C.10: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
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19.203 P3 14.04 38.87 33.11 52.55 -15 115 NoDisAcc 18 4 17 33 5545
19.238 P2 13.99 38.75 33.01 52.38 -15 115 DisAcc 17 6 18 36 5560
19.242 P3 13.99 38.73 32.99 52.36 -15 115 NoDisAcc 17 6 18 35 5575
19.499 P3 13.65 37.80 32.20 51.10 -15 115 NoDisAcc 17 6 18 34 5590
19.504 P2 13.65 37.79 32.19 51.08 -15 115 NoDisAcc 17 6 17 34 5605
19.541 P3 13.60 37.65 32.07 50.90 -15 115 NoDisAcc 17 6 17 33 5620
19.618 P2 13.50 37.37 31.84 50.52 -15 115 DisAcc 16 8 18 36 5635
19.620 P1 13.49 37.37 31.83 50.51 -20 115 NoDisAcc 16 7 18 36 5655
19.646 P3 13.46 37.28 31.75 50.39 -15 115 NoDisAcc 16 7 18 35 5670
19.676 P1 13.42 37.17 31.66 50.25 -20 115 NoDisAcc 16 6 18 35 5690
19.731 P3 13.35 36.97 31.49 49.98 -15 115 NoDisAcc 16 6 18 34 5705
19.755 P3 13.32 36.88 31.42 49.86 -15 115 NoDisAcc 16 6 18 33 5720
20.003 P1 13.00 35.99 30.66 48.65 -20 115 DisAcc 15 7 20 36 5740
20.065 P1 12.92 35.77 30.47 48.35 -20 115 NoDisAcc 15 6 20 36 5760
20.103 P3 12.87 35.63 30.35 48.17 -15 115 NoDisAcc 15 6 20 35 5775
20.223 P3 12.71 35.20 29.98 47.58 -15 115 NoDisAcc 15 6 20 34 5790
20.252 P1 12.67 35.09 29.90 47.44 -20 115 NoDisAcc 15 5 20 34 5810
20.325 P3 12.58 34.83 29.67 47.08 -15 115 NoDisAcc 15 5 20 33 5825
20.355 P1 12.54 34.72 29.58 46.94 -20 115 DisAcc 14 6 22 36 5845
20.407 P3 12.47 34.54 29.42 46.69 -15 115 NoDisAcc 14 6 22 35 5860
20.410 P3 12.47 34.53 29.41 46.67 -15 115 NoDisAcc 14 6 22 34 5875
20.739 P1 12.04 33.34 28.40 45.07 -20 115 NoDisAcc 14 5 22 34 5895
20.904 P3 11.83 32.75 27.90 44.27 -15 115 NoDisAcc 14 5 22 33 5910
20.923 P2 11.80 32.68 27.84 44.18 -15 115 NoDisAcc 14 5 21 33 5925
21.033 P2 11.66 32.28 27.50 43.64 -15 115 DisAcc 13 7 22 36 5940
21.158 P3 11.50 31.83 27.12 43.03 -15 115 NoDisAcc 13 7 22 35 5955
21.179 P3 11.47 31.76 27.05 42.93 -15 115 NoDisAcc 13 7 22 34 5970
21.204 P3 11.44 31.67 26.98 42.81 -15 115 NoDisAcc 13 7 22 33 5985
21.209 P2 11.43 31.65 26.96 42.78 -15 115 NoDisAcc 13 7 21 33 6000
21.342 P3 11.26 31.17 26.55 42.14 -15 115 DisAcc 12 9 23 35 6015
21.526 P3 11.02 30.51 25.99 41.24 -15 115 NoDisAcc 12 9 23 34 6030
21.612 P1 10.90 30.20 25.72 40.82 -20 115 NoDisAcc 12 8 23 34 6050
21.659 Pr 10.84 30.03 25.58 40.59 - 115 Rej 12 8 23 34 6050
21.672 P1 10.83 29.98 25.54 40.53 -20 115 NoDisAcc 12 7 23 34 6070
21.819 P1 10.64 29.45 25.09 39.81 -20 115 NoDisAcc 12 6 23 34 6090
21.914 P3 10.51 29.11 24.80 39.35 -15 115 NoDisAcc 12 6 23 33 6105
22.043 P1 10.34 28.65 24.40 38.72 -20 115 NoDisAcc 12 5 23 33 6125
22.187 P1 10.16 28.13 23.96 38.02 -20 100 NoDisAcc 12 4 23 33 6145
22.237 P3 10.09 27.95 23.81 37.78 -15 100 NoDisAcc 12 4 23 32 6160
22.288 P1 10.03 27.76 23.65 37.53 -20 100 NoDisAcc 12 3 23 32 6180
22.364 Pr 9.93 27.49 23.42 37.16 - 100 Acc 11 3 23 32 6280
22.592 P3 9.63 26.67 22.72 36.05 -15 135 NoDisAcc 11 3 23 31 6295
22.645 P3 9.56 26.48 22.56 35.80 -15 135 NoDisAcc 11 3 23 30 6310
22.650 Pr 9.56 26.46 22.54 35.77 - 135 Rej 11 3 23 30 6310
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period (continued)
143
Simulation Order Remaining Demands Shadow Price Remaining Inventory Total
Time Type Refr.Prod. P1 P2 P3 Parts Cores Decision Cores P1 P2 P3 Revenue
22.719 P1 9.47 26.21 22.33 35.43 -30 135 NoDisRej 11 3 23 30 6310
22.774 P2 9.39 26.01 22.16 35.17 -15 135 NoDisAcc 11 3 22 30 6325
22.863 P1 9.28 25.70 21.89 34.74 -30 135 NoDisRej 11 3 22 30 6325
23.030 P2 9.06 25.09 21.37 33.92 -15 135 NoDisAcc 11 3 21 30 6340
23.109 P1 8.96 24.81 21.13 33.54 -30 135 NoDisRej 11 3 21 30 6340
23.130 Pr 8.93 24.73 21.07 33.43 - 135 Rej 11 3 21 30 6340
23.588 P2 8.34 23.09 19.67 31.21 0 105 DisAcc 10 5 22 33 6355
23.709 P1 8.18 22.65 19.29 30.62 -30 135 NoDisRej 10 5 22 33 6355
23.709 P3 8.18 22.65 19.29 30.61 -15 135 NoDisAcc 10 5 22 32 6370
23.792 P3 8.07 22.35 19.04 30.21 -15 135 NoDisAcc 10 5 22 31 6385
23.806 P3 8.05 22.30 19.00 30.14 -15 105 NoDisAcc 10 5 22 30 6400
23.927 P3 7.90 21.86 18.62 29.56 -15 105 NoDisAcc 10 5 22 29 6415
23.948 P3 7.87 21.79 18.56 29.45 -15 105 NoDisAcc 10 5 22 28 6430
23.949 P3 7.87 21.78 18.56 29.45 -15 105 NoDisAcc 10 5 22 27 6445
23.974 Pr 7.83 21.70 18.48 29.33 - 105 Rej 10 5 22 27 6445
24.042 P2 7.75 21.45 18.27 29.00 0 105 NoDisAcc 10 5 21 27 6460
24.051 P3 7.73 21.42 18.25 28.95 -15 135 NoDisAcc 10 5 21 26 6475
24.413 P1 7.26 20.12 17.14 27.19 -30 105 DisRej 9 7 23 29 6475
24.466 P1 7.19 19.92 16.97 26.93 -30 105 NoDisRej 9 7 23 29 6475
24.476 P1 7.18 19.89 16.94 26.88 -30 105 NoDisRej 9 7 23 29 6475
24.536 P3 7.10 19.67 16.76 26.59 -15 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 23 28 6490
24.570 P3 7.06 19.55 16.65 26.43 -15 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 23 27 6505
24.611 P3 7.01 19.40 16.53 26.23 -15 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 23 26 6520
25.003 P1 6.50 17.99 15.32 24.32 -30 105 NoDisRej 9 7 23 26 6520
25.054 P3 6.43 17.81 15.17 24.07 -15 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 23 25 6535
25.129 P1 6.33 17.54 14.94 23.70 -30 105 NoDisRej 9 7 23 25 6535
25.152 P2 6.30 17.46 14.87 23.60 0 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 22 25 6550
25.397 P1 5.98 16.57 14.12 22.40 -30 105 NoDisRej 9 7 22 25 6550
25.464 P1 5.90 16.33 13.91 22.07 -30 105 NoDisRej 9 7 22 25 6550
25.548 P3 5.79 16.03 13.65 21.67 -15 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 22 24 6565
25.997 P2 5.20 14.41 12.28 19.48 0 105 NoDisAcc 9 7 21 24 6580
26.120 P1 5.04 13.97 11.90 18.88 -30 105 DisRej 8 9 23 27 6580
26.191 P3 4.95 13.71 11.68 18.54 -15 105 NoDisAcc 8 9 23 26 6595
26.198 P2 4.94 13.69 11.66 18.50 0 105 NoDisAcc 8 9 22 26 6610
26.200 P2 4.94 13.68 11.65 18.49 0 105 NoDisAcc 8 9 21 26 6625
26.301 P2 4.81 13.32 11.34 18.00 0 105 DisAcc 7 11 22 29 6640
26.396 P3 4.69 12.97 11.05 17.54 -15 105 NoDisAcc 7 11 22 28 6655
26.450 P3 4.61 12.78 10.89 17.28 -15 105 NoDisAcc 7 11 22 27 6670
26.493 P1 4.56 12.63 10.76 17.07 -30 105 NoDisRej 7 11 22 27 6670
26.574 Pr 4.45 12.33 10.51 16.67 - 105 Rej 7 11 22 27 6670
26.636 P1 4.37 12.11 10.32 16.37 -30 105 NoDisRej 7 11 22 27 6670
26.686 P1 4.31 11.93 10.16 16.13 -30 105 NoDisRej 7 11 22 27 6670
26.819 P1 4.14 11.45 9.75 15.48 -30 105 NoDisRej 7 11 22 27 6670
27.021 P2 3.87 10.73 9.14 14.50 0 105 NoDisAcc 7 11 21 27 6685
Table C.12: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
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27.051 P1 3.83 10.62 9.04 14.35 -30 105 DisRej 6 13 23 30 6685
27.085 P3 3.79 10.50 8.94 14.19 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 29 6700
27.116 P3 3.75 10.38 8.85 14.04 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 28 6715
27.473 P1 3.29 9.10 7.75 12.30 -30 105 NoDisRej 6 13 23 28 6715
27.595 Pr 3.13 8.66 7.38 11.71 - 105 Rej 6 13 23 28 6715
27.668 Pr 3.03 8.39 7.15 11.35 - 105 Rej 6 13 23 28 6715
27.690 P1 3.00 8.32 7.08 11.24 -30 105 NoDisRej 6 13 23 28 6715
27.718 P1 2.97 8.22 7.00 11.11 -30 105 NoDisRej 6 13 23 28 6715
27.756 P3 2.92 8.08 6.88 10.92 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 27 6730
27.927 P3 2.70 7.46 6.36 10.09 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 26 6745
28.181 P3 2.37 6.55 5.58 8.85 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 25 6760
28.184 P3 2.36 6.54 5.57 8.84 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 24 6775
28.194 P3 2.35 6.50 5.54 8.79 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 23 6790
28.232 P3 2.30 6.36 5.42 8.60 -15 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 23 22 6805
28.586 P2 1.84 5.09 4.34 6.88 0 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 22 22 6820
28.666 P2 1.74 4.80 4.09 6.49 0 105 NoDisAcc 6 13 21 22 6835
28.745 P2 1.63 4.52 3.85 6.11 0 105 DisAcc 5 15 22 25 6850
28.854 P3 1.49 4.13 3.52 5.58 -15 105 NoDisAcc 5 15 22 24 6865
28.953 Pr 1.36 3.77 3.21 5.10 - 105 Rej 5 15 22 24 6865
28.958 P1 1.36 3.75 3.20 5.07 -30 105 NoDisRej 5 15 22 24 6865
29.066 P3 1.21 3.36 2.86 4.55 -15 105 NoDisAcc 5 15 22 23 6880
29.113 P2 1.15 3.19 2.72 4.32 0 105 NoDisAcc 5 15 21 23 6895
29.114 P2 1.15 3.19 2.72 4.31 0 105 DisAcc 4 17 22 26 6910
29.250 P3 0.98 2.70 2.30 3.65 -15 105 NoDisAcc 4 17 22 25 6925
29.290 P1 0.92 2.56 2.18 3.46 -30 105 NoDisRej 4 17 22 25 6925
29.323 P2 0.88 2.44 2.08 3.29 0 105 NoDisAcc 4 17 21 25 6940
29.405 P3 0.77 2.14 1.83 2.90 -15 105 DisAcc 3 19 23 27 6955
29.435 P3 0.73 2.03 1.73 2.75 -15 105 NoDisAcc 3 19 23 26 6970
29.542 P1 0.60 1.65 1.40 2.23 -30 127.5 NoDisRej 3 19 23 26 6970
29.606 P1 0.51 1.42 1.21 1.92 -30 127.5 NoDisRej 3 19 23 26 6970
29.626 P3 0.49 1.35 1.15 1.82 -22.5 127.5 NoDisRej 3 19 23 26 6970
29.768 Pr 0.30 0.84 0.71 1.13 - 127.5 Rej 3 19 23 26 6970
29.937 P2 0.08 0.23 0.19 0.31 0 127.5 NoDisAcc 3 19 22 26 6985
Table C.13: Disposition decisions under dynamic implementation for one simulation
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